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ABSTRACT 
THE NECESSITY OF PRODUCING EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION PRPGRAMS 
NATIONALLY IN ORDER TO PRESERVE THE NATIONAL CULTURE 
IN THE ARAB STATES: CASE STUDY OF THE STATE OF KUWAIT 
FEBRUARY 1991 
RASHID A. AL-WALAYTI 
B.A., KUWAIT UNIVERSITY 
M.A., JOHNSON STATE COLLEGE 
ED.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: Professor Robert J. Miltz 
This study deals with the phenomenon of dependency on 
imported western television programs in the Arab states. 
The primary concern of this study is that the Arab culture 
is under siege by western culture through the massive 
importation of western television programs. This influx has 
jeopardize the continuity of the indigenous national Arab 
culture since the content of most of the imported materials 
has no connection with the authentic culture, which needs 
help in its promotion and enhancement. 
The aim of this study is to search for the reasons 
that cause the Arab governments to depend heavily on 
imported western programs rather than the nationally 
produced programs. This study concludes with some 
suggestions to promote the production and airing of Arab 
• • 
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nationally produced programs which could provide a solution 
or alternatives to the issue, or at least reduce its impact 
in order to preserve and promote the national Arab culture. 
The study examines and analyzes the experiment of the 
Arabian Gulf States Joint Production Programs Institute 
(AGJPPI) as the first professional and successful Arab 
educational television production and seeks the secret 
behind its success. The state of Kuwait is selected as a 
case study for the research, and presents Kuwait television 
as a model of Arab television systems. 
vm 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is a descriptive and critical analysis of 
the phenomenon of the broadcast of Western television 
programs by state controlled television systems within the 
Arab states. A case study of Kuwait television is presented 
and compared related state television in other Arab states. 
A review of literature indicates that state television in 
the Arab states is not reflecting the indigenous life and 
national culture. Therefore, state television became a tool 
of destruction, undermining the national culture by 
depending on Western programs broadcast on a daily basis. 
The review of the literature also indicates that studies of 
this phenomenon are lacking. Such a study should contribute 
to knowledge about the potential impact of alternative 
national programs and national production, which would serve 
to preserve and promote the culture and heritage of the Arab 
peoples. 
The goal of this research is to develop hypotheses and 
suggested alternatives for appropriate and effective methods 
by which nationally produced educational programs within 
state television may be developed and implemented. Such 
programs would serve the national culture as a viable and 
preferable alternative to importing Western programs. 
1 
2 
Statement of Problem 
The state of Kuwait, as well as the rest of the Arab 
world, depends very heavily on massive imports of western 
television programs to fill its broadcast time. This 
practice has had a pervasive negative effect on the Islamic 
Arab national culture. A central factor in relation to this 
matter is that all television systems in the Arab states - 
with few exceptions- are governmental televisions and run 
very tightly either directly or indirectly by the state 
governments. 
Current figures show that Arab states import from 40% 
to 60% of their broadcast programs, an average of 50%, and 
in some Arab states the percentage goes higher, to 80%. The 
alarm increases when we review the types of programs that 
are imported. Statistics show that entertainment programs 
were the predominant types of programs imported—whereas 
educational programs were broadcast for the least number of 
hours. The danger the entertainment programs poses arises 
from the misconception that they may be enjoyed as an 
innocent pastime, are good for diversion in leisure time, 
and that there are no particular intellectual or cultural 
ideas or biases connected with them. In fact, Herbert 
Schiller calls this misconception "the biggest deception in 
history."1 Erik Barnouw, chronicler of American 
broadcasting, puts it this way: "To me, entertainment is a 
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poisonous concept. The idea of entertainment is that it has 
nothing to do with the seriousness of the world, but that it 
fills up an idle hour. Actually, there is an ideology 
implicit in every kind of fictional story. Fiction may be 
far more important than non-fiction in forming people's 
opinions."2 
The considerable import of western programs originally 
designed for peoples of western cultures is threatening to 
break down, if not destroy, Arab people's indigenous culture 
and to disrupt the cultural continuity of Arabs' heritage. 
Regardless of the programs' content or original cultural 
focus, these programs present ludicrously distorted models 
of western cultural values as distinct alternatives to those 
of the national culture. 
There have been many exhortations in recent years 
among concerned thinkers within the Arab world pleading for 
"cultural security" to counter the massive waves of 
westernization through the importation of western television 
programs and to prevent further cultural invasion. Arabic 
researchers are arguing that importing western television 
programs is an opening of the back door for the importation 
of western values? they call it "imported civilization" 
inasmuch as people in the Arab world are beginning to feel 
alien in their own culture. This situation is causing a 
dual cultural society, since the values of an alien culture 
(depicted, moreover, in an unreal, distorted, and 
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exaggerated way for "entertainment" and commercial purposes) 
are being mindlessly superimposed on the original one 
without realistic examination or intelligent criticism. The 
danger is that people can start to devalue and forget their 
own national language, art, and cultural mores under the 
ubiquitous influence of an alien culture as presented to the 
masses via the television medium. Samir Amin, one of the 
Arab scholars, noted that "Currently, cultures are 
vanishing, not because they are isolated but as a result of 
the double standard in culture. In developing countries, we 
are observing cultural destruction, and the aim is to impose 
a western style model by ridiculous and ironic means."3 
If we assume that an elementary function of the 
television medium is to reflect and represent a society's 
culture, it is obvious that television in the Arab counties 
does not perform that function, certainly not under the 
prevailing heavy load of western programming. Douglas Boyd, 
one of the western scholars who studied television in the 
Arab countries, noted: "There is very little that is 
uniquely Arab in Arab world television."4 It is obvious, 
therefore, that television in the Arab states neither 
reflects the indigenous culture nor plays a major role in 
the process of development, but has simply been functioning 
for the most part as an entertainment medium, political 
tool, and consumptive means for western goods. 
in a meeting between UNESCO and the Arab states 
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Broadcasting Union (ASBU), it was warned that even though it 
might be an advantage to import ready-made educational 
materials due to the availability of well-produced materials 
and saving time and money, should be based on local 
conditions and programs must be relevant to the society's 
problems, concerns, and developmental needs. The meeting 
emphasized the importance of making use of local production 
elements. In 1978, the Arab Educational Technology Center 
requested its member states to submit reports on the extent 
to which they were using educational media materials prior 
to a seminar held in Kuwait about educational technology in 
the Arab countries. All the reports raised the issue of 
educational film production and all countries expressed the 
fact that they lack capabilities in this field, ranging from 
equipment, staff and funds, to creative specialists. The 
reports reflected widespread agreement that imported 
educational films had not been found suitable for 
educational programs. At the end of the conference, the 
member states recommended establishing an Arab institution 
for the production of educational films. 
Teaching and preserving the national culture is a very 
important element in the process of a country's development. 
In its 1973 report, the International Commission for 
Educational Development recommended that people should learn 
how to enact constitutional legislation which can provide 
security against spontaneous imitation in the educational 
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field and against westernization which might be exercised 
under the cover of technical aids. The McBride Commission 
states that media and advertisement should be very attached 
to culture, traditions, and development goals, not attached 
commercial interests.5 
The function of television in the Arab states should 
not be confined to preservation of the national culture but 
should also be to defend it from any kind of distortion. 
The present situation is working to foster interest in 
western civilization at a time when its influence should be 
mitigated. To open the doors widely for western programming 
means to put the national culture and its people at the 
mercy of the giant foreign corporations that produce and 
distribute the material which is aired, programming which 
manipulates people's tastes and thoughts rather than 
fulfills the national government's responsibility toward its 
people. As Herbert Schiller pointed out, "What people see 
and read and hear, what they wear, what they eat, where they 
go, and what they believe they are doing have become 
functions of an informational system that sets tastes and 
values according to its own self-reinforcing market 
criteria."6 
Studies show that there is a contradiction between 
educational strategy and television broadcasting strategy, 
if we assume there is a strategy. Arab educators are 
accusing television of destroying what education builds due 
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to the absence of clear and purposeful broadcasting 
strategy. They are calling for cooperation from the 
television industry, in an effort to halt the present 
tendency to undermine the goals of Arabic education.7 It is 
undeniable that Arab governments do not have a clear 
national strategy for television broadcasting. Because 
imported programs meet neither the goals of national 
development nor with indigenous people's need, minorities in 
the Arab states, especially children and women, are being 
harassed and unsettled by these television programs. Sarnia 
Sadik, the Director of the Egyptian television system, one 
of the leading Arab television systems, admitted that 
Egyptian television has no clear strategy for selecting some 
of its programs which are being broadcast.8 
Programs must be created that give authentic 
expression of the Arab culture and therefore, the television 
system of the Arab states need to play a better role in 
preserving the national culture and contribute to the Arab s 
cultural continuity. 
statement of Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to explore the issue of 
dependence on imported western programming on the part of 
the Arab states' television industry. 
The main question which arises is why television in 
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the Arab states depends so heavily on ready-made western 
imports, despite the fact that these programs have negative 
effects on the national culture and their irrelevance to the 
process of national development. Why not depend on 
nationally produced programs reflecting one's own culture 
and values, as do programs produced in most other parts of 
the world? 
The study intends to examine the obstacles that hinder 
the improvement of the Arab states' national television 
production, both qualitatively and quantitatively. The 
working assumption is that Arab states depend on western 
programming because of deficiencies and insufficiencies in 
Arab television production, problems that exist because of 
the nature of prevailing public policy. 
Through the process of answering the main question, 
the study should answer several other related questions 
arising from the major question, including: 
(1) What negative effects do these imported western 
programs have on the Islamic Arab culture? 
(2) What have Arab governments done to reduce the 
import of western programming? 
(3) What have Arab governments done to improve 
national television production? 
(4) For how long in the future will the Arab states 
depend on imported western programs? 
What have Arab states done to protect the (5) 
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national culture? 
(6) What is the role of private enterprise in Arabic 
television production, what is its relationship with 
government, and what types of problems are they facing which 
hinder improvement in their production? 
Significance of the Study 
The significance of this study is four-fold. It will 
examine: 
(1) How television can play a much better role in 
preserving the national Islamic culture in the Arab states. 
(2) How television can protect the national Islamic 
culture by rejecting alien values reflected in imported 
western programs. 
(3) How Arab television production can be improved 
and be a good alternative for imported programs. 
(4) How the nationally produced programs can in many 
ways accelerate the process of development. 
Finally, after identifying the obstacles which 
presently hinder programs toward self-sufficiency and self- 
interest on the part of Kuwait's national television 
industry, this research study will offer suggestions and 
recommendations for moving toward this goal. The premise of 
the study is that Arab educators should be in the forefront 
in advocating and developing changes in public policy and 
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planning by which the medium of television in the Arab 
states will help to honor and preserve rather than sabotage 
the Islamic culture. 
Methodology 
In order to answer the main question of this research, 
it is very important to know and understand other issues 
that are related to the subject, so the main issue can be 
put in the appropriate context. 
This is a descriptive study and critical analysis. To 
understand the situation in the Arab states, we must 
understand the situation in the world. Taking a panoramic 
and comprehensive look at the global media and culture 
situation and how it functions is essential to understand 
how other countries are affected with respect to this media 
system. Understanding the relationship between North and 
South, developed and developing countries. East and West, is 
significant as a key to understanding and analyzing the 
issue under study. There is a very close relationship 
between the past and present, impossible to separate. To go 
back to the historical roots of the problem is absolutely 
essential in order to understand the present situation. 
Study of the history and development of television 
broadcasting in the Arab states and the circumstances under 
which Arab television has emerged, which to a large extent 
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shaped the present situation, is also essential. Such a 
study will lead us to understand the present circumstances 
surrounding contemporary television broadcasting and how 
that is affecting the function of television in the Arab 
states. 
Since the main purpose of this study is to explore how 
to preserve the Arab states' culture, it is fundamental to 
give an overall description of the Arab Islamic culture and 
how it is being affected by western television. The case 
study focusing on the state of Kuwait will be discussed in 
detail as example of the Arab states in general. A case 
study was used as the methodology for this research. In 
this type of research the case study method is very helpful 
as a general approach to the problem in the whole Arab 
world. The Arab world is vast, comprising more than twenty 
states, and it would be beyond the scope of one dissertation 
to study each one of them in detail. The case study method 
can provide appropriate and ample guidance for comprehensive 
understanding and general review of the situation in the 
Arab world. 
Rationale for Use of the Case Study as a Metho_d 
The primary concern of this study is to examine the 
phenomenon of dependency on imported western programs in the 
Arab states' television. The research method includes 
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discussion along with descriptive analysis. 
A qualitative case study is suggested as a method for 
this research. A case study method is well suited, 
particularly in this kind of research, to study a bounded 
phenomenon. Sharan B. Merriam (1988) noted that case study 
research should be used when certain questions are raised 
about a phenomenon and when a certain end product is 
desired.9 This method is designed to illuminate a general 
problem and to make generalizations—to some degree—to look 
at a situation as a whole. A case study model can be 
developed to represent the phenomenon and also can simplify 
the complexity of the research. 
Case study research and, in particular, qualitative 
case study, is an ideal design for understanding and 
interpreting observations of educational phenomena. 
McMillan and Schumacher (1984) noted that 
The purpose of most descriptive research is limited to 
characterizing something as it is, though some 
descriptive research suggests tentative causal 
relationship. There is no manipulation of treatment or 
subjects; the research takes things as they are. 
Historical research does not deal only with the dead 
past, but also can deal with contemporary events. In this 
research, both past and contemporary events will be 
overlapped. Yin (1984) describes the historical case study 
approach: 
The case study is preferred in examining contemporary 
events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be 
manipulated. Thus, the case study :r!1*fS!12!!J''two f 
the same techniques as a history, but it adds two 
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sources of evidence not usually included in the 
historian's repertoire: direct observation and 
systematic interviewing. Although case studies and 
histories can overlap, the case study's unique strength 
is its ability to deal with a full variety of evidence- 
-documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations.11 
Case studies have the advantage of permitting 
researchers to observe the growth effect, and change in 
depth. Close analysis of a single Arab state may lead to a 
clearer understanding of the situation in the whole Arab 
world and the relationship of variables that affect 
television's function in the Arabs' culture. Yin (1984) 
noted that a case study is a design particularly suited to 
situations where it is impossible to separate the 
phenomenon's variable from their context. 
The goal of this study is to develop hypotheses about 
appropriate and effective methods to reach a level of self- 
sufficiency for national television programs in the Arab 
states. It is hoped that the results of the analysis in 
this case study could be used as suggested guidelines for 
future activities in the service of national culture. It is 
also hoped that an analysis of the case study data will 
contribute to an increased understanding of conditions that 
block the improvement of Arabs' television so it would 
participate in and contribute to the preservation of the 
national culture. 
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Selecting the Case 
Selection of the specific subject of a case study 
needs to be done carefully in order to assure that the 
subject is typical of those we wish to generalize. 
Therefore, Kuwait television was selected as an analysis 
unit for this study. Kuwait television is a good example of 
an Arab television institution for many reasons. 
Kuwait television has a fairly long history of 
broadcasting compared to that of other Arab states. It is 
the oldest television station in the Gulf region. Since 
Kuwait is the first state in the Arabian peninsula to have 
its own television system, Kuwait television played an 
important role in the development of television broadcasting 
in the area, and obviously paved the way for other Gulf 
states to follow suit. The wealth of the government, 
because of the oil revenue, afforded the government the 
opportunity to expand the television system technically to 
the ultimate, developing a modern broadcasting system. 
Thus, Kuwait has the highest average number of television 
receivers in the Arab states per capita and the second in 
the world after the U.S. : 400 sets for each 1,000 people. 
One of the unique aspects of Kuwait is that the number of 
television sets are more than the number of radio sets in 
the state unlike any other country in the world. From a 
technical point of view, Kuwait television is well Known for 
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its powerful transmission signals, which cover a vast area 
both in the Arabian peninsula and the Gulf area to Iraq and 
Iran. 
Moreover, Kuwait television is considered a leading 
production center especially for the Gulf region. Its 
production is distributed and viewed in many Arab states and 
all Gulf states in particular. Kuwait is the headquarters 
of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production 
Institution (AGJPPI), which originated the first successful 
educational series of the Arabic version of the American 
program "Sesame Street" and other successful educational and 
documentary productions. 
With respect to the issue of cultural invasion 
perspectives, there is no doubt that Kuwait is falling prey 
to cultural domination and is a target in this matter. 
Kuwait is one of the Arab states which has a special channel 
to serve the non-Arab community broadcast in English called 
the foreign channel, filled heavily with imported foreign 
programs, shows, serials, and films which are usually from 
the U.S. A whole separate channel to serve the "non-Arab 
community" is a good justification for allowing more 
imported foreign programs to be broadcast by the state. 
As a matter of fact, Kuwait and other petro-dollar 
Gulf states are more vulnerable to this type of invasion 
than other less wealthy Arab states, due to the availability 
of television and VCRs among the people and the financial 
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capability of the wealthy governments to purchase foreign 
programs. Kuwait television also overlaps with other Arab 
television systems through formal regional and national Arab 
treaties. 
The case study chapter will cover a general view of 
Kuwait as a state, television broadcasting history and its 
development to the present, the structure of the broadcast 
system, policies and strategies of broadcasting, and types 
of programs that are being broadcast. It is in this chapter 
that the main purpose of this study, the issue of dependence 
on western programs and the obstacles that hinder and deter 
national production, will be discussed. From the overall 
analysis, this study should provide some solutions, 
suggestions, and recommendations that would help to overcome 
these obstacles and improve the national production, thus 
contributing toward the goal of preserving the national 
culture. 
In the case study chapter the experience of producing 
an Arabic version of "Sesame Street" will also be discussed 
as a good example of the first professional successful 
educational programs experience in the Arab states. It can 
be used as a foundation on which to establish and build 
national educational television production in the Arab 
states. 
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Data Gathering 
The purpose of this research is to present an 
intensive case study of an Arab television model. The 
methods of gathering data in this research are to study the 
phenomenon of domination of western programs on Arab 
television and to answer the questions posed by this 
research, which will consist of the following: 
(A) Documentary Data 
These documentary data are usually governmental data. 
They are either published or unpublished documents, some of 
them formal, some informal. Basically, these documents 
include the following sources: 
1- Documents and reports of the Arab League meetings. 
2- Documents and reports of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 
3- Documents and reports of Arab States Broadcasting Union 
(ASBU). 
4- Documents and reports of government of the state of 
Kuwait. 
5- Documents and reports of Kuwait television. 
6- Documents and reports of other Arab and regional 
educational and media organizations. 
(B) Field Data 
These data were gathered by the researcher and cover 
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the main issues investigated by this research which in turn 
serve as guidance in data gathering for the research. The 
field data was gathered because much of the information 
needed for the research is not available from other sources. 
These field data include observations and personal 
interviews. 
Observation: 
Observation is a primary source of data and a useful 
data gathering research technique in a case study. In this 
research, observation will play a main role both in 
collecting and analyzing data. The observation will cover 
historical events of the past as well as those carried in 
the present. The observations will provide descriptions, 
explorations, and detailed examinations of the whole 
environment of broadcasting in the state of Kuwait, regarded 
as a model since Kuwait is part of the Arab world's larger 
environment. 
The observation will trace the historical development 
of the problem and try to explore the connection between the 
past and the present. There are many events in the past 
which can be help us to understand and examine the present 
situation. 
The observation will emphasize the strong attachment 
between television and western programs by observing the 
broadcast and their negative type of western programs 
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influence on the national culture. Also, the observation 
will include the discovery of the relationship between 
television and other variables which effect the function of 
state television in the Arab states. These variables are 
government, politics, broadcasting policies and strategies, 
democracy in broadcasting, entertainment, and the structure 
of broadcasting and how it operates and functions. 
As a result of these observations, we will understand 
why television is not serving to support the national 
culture. We will, as well, observe and examine positive 
attempts and experiments of some of the successful 
nationally produced education programs and organizations, 
such as the Arabic version of "Sesame Street" series. 
Interviews 
Another source of data for this study is personal 
interviewing. Personal interviews are a common means of 
collecting qualitative data. The importance of interviewing 
as a means of collecting data is explained by Patton (1980): 
We interview people to find out from them those things 
we cannot observe...we cannot observe feelings, 
thoughts and intentions. We cannot observe behaviors 
that took place at some previous point in time. We 
cannot observe situations that preclude the presence of 
an observer. We cannot observe how the people have 
organized the world and the meanings they attach to 
what goes on in the world. We have to ask the people 
questions about those things. The purpose of 
interviewing then, is to allow us to enter into the 
other person's perspective. 
in this study, personal interviewing was an important method 
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of collecting data that could not be collected through 
observations (such as past events that are impossible to 
replicate). All interviews in this research were direct and 
person to person. The aim was to collect certain 
information and the questions were predetermined ahead of 
time. 
Interviews included conversations with top officials 
from both the governmental sector and private sector of 
Kuwait. The governmental sector was represented by the 
Ministry of Information, which is the institution 
responsible for television broadcasting in Kuwait. Some of 
these interviews were formal, other were informal. The 
interviews also covered executive managers of institutions 
and enterprises which deal with Kuwait television in the 
fields of production and supplies, importers of western 
programs, western television companies' franchise holders, 
educational production enterprises, and people who are 
involved in educational program production and have 
expressed a concern about the relationship between 
television and culture in the Arab world. 
The aim was to study the phenomenon in more depth from 
the various perspectives of people who work and are involved 
directly on the site of the study and who could observe 
things that we could not. The main questions of the 
interviews included the following: 
(1) Why does Kuwait television import western 
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television programs? And is there any need for them? 
(2) What do you think about the positive or negative 
impact of the content of these programs on the culture and 
the people? 
(3) Why does Kuwait television not depend entirely on 
nationally produced programs for its daily broadcasting? 
(4) Is it possible to ban all western programs and 
nationalize the entire spectrum of programs broadcast in 
Kuwait? 
(5) What obstacles face implementation of national 
production? How can we reach a level of self-sufficiency? 
(6) What has the government done to improve national 
television production? 
(7) What has Kuwait television or government done to 
protect the national culture through television 
broadcasting? 
(8) Why is there such a concentration on 
entertainment programs over educational and cultural 
programs? 
(9) What do you think are the solutions and 
alternatives to importing western programs? 
(C) other Sources of Information 
Other sources of information and data were gathered by 
the researcher through sources which include literature, 
annual reports and statistics, public and government 
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documents, minutes of meetings, official and academic 
research and studies, final reports and recommendations of 
seminars and conferences, officials' logs, periodicals, 
journals, and publications of national and international 
institutions and organizations. Basically these sources are 
those listed in the bibliography. 
Definitions 
The term "Arab Culture" is misleading and inaccurate. 
It has been used very commonly by many authors and writers 
as a synonym for "Islamic Culture," which is the correct and 
accurate term, since Arab people derived their whole culture 
from Islam's teachings and law—the Holy Koran and the 
prophet Muhammad's life, as the only source generating their 
way of life. 
People, especially in the west, used the word "Arabs" 
to indicate Muslims, probably because Arabs are the ones who 
carried the message of Islam to the world in its earliest 
stages. Arabic, too, is the language of the Koran -the last 
words of God revealed to the humankind- and the language of 
Muhammad. 
The word "Arab," as well, is inaccurate. At the 
present time it is very hard to define who the Arabs are and 
who are not. Historically, the Arabs are those tribes who 
inhabited the Arabian peninsula after the Marib Dam in Yemen 
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burst. They were two major Arab tribes who inhabited the 
north and the south of the peninsula. Those tribes who 
inhabited the north were called "Adnani" and those of the 
south were called "Qahtani", thought to be more purely Arab 
than the "Adnani," the Arabs of the north. 
After Islam was revealed to prophet Muhammad, the 
Arabs carried the message of Islam to other non-Arab 
neighboring countries. The Arabs began to mix with people 
of other races, thus spreading Islam across vast areas of 
Asia and Africa. People in those countries adopted Islam 
and started speaking Arabic. The people of Egypt, for 
instance, considered at the present time a major Arab state, 
historically were known as a race of Coptic people; the 
people of north Africa, such as Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and 
Morocco, considered at the present time to be an Arab 
states, are historically known as the Moorish people. 
The term "Arabs" is used very commonly by the 
researcher, not to be racist, but with the intention of 
defining a certain geographic and political region on the 
world map which forms the members of the Arab league. In 
addition to the formal treaties that connect the member 
governments of the Arab league in connection with their 
policies and strategies, they also share a common legacy of 
religion, culture, history, and language. In this respect, 
the researcher would like to express and affirm his advocacy 
of Islamic unity. 
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The term "foreign programs" or "western programs" is 
used to refer to those programs which are produced in non- 
Xslamic countries in general and whose content does not 
necessarily harmonize with the rules and customs of Islamic 
culture. Obviously, I am referring to those programs of 
western Europe and the United States, who are major 
producers and worldwide distributors of television programs. 
The term "educational television programs" is used not 
in the formal sense of education but rather in the sense of 
non-formal education, on the assumption that every 
television program's content should be constructive as 
possible, with positive objectives which lead toward 
accumulating knowledge on the part of the viewers over the 
long term. The type of these educational programs is not 
important as long as they represent the national culture and 
do not contradict the rules of Islam. 
Organization of the Study 
This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter I 
outlines the framework for the study. Chapter II is a 
review of the literature. It reviews the prominent 
literature written on the subject which is the concern of 
this study, and is divided into two parts. The first part 
review the English language sources written mostly by 
western authors and writers, while the second part reviews 
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the Arabic literature on the subject written by Arab writers 
and authors. 
Chapter III introduces the reader to television in the 
Arab states and gives general views of media and television 
in the Arab world. This chapter covers several crucial 
topics that concern television as a medium in the Arab 
states such as western influence on Arab television, the 
government strong control on television, the political 
function of Arab television, and the characteristic of being 
a one-way medium. 
Chapter IV discusses the main concern of this study of 
the aspect of television and culture in the Arab states. 
This chapter illustrates the role of U.S government in 
homogenizing the world cultures through "made in America" 
materials. The chapter also illustrates how the imported 
western television programs affected the Arab culture 
negatively and how the Arab life style and patterns were 
changing to western life styles as a consequences of the 
extensive exposure to western television programs, 
especially those of the entertainment genre. 
Chapter V is the heart and the core of this study. It 
narrows down the situation and the issue from the Arab world 
in general to the state of Kuwait specifically as the case 
study of this research. In this chapter, the situation in 
the state of Kuwait is discussed in depth through critical 
analysis in order to provide a thorough basis for the 
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conclusions of this study. In this chapter many topics are 
covered, beginning with a brief history of the evolvement of 
the state of Kuwait to the present and the status of Kuwait 
before and after the oil era which caused an upheaval in all 
aspects of life and changed all expectations. 
Besides covering the present structure of the state of 
Kuwait, the chapter makes a critical analysis of the 
development of broadcasting in Kuwait and its evolvement 
until present time with special emphasis on the television 
medium. 
The diagnosis of Kuwait television requires tackling 
of some critical issues such as policies and strategies of 
broadcasting, censorship, types and characteristics of 
broadcast programs, and the foreign channel. Most important 
in this chapter is the relation between television and 
culture in Kuwait and how western programs played a chief 
role in disturbing the continuity of its people's culture, 
and negatively affecting the pattern and customs of the life 
style of the indigenous culture in Kuwait. 
Chapter VI describes and analyzes the successful 
experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs 
Production Institution (AGJPPI). The chapter reviews the 
secrets of success of this experiment which made it the 
first successful and professional Arab television 
production, one which could be used as an excellent small- 
scale model and serve as a firm foundation for a Pan-Arab 
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television production industry. 
Chapter VII presents results, analyses, proposed 
solutions, and conclusions of the study. In this chapter 
reasons for dependence on imported western programs are 
identified. Also in this chapter some of the problems and 
obstacles that have been hindering national television 
production are listed. As a result of these analysis, this 
chapter offers some suggestions and solutions as an 
alternative to importing, or at least reducing the 
dependence on western programs while serving to enhance 
national production. The chapter, is climaxed by the final 
conclusion of the study, encompassing the recommendations 
and the out-look for future studies in this field of 
television and culture which may promote the preservation of 
the Arab national culture. 
Limitation 
This study deals with television in the Arab states in 
terms of cultural dimension only, primarily as a consequence 
of imported foreign western programs. However, there are 
other important dimensions in Arab television which must 
also be studied and researched. The researcher encourages 
other scholars and researchers to analyze other aspects of 
Arab television from different dimensions and perspectives. 
During the research process, the researcher faced some 
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difficulties in finding sufficient information and available 
sources. The researcher had found that Arabic libraries 
holdings on the subject of Arab media in general and 
television in the Arab world in particular are scarce and 
poor. This research concentrates on the state of Kuwait, 
only as a model. Television in other Arab states should be 
studied, researched, and analyzed in detail as well. 
Conclusion 
The television situation in the Arab states is not 
functioning along the right path. It neither promotes nor 
protects the authentic Arab people's culture. 
The heavy dependence on broadcasting alien western 
ready-made programs constitutes a very dangerous phenomenon 
in the Arab television and a negative aspect in its 
function. This negative phenomenon, which started 
simultaneously with the emergence of television in the Arab 
world, has helped to create a dual culture society and which 
started to threaten the people's ingenious culture. 
The peril in these imported programs lies in the 
promotion of western culture and the implication of the 
supremacy of western values, which aims in the long run to 
superimpose western culture over Arab culture. There is an 
urgent need for drastic reform in the function of Arab 
television and reconsideration of the type of programs to be 
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broadcast. Arab governments are requested to make maximum 
use of television and to make it work in the service of the 
people's culture and need, not only protecting it but also 
fending and enhancing it. 
The western media invasion through television programs 
and software must be stopped in order to protect Arab 
identity. Dependence on western programs must be 
eliminated. The quality and quantity of national and local 
production must be enhanced so as to reach a level of self- 
sufficiency. 
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Chapter II 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Introduction 
The phenomenon of dependency on western programs is 
not exclusive to a specific geographical area in the world, 
rather it is a worldwide phenomenon. Therefore, it is not 
only an issue threatening the culture in the Arab states but 
an issue threatening the global cultures in other parts of 
the world, especially in developing countries where the more 
they depend on western programs the more the risk exists 
that their culture may perish. 
The body of this review of literature is divided into 
two parts. The first part focuses on the one-way flow of 
information of western television programs as global issue. 
All of this literature is English sources and was written by 
western writers. The second part focuses on the same 
phenomenon in the Arab states, although some literature 
pertaining to the first part has touched very slightly on 
the issue in the Arab states. 
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Western Literature 
Among those first scholars who started to trace and 
analyze the phenomenon and became extremely discontent and 
sensitive to the issue is Herbert I. Schiller. In his early 
work in 1969, Mass Communication and American Empire. 
Schiller illustrated the relationship among different 
variables of the equation in this matter. Schiller's 
emphasis was on the strong connection between the American 
media technology industry and the American military- 
industrial complex. He sees that American television 
exports are part of the American military activities which 
are part of the American government foreign policy to 
subjugate the world in order to achieve economic goals. 
Schiller also sees that all these operations are done 
through a complicated and organized operation network of 
military, economic, and media systems. 
Later in 1976 and in a more specified work about media 
and culture, Schiller developed his theory of cultural 
imperialism in his study Communication and Cultural 
Domination. In this work, he explained in more details the 
role of the multi-national corporations and advanced 
technology, especially in the field of media, tourism, 
training programs, and western media curriculum and theory 
in spreading American culture to the rest of the world since 
World War Two under the cover of Free Flow of Information 
33 
doctrine. Schiller accused the U.S government of reviving 
colonialism over the new independent countries through 
attempting to homogenize the world's cultures and turning it 
into a global village with the help of its advanced 
technology so as to exploit it economically by controlling 
it culturally. Schiller argues that the present global 
structure of the world information system is unbalanced and 
unfair and it has been set up to meet the U.S interest only 
and to match the U.S foreign policy. 
In their joint work, National Sovereignty and 
International Communication. Schiller and Nordenstreng argue 
that developing countries' national boundaries, national 
autonomy, and the independence they have gained in the last 
few decades have been violated and have become meaningless. 
The new advanced media technology in the age of the direct 
satellite can penetrate all these boundaries so that the 
future of these countries can be determined by those who own 
and control these satellites. The unregulated flow of 
western programs can impair not only the cultural identity 
but also the national media policy in the receiving 
countries. As a result, these developing countries have 
last their sovereignty over their national land and have 
become not only economically but culturally dependent on 
western products, a situation which threatens the cultural 
continuity of these countries as long as they are within the 
sociocultural orbit of developed countries. 
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There are other sources which relate to Schiller's 
topic and support his theory of cultural colonialism. A 
related work is Picture-Tube Imperialism: The Impact of ij.s 
Television on Latin America, by Alan Wells, in which he 
follows and supports Schiller's theory. Wells presented two 
case studies of Latin America, the focus of his study. 
Wells concludes that the purpose of Americanization of Latin 
America television and life style has an economic end 
according to consumerism theory. 
Jeremy Tunstall in his work The Media are American: 
Anglo- American Media in the World, gave a good panoramic 
and comprehensive look at the media situation, its 
structure, strategy, and impact on the world, along with a 
review of its historical development. Tunstall discussed 
many media issues in different parts of the world. Tunstall 
argues that the problem of cultural identity is part of a 
large problem of national identity. Tunstall sees that a 
country with a high national identity tend to have a strong 
cultural identity and vice versa. Therefore, he listed as 
having Africa the least strong national unity in all 
countries. Tunstall emphasized the relationship between 
national identity and the role of media. 
Another study, by Anthony Smith The Geopolitics of 
Information: How Western Culture Dominates the World, 
demonstrates the power of American media in all its aspects 
either in producing, distributing, or disseminating 
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information all over the world. Smith supports his thesis 
with number and statistics on the massive amounts of budget 
expenditures and exports spent overseas to transmit American 
ideologies. Smith reviewed in a critical manner the old 
world information order and the struggle for new information 
order, which was a struggle between governments of the 
powerful and powerless to maintain cultural domination over 
developing countries. 
Smith believes that the Free Flow of Information 
doctrine is blocking cultural development and that 
technology is a primary factor in multiplying the danger of 
cultural domination. Smith also sees that the western 
approach of modernization is in conflict with culture and 
social heritage when applied in developing countries. 
Another study by Armand Mattelart, Multinational 
Corporations and the Control of Culture, emphasizes in more 
detail the role of multinational corporations in the field 
of cultural imperialism. Matterlart argues that the 
function of these corporations is the same function of the 
colonial governments of the past in dominating and 
exploiting the wealth developing countries. Mattelart also 
emphasizes on the relationship between these corporations 
and the ruling elite in the developing countries. 
UNESCO is an active organization in this field. It 
conducted and published many studies in this issue since it 
is the organization which sponsored the Free Flow of 
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Information doctrine. Perhaps the most reasonable and most 
concentrated study which focuses and exposes in depth the 
international one-way flow of western television programs 
was done by Kaarle Nordenstreng and Tapio Varis in their 
wor^ Television Traffic- A one Wav Street?. They surveyed 
most countries and presented a worldwide map of television 
programs' flow. Unlike other studies in the field , this 
study went further in analyzing the issue in depth by 
collaborating with other world scholars to reach a solution. 
At the end of the study, the authors suggested a general 
framework as an alternative solution. 
A decade later in 1983, a similar updating study was 
done by the UNESCO as a follow up, entitled International 
Flow of Television Programs. A few more things were added 
to the study, such classification of programs categories, 
duration of imported programs, and sources of imported 
programs..all that in comparison with domestically produced 
programs. The result of the study indicated no clear 
changes in the global situation in comparison with the 1974 
figures. The imported programs still constituted more than 
one third of the total time of broadcasting. 
Another study published by the UNESCO is Trans¬ 
national Communication and Cultural Industries, by Thomas 
Guback and Tapio Varis and others. The study's focal point 
is that TNCs have largely contributed to the cultural flow 
of programs and to the circulation of materials, in 
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Par^icular between developing and developed countries. The 
study concluded that TNCs role have an economic and cultural 
impact, that they are very active in the media field, and 
that their role can not be disregarded. 
In 1980, the UNESCO published its first comprehensive 
study of world communication problems in what has been known 
as "Sean MacBride Commission Report," an effort of two years 
of research published under the title Communication and 
Society Yesterday and Tomorrow: Many Voices. One World. The 
report raised the issue of disparity and the huge gap in all 
media aspects between developed and developing countries and 
the issue of one way flow of information which caused a 
severe damage to developing countries cultures. The 
conclusion of the study recommended a fairer and more 
balanced flow of information between north and south, and 
called developing countries to strengthen their independence 
and self-reliance through strengthening their cultural 
identity: 
Establishment of national cultural policies, which 
should foster cultural identity and creativity, and 
involve the media in these tasks. Such policies should 
also contain guidelines for safeguarding national 
cultural development while promoting knowledge of other 
countries. It is in relation to others that each 
culture enhance its own identity. 
There are two other studies more specialized than the 
one mentioned above. The first one is Broadcasting in 
Africa, by Sydney W. Head, in which he surveyed all African 
countries, including Arab African countries. Head observed 
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that Africa is facing many problems and media has not been 
used to its capacity in the process of development despite 
the huge potential the media can play. Head also criticized 
the western approach being applied to broadcasting systems 
Africa and warned that alien techniques, methods, 
institutions cannot be exported to Africa without 
appropriate modification. Head believes that there is an 
opportunity for creative adaptation based on Africa's lack 
of information infrastructure, Africa's need to use the 
media in coping with problems of economic and social 
development, and Africa's special political demands upon the 
media. 
The other study is Elihu Katz and George Wedell and 
others, Broadcasting in the Third World: Promise and 
Performance. which used eleven developing countries as case 
studies. The study conclusion is that broadcast media and 
particularly television in developing countries are in 
general purveying a homogenized brand of popular culture, 
either copied or borrowed from broadcasting in the west. 
The study warns that maintaining this situation is certainly 
destructive of indigenous political and cultural self 
expression. The study criticizes the structure of 
broadcasting in developing countries and the control of 
government. Therefore, they (the governments) did not leave 
much room for dissent, however constructive, and did not 
for the inherited culture values of the leave much room 
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society either. 
Katz and Wedell call for more authentic self- 
expression in broadcasting and assert that broadcasting 
serves not only the goals of national integration and 
economic development, but also the goals of culture 
rediscovery and creativity. Katz and Wedell argues that 
developing countries' mistake has been in imitating western 
styles and the solution to that is to establish their own 
style of broadcasting system based on their own theory, 
demands, needs, and circumstances. 
Boyd A. Douglas is one of the few western scholars who 
showed interest and studied Arab broadcasting in depth. In 
his study, Broadcasting in the Arab World, he surveyed and 
analyzed form critical point of view all radio and 
television systems in the Arab states. At the end of his 
study, Boyd discussed some of the critical Arab broadcasting 
problems as an outside viewer. Boyd observed several things 
that characterized the programs content in Arabic 
television: massive import of western programs, 
concentration on entertainment materials, strong control of 
government, political propaganda, and it is a one-way 
medium. Boyd concluded that there is very little uniquely 
Arab in Arab television. Boyd also pointed out that the 
obsession of predominantly western style images in all 
television aspects, from equipment, training, production, 
creativity, theory, and content has caused negative 
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consequences on the style of Arab television. 
Arabic Literature 
The second part of the literature I have reviewed was 
written since 1980. it was very difficult to find a major 
study prior to that date, in which there are several 
reasons. Television is still considered a new field in the 
Arab states either for governments or people. As a matter 
of fact not too many Arab states have institutions to teach 
media studies, nor do they seem to wish to have them. Only 
a few Arab states have academic institutions of higher 
education, and these are criticized for their inadequacy. 
There is still a big demand and urgent need to discover 
television in all its dimensions in the Arab states. 
Most of Arabic research are superficial and lack 
critics and objective analysis. Many of them are purely 
descriptive survey studies. I am going to review several of 
the better major studies. 
One of these studies is by Awatif Abdulrahman Issues 
of Media and Culture Subservience in the Third World. In 
her study, she followed and supported western theories of 
cultural imperialism of Schiller, Mattleart, and 
Nordenstreng. Even though she concentrates on the press, 
she analyzes the issue from a broad perspective rather than 
a narrow one and tackles the issue in the Arab states as 
part of a global issue rather than a regional one. 
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Therefore, she attempts to examine the external factors of 
the issue rather than the internal factors. Abdul- Rahman 
focuses on the international efforts to solve the problem 
between north and south within the global framework but she 
could not come up with any solutions or alternatives for the 
Arab states. 
In another study more narrow than the first, Abdul- 
Rahman focuses on the issue in the Arab states. In her 
work, The Dilemma of Developmental Media in the Arab world, 
she tackled the issue of cultural invasion from the press. 
Abdul-Rahman concludes that the main dilemma that hinder the 
media from playing a developmental role in the Arab world is 
the absence of specific media theory for the Arab world 
which would fits with its needs and demands. Therefore, 
Abdul-Rahman presents at the end of her study a general 
headlines theory for the Arab world as an alternative for 
western theories. Part of her theory called for preserving 
national cultural identity through media in a very general 
statement. 
Another study is by Mustafa Masmudi, one of the 
pioneer Arab scholars in this field. In his distinguished 
comprehensive work, The New Information Order, Masmudi in 
one segment of his study focuses on the danger of the 
cultural invasion and the importance of preserving cultural 
identity. Masmudi also presents a general frame work on how 
to implement media in the service of preserving the culture. 
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Masmudi also devotes part of his thesis to the situation in 
the Arab world. He presents a general evaluation of the 
media situation in the Arab world and reviews some of the 
constraints that face media development between the Arab 
states and within Arab states. He also criticizes Arab 
media policies and strategies. 
Accordingly and as a conclusion to his study, Masmudi 
has presented for the first time a new strategy of new Arab 
information order to be applied in the Arab states. The 
purpose of this strategy is to enhance the performance of 
the Arab media. Part of the strategy was to counter the 
cultural penetration through achieving media immunity to 
achieve what he called it cultural security. Masmudi's 
strategy however, was still very general and idealistic and 
could not deal with the existing problems at the existing 
level. The strategy ignored the existing problems and was 
set as if the circumstances were ready for such a strategy. 
Masmudi, however, did not explain how the strategy could be 
applied successfully under the actual circumstances. 
A similar study to that of Masmudi was published by 
the Arab League Education, Culture, and Science Organization 
(ALESCO) . The study was a report by the Arab Commission to 
study issues of media and communication in the Arab world 
which is also headed by Masmudi. The study is called Arab 
Media Present and Future: Toward New Arab Order for Media 
and communication. Like other studies, this study was not 
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tackling television issues in particular, rather was 
tackling media issues in general. Part of the study brought 
attention to the threat of massive flow of western cultural 
materials and their negative effects on Arab culture. The 
study also called for protecting the national culture and 
enhancing national media policies and national television 
production. The study criticized the gap between media 
institutions and other educational and cultural institutions 
and called for more collaboration among them. In 
conclusion, the study presented a general philosophical 
strategy as a frame work foundation for Arab states' 
national media policy. 
A joint work by Yahya Abu Bakr, Sa'ad Labib, and Hamdy 
Kandil, some of the prominent scholars in the field of Arab 
media, is titled Developmental Media in the Arab States: 
Needs and Priorities, and published by UNESCO. The authors 
criticized the present Arab media policies and planning 
strategies in general and proposed priorities and planning 
as a first step for reform. However, some of these 
priorities were more technical. The study also called for 
more collaboration among media, cultural, and educational 
institutions. The study criticized the importation of 
educational programs and called it a major obstacle to a 
successful implementation of national development plans. 
The report stated that a joint meeting between UNESCO 
and Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) held in Baghdad 
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warned that while it might be advantageous in some ways to 
import ready-made television programs, popular science 
materials as these were backed by greater production 
resources and hence might represent cost savings. The 
scientific materials disseminated should be based on local 
conditions, make use of local production elements, and deal 
with issues and subjects that were relevant to the society 
concerns and its problems, its development needs and plans. 
In the field of television, the study suggested a few 
shallow tips to improve Arab television policies. Once 
again, the suggestions focused more on technical aspects of 
television rather than on the content of programs. 
In a seminar held in Tunisia conducted by the Arab 
States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) about Television Production 
Issues in the Arab States, delegations from all Arab states 
gathered to discuss the issue of television production. 
Interestingly, the participants in this seminar discussed 
the issue of production as an independent issue which has 
nothing to do with cultural invasion issue or the issue of 
imported western programs. Therefore, the solutions and 
suggestions the seminar came up with were empty of any 
reference to programs' relationship to education and culture 
or the type of programs to be produced, and concentrated 
mostly on technical points. The seminar in general 
concentrated on the solutions more than on the problem, in 
other words without knowing and understanding the problem. 
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Thus the solutions they came up with were not in accord with 
the essence of the problem. Even though the participants 
have tackled some sensitive issues and solutions, they fall 
short of examining the basic problems. 
One of the most important conferences in this field is 
the one which was held in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The 
conference was conducted by the Arab Education Bureau for 
the Gulf States under the title of What Educators Want From 
Broadcasters. In this conference, education leaders up to 
the level of Ministers of Educations, media leaders up to 
the level of Ministers of Information, and scholars in the 
field of Islamic Arab culture from different Arab states 
discussed the issue of media and education within the 
context of the Islamic Arab culture. The long debate and 
argument discussions among the participants have revealed 
huge gaps and obvious disagreement, discord, and lack of 
cooperation between media and education institutions in the 
Arab states. The final report of the conference called for 
more coordination and cooperation between media and 
education institutions in the following fields: 
1- Unifying goals, objectives, plans of both institutions. 
2- Instill Islamic Arab values in programs and curriculum 
of both institutions, especially in children's programs. 
The conference requested more attention given to children's 
production locally to halt imported alien programs. 
3- Encounter the flood of cultural and intellectual 
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invasion by two methods: 
a- Immunization: by selecting carefully television programs 
which do not contradict with Islamic teachings, 
b- Cure: by encountering destructive values by the use of 
persuasion in both education curriculum and on television 
programs. 
4- The participants also requested that all broadcasted 
programs must be in accordance with Islamic teachings, with 
more concern should be given to Islamic programs. 
5- The conference emphasized the importance of reinforcing 
the Arabic language in both media and education institutions 
as a supreme Arabic value. 
May be the most realistic study and the best of what 
has been written about Arab television is by Sa'ad Labeeb. 
In his work Studies in Arab Television. Labeeb criticizes 
the present function of Arab television, structure, 
objectives, planning and policies. Labeeb emphasizes on the 
importance of planning in Arab television policies. Labeeb 
also presents from his point of view the objectives of 
planning in Arab television policies. 
About the issue of cultural invasion, Labeeb stresses 
the role of television and other media aspects to repel the 
current invasion. Unlike other literature, Labeeb is one of 
the few writers who demands a merger between religion and 
television in Arab states since religion has been vital 
element in Arab culture throughout the history, and still 
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is. Labeeb went even further by saying that religion 
teachings should determine the general frame work of any 
television and culture policies. Labeeb also focused on the 
Arabic language as an important vital element in the Islamic 
Arab culture as well. Labeeb called for supporting local 
production and suggested very briefly a few general tips on 
how that could be done. 
Husain Abu Shanab in his study, Communication Policies 
i.D..the. State of Kuwait, noticed that drama programs and 
entertainment programs always constitute the larger 
proportion of the daily broadcast programs in Kuwait 
television. He also noticed that imported news usually 
range around 60% of the total broadcast news, which was the 
major concern of his study. Abu Shanab very briefly called 
for encouraging local production either on state level or on 
Pan-Arab level to address Arab people's national issues 
within well prepared and studied media policy. 
Conclusion 
As we have noticed from the review of literature 
above, they all share and agree to preserve and protect the 
national culture through television medium and programs' 
content. They all called for halting and reducing foreign 
programs and increasing national programs. However, non of 
them elaborated and explained how that can be done. This 
study will address this question of how we can implement 
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television programs in the service of national culture by 
depending on national production through discovering of the 
obstacles that hinder this kind of national production. 
This study will also suggest at the end of the thesis some 
solutions as an alternative to the present situation. 
Chapter III 
TELEVISION IN THE ARAB STATES 
Introduction 
This chapter serves as an introductory chapter to the 
study. It gives a general overview of television in the 
Arab states and other critical issues related to it. It 
describes in critical analysis the function of Arab 
television since its emergence as a medium in the Arab world 
and the governments' approach and perception of this medium. 
This chapter gives a historical background of Arab 
television and the western influence on this medium in 
particular, and broadcasting in general, since the early 
days. The chapter also illustrates the relationship between 
television and Arab governments which to great extent 
affected its constructive function. 
As a consequence of the relationship between 
governments and the states' television industry, this 
chapter covers many connected issues, particularly the 
aspect of the political function of Arab television and the 
fact of its being a political oriented medium. An important 
part of Arab political broadcasting and its political 
orientation is its development in this direction during 
Nassir's reign, a part which cannot be ignored in the 
49 
50 
history of Arab Broadcasting. Last but not least, the 
chapter covers one of the common features that characterize 
Arab television, that of being a one-way medium. 
The Arab States 
The land of the Arab nation is a unique land. People 
look at it differently according to their individual 
perspectives. To economists, it is a land of sponge filled 
with oil. Sociologists look at it as an arena in which 
modern technology is engaged in struggle with the most 
deeply-rooted traditions of the past. To anthropologists, 
it is the land of mankind's ancient civilization. Novelists 
and film makers imagine it to be a region of desert sand, 
oasis, and palm trees replete with scenes from the Arabian 
nights. Politicians look at it as the sixth power in the 
world. And of course, on top of all that, billions of 
people look at it as the land of origin of the three major 
religions of the world. 
From a cultural point of view, the Arab ministers of 
Education in their third conference, which was held in 
Kuwait in Feb, 1968, described the Arab nation in its final 
report as follows: 
The Arab nation is a single nation with deep historical 
roots, the Arab people are united in respect of their 
common land, culture, language, history, interests and 
will; Arab nationalism is the human, civilizational, 
cultural, social, and historical reality of the nation 
and concepts, principles and goals which spring from 
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and express that reality. The Arab nation has a human 
and civilizing mission which has been manifested 
throughout the ages and which has contributed to 
progress and development and to the buildinq of the 
World civilization.1 
From the geographical point of view, the Arab World 
occupies a vast area which is estimated at approximately 
13,738,000 square kilometers, or 10.8% of the earth's 
surface. It extends over an expanse of 7,000 kilometer, 
from the Atlantic Ocean in the West to the Arabian Sea and 
the Indian Ocean in the East, a distance equal to one sixth 
of the circumference of the earth.2 
From the demographic point of view, the population of 
the Arab land, according to 1980 census, was estimated at 
172,558,000, for making an average density of 12.5 persons 
per square kilometer. There is, however, a considerable 
disparity in this respect between different parts of the 
Arab World, ranging from a minimum of 1.3 persons per square 
kilometer in Mauritania to a maximum of 575.1 in Bahrain. 
The low population density of the Arab World is 
attributed to its large desert area, which is estimated to 
constitute some 68 per cent of its total area. When desert 
areas are excluded from the calculation, the Arab World's 
mean population density becomes 40 inhabitants per square 
kilometer. If the total population is evenly distributed 
over arable and potentially arable land, the average density 
would increase to 288 inhabitants per square kilo-meter, a 
figure greater than the corresponding figure for the United 
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Kingdom, one which would be regarded as ranking high on a 
world wide scale. The total population of the Arab World is 
expected to increase to approximately 295,000,000 by the end 
of this century.3 
While the Arab World constitutes nearly 10.8 % the 
world's surface, its people count for only 3.4% of the 
world's population and their share of the world's income is 
only 1.1%. Per capita consumption of electricity in the 
Arab World is only 2% of the corresponding figure in the 
developed countries. The Arab World's energy consumption in 
general amounts to only 3% despite the fact that the Arab 
World is the world's largest source of energy.4 
Regardless of what has been said about the wealth of 
the Arab World, its total share of the world's income is not 
commensurate either with its geographic area or its 
population. It must be realized that the Arab countries are 
still poor countries, and their resources are in need of 
development. 
Despite the common factors shared by the Arab states, 
there is also a huge disparity among Arab states, in many 
aspects. The annual per capita income in North Yemen is 
$300, while it is $22,000 in the U.A.E, according to 1978 
statistics. In educational services, we observe that formal 
schooling started in some Arab states as late as the Sixties 
or the Seventies while other states have had schools and 
educational institutions for centuries. 
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We find different types of governmental structure in 
the Arab states (monarchy, republic, and revolutionary), 
single party system and multi-party system, and we find 
different types of economic systems (socialist- oriented and 
free enterprise)* States' constitutions vary from one state 
to another. Whereas some states have temporary 
constitutions, others have no constitution, and while in 
some states the constitution calls Islam the state's 
official religion, others call the state a secular state. 
In terms of media, this disparity is obvious in the press, 
radio, and television. Using the UNESCO scale of 20 
television set for each 1000 inhabitants, one finds that 
most Arab states are above that scale with the exception of 
Sudan, Somalia, Oman, South Yemen, and North Yemen. 
According to UNESCO figures, Kuwait is on top of the list of 
Arab states for the highest average availability of TV sets: 
400 TV sets per 1000. At the bottom of the list comes South 
Yemen, with 18 sets for each 1000 inhabitants,and North 
Yemen with 6 sets 1000 inhabitants, constituting 0.2% only.5 
In terms of the press, Lebanon is the only Arab state that 
passed the UNESCO scale of 100 copies for each 1000 
inhabitants. 
Despite of all that has been said, however, about the 
unity of the Arab states, one should not be too optimistic 
about this illusion of Arab unity. As a matter of fact, 
Arab unity around the slogan of what has been called "Pan- 
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Arabisin'' is probably the biggest lie in the Arab history. 
After decades of calling for this ideology, it turned out to 
be nothing but a myth. To know more about this, we should 
look at the practical side. 
In reviewing the history of the Arabs, I found no 
shred of evidence that the Arab people have ever unified at 
any time under the name of "Arabism". In fact, the first 
and the only times that the Arab people have succeeded in 
unifying themselves were under the Islamic dogma. Probably 
that is why no Arab unity existed before the emergence of 
Islam. 
At the present time, the Arab states are not in 
accord. They never have been so since the turn of this 
century with fall of the Islamic Ottoman Caliphate and the 
emergence of Western colonialism over Arab land— and even 
after their independence from Western countries. In fact, 
we observe Arab people's unity before independence during 
the struggle against the colonialists was much stronger than 
after independence. There are many disagreements among Arab 
states' governments; they are usually in constant dispute 
among themselves and they had never been in accord at any 
time— and if they did it never lasted long. 
While many people believe that the major dispute among 
Arab states is political, the fact is that the main dispute 
among Arab states is an ideological one which is more 
profound than the political; actually politics is part of 
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the ideology and the disparity among Arab politics reflects 
the disparity in their ideologies. We find Arab states have 
<^ifferent idealogies in which the structure and other infra¬ 
structures are derived from this ideology. This 
differentiation in ideologies was reflected in the media 
policies and it justifies the constant dispute among Arab 
states. 
There is no doubt that the Arab World is living in an 
ideology dilemma. The search for an alien ideology as an 
alternative for its indigenous ideology has led the Arab 
World astray. All the ideologies the Arab states experience 
right now are unsuitable for the indigenous Arab atmosphere, 
they all were exported to the Arab land by the west during 
the colonial period. 
Since the emergence of Islam in the seventh century 
until the fall of the Turkish Ottoman Empire in the 
twentieth century, we find that the Arab people have had 
only one dominant and firm ideology, the Islamic dogma,which 
has maintained their stability, prosperity, and unity. 
Media and the Arab World 
Communication in its basic doctrine and principle is 
not a new form of knowledge. It was known and practiced by 
the people in the past throughout the ages. But it is 
entirely new in this age of electronic communication in its 
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style, methods, content, theories, pattern, and techniques. 
Media in its modern form as a new technology is a new medium 
the Arab World in all its notions and practices. And 
since the Arab World is still new to this type of technology 
it is still vague to many people and has been utilized by 
many randomly in circumstances where other notions and 
misconceptions interfere with it. 
It took the Arab World quite a long time to realize 
the appreciation of media in its modern form. It has been 
underestimated by Arab states for a long period of time. 
The political situation in the Arab World and the Arab- 
Israeli conflict is probably the main key to realizing the 
power of media. 
The Arab League covenant which was declared on March 
22 1945 did not give media the attention it deserves; in 
fact, no attention was directed to media affairs. Perhaps 
this default can be attributed to the lack of Arabic 
institutions specializing in the field of media; the neglect 
of Arab public opinion, furthermore the notion of the power 
of media and technology at the time, was immature. Article 
# 2, which was about cultural affairs and transportation, 
has ignored the subject. Gassan Atiyya believes that was 
intentional, on the grounds that media is considered a state 
responsibility, and the covenant was trying to avoid any 
kind of violation to state sovereignty. It was cautious in 
interfering in any state internal affairs.6 Ironically, at 
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that time not too many Arab states had their broadcasting 
system as yet, and many of them had not gained their 
independence yet. 
It seems that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
aggravation of the political events in the Middle East, and 
the Arab image in the rest of the World have forced the Arab 
states to start changing their media policy from state level 
to Arab league level so as to give more attention to Arab 
media matters— especially to improve the Arab image 
politically abroad. However, the Arab League has not given 
the issue the attention and the boast it deserves. The 
launch was weak, disorganized, narrow minded, unplanned, had 
no firm grassroots, and lacked vital factors. 
It started in 1954 with a narrow approach by 
establishing media and information offices in some major 
cities in the world for the primary purpose of Arab 
propaganda on the Palestinian question. These offices were 
called Arab media and information offices. These offices 
were under joint auspices of the Arab League and Arab 
ambassadors in these countries. In 1953, a Department of 
Information and publication was established and, in 1959, 
the organization of this department was expanded somewhat to 
include other committees and offices; however, in general, 
the role of these organizations was limited and primitive 
and it had no effective activities worth mentioning.7 Abdul 
Rahman Al-zamil who studied, analyzed, and evaluated the 
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role and activities of these offices and organization has 
pointedly criticized them. Their establishment and 
operation was not based on a serious clear study and lacked 
many vital elements in the planning process. Al-zamil 
concluded that these offices had failed to set a strategy of 
clear objectives to achieve positive results. He 
recommended to abolish these offices; however, he attributed 
the responsibility to the Arab League-- the organization 
which maintains surveillance of these offices' operations. 
He charged that it was responsible for an ineffective 
decision making process, weak policy, and vague goals.8 
It was not until January 1964 when the Arab summit 
tackled for the first time the issue of media in their 
agenda. Once again the reason was a purely political one. 
It was because of the aggravation in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict during the Israel operation intending to detour the 
direction of Jordan river. In this summit, upon reviewing 
the file regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Arab leaders 
have agreed that media is one of the primary weapons that 
must be considered in countering Israeli aggression, second 
only to political and economic weapons. The summit, 
however, had failed to set a clear strategy for en Arab 
media framework. But the recommendation of the final report 
of that summit concerning the subject of media, fall far 
below the need, and hardly touched on the issue except for 
one simple and general statement, as follows; " Arab states 
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must establish the necessary strategy to tackle political, 
economic, and media issues".9 
In March 1964, the first meeting of Arab ministers of 
information was held in Cairo two months after the summit 
and according to the summit's recommendation. In this 
meeting, the Arab ministers set basic alternatives and 
general headlines for an Arab media framework. Simply, they 
demanded reorganization of the media department, and more 
coordination between Arab Embassies and media centers 
abroad. The goal of all these moves was the Palestinian 
question.10 
Despite the fact that the media issue has been on the 
agenda of every summit since 1964, no attempts had been made 
to set a clear and specific strategy and all the 
recommendations came in general headlines. The second 
summit, which was in September 1964, recommended the 
following in article # 10: "Give the necessary commands to 
ministers of information to set an Arab social strategy for 
media that assure presentation of Arab issues.". Despite 
the general brevity, vagueness, and lack of many details, 
the recommendation is considered to be the first indication 
from Arab leaders for a certain media strategy, even though 
this time the summit recommended social media strategy 
instead of political strategy which was rather unusual and 
unexpected. Muhammad Masalha believes that the consensus on 
the function of political media at the time was a premature 
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among Arab states .11 
The third summit in 1965 in Morocco gave the green 
light to states' governments for more monopolization of all 
kinds of media forms. The summit urged the governments of 
member states to tighten their grip and control over the 
media in their states and to halt the severe air waves 
hostility among the members in order to improve relations 
among Arab states. The third article of the final report of 
the summit recommended the following: 
1- Utilization of press and broadcasting and all forms of 
media should be in the service of the Arab question. 
2- Adherence to limiting objective discussion and 
constructive criticism in tackling Arab issues and halting 
press and air waves campaigns and all forms of media. 
3- Review and revising of the press laws in each state and 
enactment of legislation that would prohibit any media act 
which might cause any offence to any Arab state or might 
directly or indirectly offend the head of states.12 
However, all these recommendations did not have the 
chance to be enacted, and the members could not keep their 
agreement. Once the summit was over, the Arab states got 
involved in more disputes and disagreements among themselves 
through the media, and generated even more severe hostility 
than before until they all awoke to the tragedy of the Six 
Days War defeat. The defeat was considered by many a defeat 
in the media field more than a defeat on the battle field. 
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Indeed, the Six Days War defeat is considered a major shock 
which draw a clear cut line in Arab media history. Al-zamil 
observed an obvious disparity between Arab media activities 
and policies before and after 1967 defeat. 
with the exception of the educated class and political 
commentators, neither Arab leaders nor Arab people have 
given a thought prior to the defeat to media affairs 
beyond the limits of Arab states' borders.13 
Al-zamil observes that Arab governments began to think 
of media more seriously and logically than ever right after 
the defeat. The Arab Ministers of Information, in their 
September 1967 meeting which was called exclusively to 
discuss the defeat— admitted the failure of their policy in 
the field of media and that these mistakes and shortcomings 
contributed to the defeat. The participants demanded a 
reevaluation of the whole situation and reconsideration of 
the issue. The meeting came up with only one final 
recommendation by the end of their meeting, reflecting their 
attitude: "Create a media policy to persuade world opinion 
with respect to the justice of Arab issues".14 
On the contrary, in their previous February 1967 
meeting, held a few months before the war occurred, the 
participants were not enthusiastic about the issue and the 
final report of that meeting did not mention it. 
Background History of Television in the Arab States 
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The start of the first Arab television broadcasting 
system is not really known. Whereas some writers believe 
that the first formal Arab television station was built in 
IracJ 1956, others believe that there were other private 
television stations before the Iraqi station. It seems that 
the first television station in the Arab states began in the 
early 1950's as non-official beginning when the French and 
the Americans established the first television stations in 
the Arab states. Even though it is not quite sure who 
started first, it is believed that the French built the 
first television station in MOROCCO in 1954. Around that 
time the American Army built another station at Wheelus Air 
Base in Libya and two more stations in Saudi Arabia. Then, 
in 1956, the Iraqi launched their television as the first 
official Arab television. 
Television did not start in all Arab states as a 
governmental television, especially those states which 
started earlier than others. As we have seen, some of them 
started in the form of foreign military activity as in the 
cases of Libya and Saudi Arabia. In some Arab states 
television started in the form of commercial services, as 
for example in Morocco (1954) where television began by the 
French on a commercial basis in Rabat and Casablanca, in 
Lebanon where the Lebanese Television Company was founded in 
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1956, and the Lebanon and the Orient Television Company 
founded in 1962. In Kuwait, television broadcasting was 
launched by a private station owned by a businessman who 
happened to be an RCA dealer. In Bahrain (1973), a 
commercial station whose revenues were derived exclusively 
from advertising and which was established by the American- 
owned International Radio and Television Corporation, the 
government owned 20% of the station's capital. 
Television did not start in all Arab states at the 
same time or even within a short period of time. As a 
matter of fact we find disparity and a huge gap in time 
among Arab states in establishing their television services. 
We see that some Arab states started their television 
service relatively late compared to other Arab states. Some 
such as Morocco, Libya, Iraq, and Lebanon started their 
television as early as in the 1950's. We find that other 
Arab such as Qatar, United Arab Emerits, Oman, and North 
Yemen, did not have their television service till mid and 
late seventies or even in the eighties as the case in 
Somalia. Sometimes we see a time span as long as twenty 
five years. 
Although television in the Arab states did not start 
with government sponsorship, all television systems in the 
Arab states at the present time are under extraordinarily 
tight governmental control either directly or indirectly, 
reach the level of exaggeration in all its aspects 
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including supervising,directing, funding, control, and 
operations. In Dubai (U.A.E) we find the only commercial 
television station in the Arab World; however, even this 
station is highly supervised by the government. Another 
special case is Lebanon; television in Lebanon began on a 
commercial basis with two television companies, both with 
substantial outside financing. This situation continued 
until 1978, when the two companies were merged into a single 
service owned jointly by the government and the private 
sector. In the special case of the civil war in Lebanon, 
there exist different televisions stations representing 
different fighting sects. 
Through the years of government control, policies of 
television has changed slightly. In the early days 
advertising used to be prohibited; now, most Arab states 
allow advertising in their television broadcasting even in 
very strict states such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Even 
though advertising is permitted, it has to be within a 
certain limit. Most Arab states do not have a television 
fee. In some Arab states a fee takes the form of charge 
added to the electricity bill. 
The technical development of television in the Arab 
states has grown very rapidly in all its related aspects 
particularly in the last two decades, especially in the rich 
oil Arab states either in receiver ownership, facilities, 
training, land coverage, transmission power, broadcast 
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hours, station numbers, and channels availability. 
At the present time , there are more than 116 
television stations in the Arab states, some of them linked 
together in a microwave network such as "maghrebvision". 
Similarly, stations within a single state may be linked by 
satellite, as is the case in Sudan and Algeria. The Saudi 
television network which links a number of cities in Saudi 
Arabia is perhaps the largest and newest television network 
in the Third World. 
Western Influence on Arab Television 
Western influence has a great presence in Arab media 
in general and Arab television in particular. This 
influence is not recent. When we trace the back ground of 
this influence, we find it was going on since the early 
stages of establishment of television. 
Western countries have had a great influence on and 
played a vital role in introducing and establishing 
broadcasting in general in the Arab states. It influenced 
not only television but it also radio, before that. This 
western influence has continued and still exists, even after 
the westerners had left the Arab land. In any case, radio 
and television are considered a western invention in the 
first place. 
This influence began during the colonial era when the 
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Westerners established the foundation for Arab broadcasting 
for their own purposes, to be more specific, during World 
War II when the Allies and the Nazis built broadcasting 
stations in some parts of the Arab world to spread 
propaganda for their policy during the war and to serve 
their own interests as colonists. Obviously, the Westerners 
did not establish these stations for the benefit of the 
indigenous people so it would seem that if World War II had 
not broken out Westerners would not have bothered to 
establish these stations. 
Probably the first words the Arab people heard through 
the air waves was ...THIS IS BERLIN...and THIS IS LONDON!15 
The British, French, Italians, and the Germans are actually 
the first ones who introduced broadcasting to the Arab 
World, each one according to his location in the Arab World. 
That's why we see the Arab states which were not under 
western colonialism begin their broadcasting services 
relatively late comparing to other Arab states which were 
under western colonialism. Douglas Boyd attributes the late 
radio service in Saudi Arabia to the absence of foreign 
influence on government decisions at the time: 
There had been no such early need for a radio 
broadcasting service in Saudi Arabia, as in Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Iraq. No foreign power was at the time 
influencing government decisions. 
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Radio 
In reviewing history of colonial periods, we observe 
that the French introduced radio broadcasting to their 
colonies in the Arab states in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, 
and Lebanon. The British introduced it in their colonies in 
Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Palestine, Kuwait, U.A.E, and South 
Yemen. 
In Egypt, Egyptian radio had an Anglo-American and 
Anglo-French birth. In 1931, Egypt had two radio stations, 
each one owned by an Englishman and a Frenchman; both 
stations were advertising European and American products. 
Broadcasting occurred in Arabic, English, and French, but 
English concerts and dance records were in daily use. Thus 
there was a background of some 25 years of strongly Anglo- 
American, and French- influenced radio when the Voice of the 
Arabs began in July 1953.17 
Later, the British company, Marconi, set the first 
pattern of radio broadcasting in major cities before it 
expanded it services in the following years with agreements 
with the government. In Libya, broadcasting began in 1939 
by the Italians when they established a radio station in 
Tripoli. The station was called "RADIO MARRELLI" but it was 
destroyed during World War Two. Libya also experienced a 
military broadcast service which was operated from both the 
British and the Americans Armed bases till the 1969 coup. In 
Sudan, the British began radio transmission in April 1940 
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from a small room in the post office of the city of Umm 
Derman, funded by the budget designated for Allied 
propaganda. The function of the station was give updated 
news of the war. The British authorities distributed 
receivers in the public square to encourage people to listen 
to the station. The station was expanded in 1942 and two 
programs were added, one broadcast in English only; the 
other was for the fighting troops. Once the war was over, 
the Allies terminated the station's propaganda budget and it 
almost ceased operating, but British authorities interceded 
and continued to subsidize the station.18 
In Somalia, broadcasting was introduced by both the 
British in 1943 and the Italian in May 1951 to serve their 
colonial purposes, since the British dominated the north and 
the Italian dominated the south. Both stations were 
broadcasting in English and Italian besides the Arabic 
language. In Palestine and Jordan, the British built a 
radio station in 1936 during the mandate authority, one of 
the early and prominent radio stations in the Arab World. 
The special concern of the British in this station is due to 
the Palestine strategic location and because it is the focal 
point of Arabs, British, and Jews. The station was 
broadcasting in three languages, Arabic, English, and 
Hebrew. In Iraq, the Germans had the best stronghold in the 
Arab world, where they built a powerful station with their 
gifted, skilled, and talented announcer, Yunis Bahri, to 
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propagandize for them. 
In Kuwait, the British also built a small radio 
station for the Allies to counter the powerful Nazi station 
in Iraq for which all program materials were provided by the 
Germans. In South Yemen, radio started in Hay 1954 with the 
local relying station of the BBC Arabic service from London 
and the Cypress-based, British-operated station. Programing 
was broadcast via a transmitter rented by the colonial 
government from the British telecommunication company cable 
and wireless.19 In North Yemen, broadcasting began in 1947 
when an American delegation gave the ruler at the time, Imam 
Yahya, a gift of a CB device which could operate as a 
transmitter; he used this device to start broadcasting 
despite the rarity of receivers among his people.20 In 
U.A.E, the British forces brought a radio station for their 
own use and built it in the sheikdom of Sharja. 
In Saudi Arabia, despite the late public use of radio 
in the Kingdom, the King, acquired from his friend, British 
Marconi agent H.st John Philby, a portable transmitter that 
would accompany him when he traveled, to keep him in touch 
personally with the vast Kingdom and the outside World where 
he purchased and installed a network of transmitters in 
various cities in the Kingdom.21 In May 1949, the King had 
a contract with International Electric Company (IEC) a 
branch of ITT to build a medium wave transmitter in the 
of the country. Later the same company had Western provence 
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another contract to build another station in Jiddah.22 
The French were very active in their colonies as well. 
In Lebanon, in 1937, they constructed two radio 
transmitters. One medium wave station to operate in 
September,3 1938 and a short wave to operate in 1940. Both 
stations were operated by the French. The purpose was to 
counter Italian and Nazi German propaganda beamed at Syria 
and Lebanon from the Arabic division at radio of Berlin.23 
In Morocco, the French built a radio station in 1928 during 
their occupation. In Algeria, radio broadcasting began in 
1925 when the French government built a radio transmitter to 
serve one million French colonists. The expansion was 
O 
continued, and by the end of the war, the transmission was 
covering most of the country. It was not until January 1963 
when the national government took over the stations. In 
Morocco, the situation was even worse and it took on a 
humiliating formal aspect when the French had an agreement 
with the Moroccan government for a monopoly over Post, 
Telephone, and Telegraph (PTT). In November 1924 the 
monopoly was expanded to include all electronic 
communication. In Feb 1928, the French started radio 
broadcasting. Under the French protectorate, the mission of 
radio was to serve French interests, those of the settlers 
and those of the empire. News and other programs were 
tightly supervised by the Resident General. He appointed 
the Director of Radio Morocco. Perhaps that's why radio in 
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Figure 1. Number of radio sets per 1000 people. 
SOURCE: Arab Media Present and Future; Toward New Arab 
Information Order, ALECSO, Tunis, 1987. 
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Morocco did not play any part in the struggle for 
independence. in Tunisia, the French also had a very strong 
influence. The colonial government broadcast a radio 
service in 1930 to serve primarily the French colonists. 
The broadcast materials consisted largely of materials 
imported from France. Even after independence in 1956 
French staff helped operate the Tunisian station and the 
French channel maintained its broadcasting. 
Television 
In the field of television, the history of its 
development was not much different than it was in radio. By 
and large television was also introduced to the Arab World 
by westerners. Whereas the British and the French were the 
most active in introducing radio, the Americans had joint 
the British and the French as a up coming force in 
introducing television, competing with them, and years later 
becoming the only predominant force in the field of 
television in the Arab World. 
Jeremy Tunstall attributes the American presence to 
military and economic objectives "Television, especially, 
had a very American-influenced birth in the Middle-East. 
One factor was the early presence of television stations on 
the Persian Gulf used by the USAF and American oil 
companies. There was also much activity by RCA, with whom 
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the United States government was directly involved in 
establishing television in both Syria and Egypt (as a 
balance to Soviet financing of the Aswan dam)...American 
influence has been especially strong in the birth of 
television in the oil states of the Persian Gulf."^ 
In fact, it is believed that the first television 
stations in the Arab World were built by the U.S Army, when 
American armed forces established low-power English language 
stations utilizing the technical Americans standard for both 
military base personnel at Wheelus Air Force Base in Libya, 
and the U.S Military Training Mission at Dhahran Inter¬ 
national Airport in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Arabian- 
American Oil Company (ARAMCO) built a similar low power 
station for its 9000 employees in the Eastern province of 
Saudi Arabia. This station still operates. 
The first formal Arab television station, established 
in Iraq in 1956, was imported originally as part of a 
British trade fair. In 1966, the British company, Marconi, 
won a contract with the Jordanian government to build a 
Jordanian television system. In South Yemen, television was 
introduced by the British during their occupation of South 
Yemen. The purpose was to find a means of distracting 
people's thoughts from the outcomes of the revolution in 
neighboring North Yemen and from listening to the popular 
Egyptian radio programs which were attacking very severely 
the British presence in South Yemen and demanding that 
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people revolt against the British occupation. The station 
was destroyed during the struggle against the British and it 
took the new regime two years to resume broadcasting. in 
U.A.E (United Arab Emerits), the British started a 
television company on August 6, 1969 owned by the British 
company, Thomson, but in same year the regional government 
took over the station.25 in Oman, television broadcasting 
began in November of 1974 by a German company which operated 
and maintained it according to an agreement with the 
government. Another Oman station was established in 1975, 
operated by a British company under contract with the 
government. It was not until 1979 that the government took 
over the two stations.26 
In the North Africa Arab states, it is believed that the 
French built the first television station in the Arab World 
and in Africa as well. In 1950, two French firms obtained 
from (PTT) Post Telephone Telegraph a 50-year monopoly on 
Moroccan Television to broadcast in both Arabic and French. 
In Algeria, the French built the first television station 
during the occupation but the station was destroyed during 
the liberation war. After rebuilding the station, some 
radical French destroyed the transmitter in order to prevent 
the Algerian people from listening to president Degoal 
statement that declared the independence of Algeria. The 
French rebuilt the station again in 1963.27 
In Libya, the U.S Army Forces built one of the first 
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television stations in the Arab World in Wheelus Air Base to 
entertain American personnel. In Egypt, the government 
signed in 1959 a contract with RCA to provide a 
comprehensive television service for Egypt and Syria. Both 
were united under the name of United Arab Republic. In 
Lebanon, the first television station was established with 
the help of the French and the second television station was 
established with the help from ABC.28 
In Saudi Arabia, there was a very strong American 
involvement in the Saudi television system, both in planning 
and operation. Saudi Arabia started its own television 
service relatively late compared to other Arab states. 
Until mid 1965, Saudi Arabia was the only big Arab state 
which did not have its own television system despite the 
fact that the second television station in the Arab World 
was founded in Saudi Arabia by the U.S.A.F to entertain Base 
personnel. Also another station was founded earlier by the 
Arab-American Oil Company (ARAMCO). 
The American connection started when the Crown Prince 
(Faisel), who later became King made a visit to American 
Ambassador Parker T. Hart and asked him for help in building 
a television system. Ambassador Hart passed the request to 
the State Department, which, in turn, passed it to the FCC. 
Edward W. Allen, chief engineer came to Saudi Arabia and 
wrote a report that served as a blueprint for an agreement 
between the two countries. The Allen report called for the 
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responsibility of the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers (COE), who 
had already constructed many governmental projects 
throughout Saudi Arabia. The responsibility was formally 
defined in an agreement signed in January 1964 by Ambassador 
Hart and Saudi government. The (COE) chose the American 
firm of RCA to supply the equipment, and another American 
firm, NBCI, for the operation and maintenance. COE, RCA,and 
NBCI continued to carry out the development and expansion of 
the Saudi television.29 
In Bahrain, also, an American company, RTV 
International, signed a contract in 1974 with the government 
to operate a color commercial television service, making 
Bahrain the first Arab state to have color television and 
the only commercial station in the region. In fact the, 
station's slogan was " The first color television in the 
Arab world". The government owned only 20% of the 
enterprise and had one representative on its Board of 
Directors. In general, the station was too Americanized. 
There was no signs that it was an Arab station or operated 
in an Arab state except fir its broadcast of Arabic news.30 
The government assumed operation of the station in 1976 
because of its poor facilities and to overcome rumors of a 
CIA connection with the station.31 
In North Yemen, a group of international businessmen 
headed by an American attempted in the 197 0s to gain a 
government concession to operate a commercial television 
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service in the capital city San'a, with a percentage of the 
income paid to the government. Due to the political unrest 
and military coups which changed governments, such an 
agreement could not be reached. 
Television and Governments in the Arab States 
One of the obvious features that characterized Arab 
television is it strong relation to governments. All 
television stations in the Arab states are state systems. 
They are owned, controlled, supervised, operated, and 
financed by the governments. There is no doubt that Arab 
governments have realized the power of television as an 
effective influence by whoever is using it over public 
opinion. It seems that Arab governments have no intention 
of giving up this psychological weapon, even partially, at 
least in the near future. 
On the contrary, we observe more and more control and 
domination because television broadcasting has become part 
of the national policy. That justifies the tight control of 
government over television and the absence of even a minimum 
of public participation. Democracy and television in the 
Arab states have always clashed with government structure. 
Herbert Schiller notes that whichever way decision-makers 
move in any particular situation, the central and 
unprecedented fact is that information control 
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Figure 2. Number of television sets per 1000 people. 
SOURCE: Arab Media Present and Future; Toward New Arab 
Information Order, ALECSO, Tunis, 1987. 
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Figure 3. Distributions of television transmitters 
on global basis. 
SOURCE: Arab Media Present and Future; Toward New Arab 
Information Order, ALECSO, Tunis, 1987. 
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has become part of national policy. The techniques of 
ideational packaging have become instruments for 
manipulating popular support for (or, at least, indifference 
to) governmental actions.32 
If Arab governments are acknowledging television power 
at the present time, that was not the case when television 
first started in the Arab World. It seems that Arab 
governments have discovered the power of television years 
after it started in their lands. As a new technological 
invention, not too many Arab leaders realized its power, 
which probably explains the existence of private stations in 
the early years and their disappearance in later years. The 
Arab states built their television systems relatively late 
on the scene, which is why we did not see as much attachment 
between government and television in the past as we do now. 
The attachment has increased over the years. Governments 
increasingly paid more attention and manifested more concern 
about television as the years went by. In fact, television 
received more governmental attention than any other aspect 
of media— the press, for example. 
It seems that Arab governments were trying to 
encourage their people to be attracted to television by 
watching television as the ultimate voice of government 
authority, since the press is not necessarily the formal 
voice of the government in some Arab states. We observe 
that Arab television has developed quite drastically in the 
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past twenty years, much faster than was expected despite the 
fact that Arab television started in the mid-fifties and 
early sixties. Jeremy Tunstall observed that, 
An unusual aspect of the Arab-Muslim World is that the 
weak press tradition, combined with government 
enthusiasm for television, leads to several countries 
having television set ownership more widely diffused 
than daily news paper sales.33 
fact, one of the main problems Arab television is 
suffering from is the extraordinary censorship and the 
unusual government control. At a time when one of the 
functions of television is to pose government activity, we 
find virtually the opposite in the Arab world where 
government exercises censorship of television. In addition 
to its weakness as an institution, poor human resources, 
lack of technical training facilities, it also lacks freedom 
of creativity. 
Arab television has often been used as a tool to 
legitimize undemocratic government systems and in many cases 
to legitimize illegal government actions, since there are no 
democratic governments in the Arab states. There are only 
two types of governments in the Arab states; either monarchy 
governments or military governments, and they both are 
undemocratic. Since the state structure is not democratic 
it was very natural that this would also be characteristic 
of the states' institutions. Democracy does not exist in 
television, and criticism of governments, heads of state, 
and senior officials is prohibited. In fact, criticizing a 
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head of state is considered the greatest unforgivable sin. 
Mahmood El-sherif, an Arab media activist holds Arab 
governments responsible for the abuse of television, 
Unfortunately, and because the means of communication 
in the Arab countries were and still are owned and 
controlled, overtly or covertly, by Arab governments, 
these means have been used in certain instances for 
negative purposes, and in the absence of a free 
competition for quality, certain branches of the media, 
like television, not only failed in discharging their 
social responsibility, but were turned into proponents 
of harmful pattern of behavior, and even moral 
decadence. 4 
The Arab committee studying media issues in the Arab 
World, in its report, " Toward New Arab Information Order," 
expressed its deep disappointment in the weak performance 
function of Arab broadcasting and blamed Arab governments 
for the deterioration and admitted the low level that Arab 
broadcasting has reached, 
Concerning the core, Arab media has not reached the 
level that adequately copes with its message in terms 
of increasing the awareness of Arab citizens, 
reinforcing his cultural identity, getting him involved 
in his society's main problems, and contributing to the 
social development. On top of that, Arab media probably 
was in many cases the cause of Arab citizen living in 
confusion and contradiction. Arab media has been 
utilized in many cases in the service of questionable 
goals such as sustaining dispute and disagreement 
instead of reinforcing brotherhood ties of the Arabs, 
defending the justice of Arab issues, and contributing 
to development programs of Arab societies.35 
The Political Function of Arab Television 
Media activists in the Arab World believe that there 
is a big difference in the content of broadcast messages 
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some twenty five years ago and those of today. The 
political content of programs has out-numbered any other 
locally produced programs. The political programs 
constitute from 15% to 25% of the total programs broadcast 
either on radio or television, and the government monopoly 
of the broadcast media has a lot to do with this political 
function.36 The ruling elite in the Arab states has 
utilized the media for political socialition of their states 
to instill certain political values promoted by these ruling 
elites. Usually to increase the public loyalty to the head 
of state, the political system, and the state structure. 
At the present time, if we look at television in the 
Arab states from any angle, we find that it always relates 
to politics. That give us the rationalization that we can 
not separate television from two things, one a consequence 
of the other. First, we cannot separate it from government 
and, second, we can not separate it from politics. Jeremy 
Tunstall, who studied media in Arab states, noted that every 
where else in the Middle East, the media have always had 
strong political overtones.37 
The evidence of what we are saying is that wherever we 
go in the Arab states, we see that television and radio 
stations are always protected by the army, unlike other 
states's institutions. And whenever there is a coup, the 
first thing done is to attack and take over television and 
radio stations, since broadcasting services became part of 
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the political system. It becomes the voice of the 
government, the voice of authority. As a consequence, 
broadcasting stations become a main political target for 
every new regime and every anti-governments regime. 
After a military coup took place in Iraq in 1958, 
Qassim became to power. He was well known for his fondness 
for television and political broadcasting. He was devoted 
very extensively and exclusively to broadcasting to promote 
his own personal political philosophy in a way that was much 
worse than President Nassir of Egypt. His daily television 
appearance and speeches proved his attachment to television. 
In 1963, Qassim was overthrown in a coup and he was killed 
near the television studio. Ironically, his body was 
displayed on live television.38 
In 1971 during the unsuccessful bloody military coup 
in Morocco, a rebel army group seized the radio station and 
claimed the King is dead, declaring a revolutionary republic 
government. Forces loyal to the king put down the rebellion 
after seven hours of battle to recapture the radio 
station.39 Also the same thing happened during the bloody 
coup in South Yemen in January 1986. The two struggling 
groups of rebel forces and government forces lived through 
days of battles, attacking each other through the air waves. 
The battle to capture the television station make the 
station go off the air for days before the public knew who 
won the battle. In Lebanon, since the start of the civil 
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war, each fighting group has its own radio and television 
station. 
Television in all Arab states with no exception has 
been used as a tool of governments. And it has been always 
treated and looked at as the private property of the ruling 
elite and, to be more specific, as a personal tool of the 
head of the state. Governments have always looked at 
television as a monopoly tool and they are the only class 
who have the privilege of expressing their attitudes. The 
main function is to propagandize for the ruling class and to 
defend their internal and external policy. 
Arab television has been overused in politics and its 
programs are overloaded with purely political content 
reflecting the attitudes of certain people. And if Arab 
governments have assigned high priority to radio and 
television broadcasting, they have also assigned an even 
higher importance to the political content of programs. In 
fact, politics was the main concern of broadcasting 
development in the early years. As a consequence Arab 
governments were more concerned in utilizing television in 
politics much more than to utilize it in social development. 
And in investing resources in television than in investing 
resources for any other human and developmental services. 
There are some Arab states in which their people are 
in desperate need for basic human services: however, their 
governments insisted on giving the top priority to building 
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luxury television stations.40 Even though some analysts see 
that the political phenomenon in Arab television can be 
ascribed to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the political 
seething in the Middle East in general, the truth is most of 
these programs do not deal with Arab issues as much as they 
serve as propaganda for each state government. State 
government news always precedes and has priority over 
national news no matter how important the latter may be. 
News bulletins always start with the news of the head of 
state and government officials no matter what the situation 
is, even in cases of national disaster. 
Statistics and figures showed that political programs 
and news in Arab television occupy the largest portion of 
broadcast programs after entertainment programs, for an 
average of 20%. In some Arab states the percentage reaches 
25%. UNESCO conducted research in behalf of the Gulf 
Television Agency to find the reasons why International and 
Western media do not use their news to the level the Agency 
would desire; the findings of the study indicate that most 
of the Agency news does not take into account the common 
sense of news ethics and norms of the west. It insists on 
the state protocol news, news which makes no sense to the 
public, in addition to having a lack of professional 
principles of news reporting in media broadcasting. 
Muhammad Al-Sanousi, former Under-Secretary Assistant for 
Television Affairs in Kuwait, told the writer in a personal 
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interview that there are many exciting and powerful events 
and news taking place in the Arab world, but they are 
rejected by the international news agencies primarily 
because of poor and improper coverage. 
In analyzing the content of these political programs, 
we conclude that these programs usually aim to do the 
following: 
1- gain people's loyalty to the head of state. 
2- Praise the political structure and the ideology of the 
state. 
3- Praise the performance of the government. 
4- Defend the internal and external policy of the state as 
the level of perfection. 
Political Broadcasting Under Nassir 
In studying media within Arab states, one can not 
ignore the role that Egypt under Nassir had played in the 
development and shaping of Arab media, especially in the 
field of political broadcasting, regardless of the negative 
aspects of this role. It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to cover this role in detail, however, it is unfair to 
ignore it totally. Inevitably, one must touch on the 
political aspect of this role. 
Perhaps one of the sharp turning points of Arab 
government involvement in broadcasting was in the 1950s when 
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Nassir of Egypt came to power. When for the first time in 
the Arab World the political broadcasting phenomenon was 
launched as the main function and the clear, strong, and 
formal relation between government and broadcasting was 
established. 
Nassir was the first Arab ruler to monopolize not only 
radio and television but the press as well, through what has 
been called "nationalization of the press". With that, he 
announced the official attachment between government and 
broadcasting. Since Nassir came to power, he caused an 
upheaval within the Egyptian broadcasting system which 
afterward became a pattern for other Arab states: 
1- For the first time in the Arab World Nassir put 
broadcasting under direct government control through a 
ministry of national guidance which later became in the Arab 
states the ministry of Information. 
2- He showed his appreciation of broadcasting by giving 
special attention to developing broadcasting performance, 
and increasing the number of employees and technicians. 
3_ Increased transmission hours and variety of programs. 
4- Increased transmission power to cover not only Egypt but 
also the Arab World to achieve political purposes. In less 
than ten years transmission power increased 28 folds. 
5- Increased and expanded external services. 
Nassir set the first and the best example of how to 
devote broadcasting to personal propaganda and politics and 
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how to use it both as a personal and as a government tool in 
the Arab World? which was followed later by all other Arab 
governments. Nassir played a major role in spreading the 
political broadcasting phenomenon throughout the Arab 
states, which was heretofore unknown? at the very least, he 
helped to accelerate this type of expansion. 
The role of broadcasting as an important and a vital 
P°litical force for transmitting ideas, mobilizing masses, 
shaping public opinion, and reaching out to people was 
invisible for Arab rulers until they awoke to hear Nassir's 
voice endeavoring to topple their monarchies, especially 
those of Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, during what 
has been called of the Air Waves War. Nassir also called 
for Arab liberation from Western colonialism in some Arab 
states such as Algeria, Oman, and South Yemen. Nassir 
triggered the first spark through his popular and powerful 
station, "Voice of The Arabs" which was actually "Voice of 
Nassir" and through the voice of the legendary and most 
skilled announcer of all Arab times and Nassir's spokesman 
"Ahmed Sae'id", the Walter Cronkite of the Arabs. 
The fast success and the amazing growing of the 
popularity of the "Voice of the Arabs" program among the 
people caused its broadcast hours to jump from half an hour 
a day, when it first began in July 1953 to seven hours in 
July 1954. In 1962 the average broadcast hours reached 22 
hours and 15 minutes, and grew to 24 hours in 1970. 
90 
For so many years, Egypt had been the knowledge center 
for the Muslims and Arab World. At the turn of the century, 
Egypt became a major source of printed media and films for 
the Arab states, and with the launching of the "Voice of the 
Arabs" station, Egypt completed its role as a center of 
electronic media for the Arab states. 
Nassir for the Arab World had played the same role 
that Hitler did for Europe. if Hitler realized the power of 
radio to manipulate people's thought before other Western 
leaders did, Nassir also realized the power of radio and 
television before other Arab leaders did. Nassir suddenly 
became a voice that attracted the attention of the Arab 
people through air waves. He was the first Arab figure to 
master broadcasting as a political medium taking advantage 
of the Arabic culture as an oral culture.43 Nassir's smart 
utilization of broadcasting was not only directed against 
Arab rulers in other Arab states but also against his own 
people who opposed his regime and his personal enemies 
outside Egypt, a practice Which was followed as an example 
by other Arab leaders. Egypt is considered a pattern with a 
special effects in terms of political programs. In the 
fifties, the Egyptian regime concentrated primarily on 
radio; in the sixties increased attention was concentrated 
on television as an additional tool to reach out to 
audiences; Nassir used both radio and television to evoke 
enthusiasm and was promoting people's advocacy of his 
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political and economic changes. He also used it to develop 
contempt for the regime's enemies he was fighting, domestic 
as well as foreign enemies.44 
Nassir's voice succeeded very quickly and powerfully 
in attracting audiences all over the Arab states in an 
attempt to export the Egyptian revolution model to other 
Arab states and to gather Arab people around his ideology. 
He makes himself an Arab national hero through broadcasting, 
especially after he raised his slogan for Arab Unity through 
his famous racist movement, "Pan Arabisim". 
For so long, Nassir's station was calling Arab people 
to topple their monarchy government regime and to set up a 
revolutionary governments especially in states such as 
Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen, accusing them of 
loyalty to the west. The quick and positive responses to 
Nassir's calls in Iraq and North Yemen amazed Arab 
governments and made them realize, probably for the first 
time, of the power of broadcasting in mobilizing people 
politically. Arab governments found themselves unable to 
counter Nassir's station due to their lack of powerful 
transmission and skilled personnel. During the vicious 
campaign from Nassir's station attacking the Iraq 
government; the Iraqi government petitioned the American 
Ambassador to Iraq with an urgent request that the U.S 
supply high-power short and medium-wave transmitters in a 
matter of days or few weeks at the latest because Iraq's 
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transmitter's were too inadequate to match Nassir's 
signals.45 In 1958, as a result of Nassir's calls, a bloody 
coup took place in Iraq. The full credit may go to Nassir's 
station and its mouthpiece, Ahmed Sae'id. 
The fast success and powerful advancing of Nassir's 
station took other Arab leaders by surprise. its threat 
extended to other Arab governments which were in dispute 
with him ideologically. After the early and fast result in 
Iraq, the Nassir station made the same demand to the people 
in other Arab states there were where also positive results 
in Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen. That was a sufficient 
to other Arab governments of the threat of broad¬ 
casting to their regimes. All of a sudden, the Arab 
governments found themselves at a critical disadvantage. 
In an attempt to repel Naasir's station and to deter 
their people from listening to his provocative commentators, 
Arab governments that opposed his ideology started to 
accelerate establishing their own broadcasting systems to 
emulate him politically in order to distract their people 
from listening to him. In fact, one of the reasons that the 
British-introduced television in South Yemen is to distract 
people from listening to Nassir's station. Also, Arab 
governments which were proponents of Nassir's ideology and 
witnessed the success of his station and admired the 
popularity of his broadcasting strategy were eager to 
develop their own systems following his pattern. 
93 
Meanwhile, after witnessing the popularity and the 
over-whelming success of his station, Nassir was eager to 
develop the power of his broadcasting system to make sure 
that all Arab people, either in Asia or Africa, could hear 
his voice. During the Yemen War, Nassir distributed 100,000 
transistor radios sets to ensure that the "Voice of the 
Arabs" would reach Yemeni tribesmen.46 Nassir wanted his 
voice to reach the people not only in the Arab World, but 
also the people in the Third World as well. Between 1952 
and 1971 Egypt expanded its radio transmission power 
seventy— fold, ahead of both France and Japan in hours 
broadcast.47 Since 1953, Egypt started broadcasting to 
Indonesia, India, and Pakistan. And in 1954 it started 
broadcasting to Turkey, Iran, and East Africa. Broadcast 
hours jumped from 86 hours a week in 1953 to 339 hours a 
week in I960.48 Broadcasting under Nassir has expanded 
tremendously. In 1962, a United Nations report classified 
Egypt radio as the World's largest and powerful external 
service in daily transmission hours after the Soviet Union 
(RM) .49 
In addition to Nassir's success in utilizing 
broadcasting for political reasons to mobilize people in 
order to achieve his goals, other circumstances helped him 
to reach them: 
1- Nassir was the first Arab ruler to appreciate the power 
of media and he took advantage of broadcasting both as a new 
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technology and as a double-edged weapon. He could reach his 
far away Arab audience in Asia and Africa by radio waves, 
which the printed media could not do. Nassir did not want 
to attract only the literate elite Arabs, but also the 
illiterate masses at the bottom of the pyramid. The 
enormous number of illiterate Arabs did not have to know how 
to read to listen to his programs. 
2- He used broadcasting as a means of crossing national 
borders, whereas printed media could be easily banned by 
those who opposed his ideology; jamming techniques were not 
available at the time. 
3- Nassir seized upon the opportunity that none of the Arab 
rulers appreciated media as he did and not all Arab states 
had their own broadcasting system; their people had not yet 
begun to pay much attention to broadcasting, and even when 
their governments did have stations, they were not as 
powerful and popular as Nassir's. 
4- As mentioned earlier, Nassir took advantage of the 
Arabic language as an oral language, by which he could 
communicate with his audience very strongly and with 
emotionally overtones to provoke and stimulate them. 
5- The peak of political unrest in most Arab states during 
the 1950s and 1960s helped Nassir to succeed to a great 
degree, since most Arab states at that time were still under 
Western colonialism and had not yet gained their political 
independence. Their states had not been really defined yet, 
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the struggle of power was continuing among different 
factions, none of the regimes were firmly established, and 
there was an absence of prominent charismatic leaders who 
could rival Nassir. The Egyptian revolution, as the first 
major revolution in the Arab World against the British, was 
the first spark of rebellion against colonialism in the Arab 
states. Nassir was trying to transmit this spark through 
the broadcasting programs beamed to other Arab states, 
promoting the Egyptian revolution as an ideal for similar 
expected revolutions to model themselves after. 
Thus, Nassir was the first to capture and attract the 
first generation of a government political broadcasting 
audience long before any other Arab leaders did; competition 
was then created among other Arab governments to capture as 
many audiences as they could to attract them to their side. 
As a result, politics and government propaganda became a 
major factor in establishing broadcasting systems in other 
Arab states either to support Nassir's ideas or to counter 
propaganda from him. Basically, it is fair to say that the 
emergence of broadcasting in the Arab states was due to a 
cause not a need. Even after the introduction of 
television, this political function of broadcasting has 
automatically shifted as a natural consequences from radio 
to the newly introduced medium, in which this notion became 
even more developed than it was in radio. 
As a result of other Arab states' reaction to Nassir's 
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station which had set the first and best example for 
devoting broadcasting to propaganda for his regime; other 
Arab governments followed exactly the same pattern setting 
up the first priority and the ultimate objective of their 
broadcasting system to be propaganda for their regimes. 
Perhaps that is why we see all Arab televisions broadcast 
are filled with political programs and news which 
propagandize for the government and the regime, making 
television the voice of government only. Also, Nassir's 
grip and centralization of control of the broadcasting 
system, his direct daily control and supervision, together 
with his strategy and technique in attacking his enemies, 
was followed by other Arab governments. 
It was years before the Arab people discovered that 
Nassir's political broadcasting was based on fraud and 
illusion and that they were being used for his personal 
objectives. The relation between Nassir and his political 
broadcasting finally collapsed and came to an end when he 
lost his credibility; the Arab people who had been listening 
to his stations and his emotional voice for years lost their 
belief in him. For years he had been promising the Arab 
people to bring them triumphant victory over Israel, and for 
years had been promising to unite them very soon around his 
ideology. They finally discovered his lies and that they had 
been fooled by the overtone of his speeches all these years. 
Probably one of his biggest lies that neither history nor 
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the facts could hide was perpetrated when he told the Arab 
people during the six Days War that he had crushed the 
Israeli army and that he had won the war he promised the 
Arabs; his own people discovered a few days later from the 
enemies' stations that they had lost the war in one of the 
most humiliating and shameful wars in Arab history. 
One-Way Medium 
The basic concept of any communication medium is that 
it is a two- way medium between the sender and the receiver, 
or at least it should be. if either side did not 
communicate or did not communicate properly, then the 
communication will be ineffective or less effective. The 
fact is that the effectiveness of communication depends upon 
the interplay and the interaction among the participants. 
The variable degrees of communication usually cause 
miscommunication and then misunderstanding which harm 
generally the degree of effectiveness in getting the content 
of the message across. Television as a medium can not only 
send messages, but can also facilitate two-way communication 
involving people's participation. 
Studies have shown that one- way communication methods 
are ineffective. Everett Rogers explains why: 
Self-development implies a different role for 
communication than the usual top-down development 
approach of the past. Technical information about 
development problems and possibilities and about 
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innovation is sought by local systems from 
the central government. The role of government 
nlw T Kagenfies' then' is mainly to communicate in 
to Ho -1 th®se locally initiated requests, rather than 
to design and conduct top-down communication campaigns. 
Key elements in self-development approaches are 
mass mobilization, and group efficacy, 
*inhothe ?ain responsibility for development, planning 
and execution being at the local level.^ 
If we try to apply this notion to television in the 
Arab states, we find that governments’ approach to 
television is simply a "one-way medium,". Meaning it 
functions only as a sender; as a consequence it became 
useless and mal-functioning and lacks interaction. Sydney 
Head comments on this point: 
Part of the reason for the lack is that officials of 
some governments still tend to regard broadcasting as a 
one-way medium. They see it as a means of issuing 
directives, orders, fiats, or edicts, rather than a 
means of establishing a dialogue. They see it as a way 
of imposing conformity, rather than as a means of 
developing consensus; as a weapon of propaganda, 
rather as an avenue of enlightenment. Such officials 
use the national broadcasting service as a personal 
megaphone, rather than as a device for responding to 
the wants and needs of those at the receiving end. 
This one-way approach on the part of high officials 
demands broadcasters as professionals..though their 
generally low status is also a function of the 
recruitment and training process.51 
The above statement applies exactly to the situation 
in the Arab states. Arab television does not establish a 
dialogue, nor does it develop consensus. Rather than 
enlightment, it is an avenue of black-out in the Arab 
states, and a one-way device which does not responds to the 
needs of the people at the receiving end. Everett Rogers 
sees that the lack of authentic contact and understanding 
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between the source of communication and the receiver is 
likely to nullify the effects of whatever is transmitted 
through media. Lack of feedback, Rogers says, results in 
"remedying where there is no pain" He notes that: 
the inadequate communication between elite and masses 
may...:Lead to conflict in which the frustrated masses 
seek to communicate their needs by more violent 
expression. Perhaps the high rate of political 
instability in less developed countries in the 
1960's...is a manifestation of the communication gap 
between elite and masses. One reason for the frequent 
failure of elite- directed programs of change is that 
we know so little about the traditional audience.52 
Yahya Abu Bakr and others believe that many Arab 
scholars attribute the phenomenon of fundamentalist 
movements in some Arab states to the weak content of the 
religious message communicated by the media. Therefore, 
several Arab states are currently conducting a comprehensive 
reexamination of the complementary roles of mosque and the 
media. 
Television does not create an immediate response and 
feedback, but that can be done through audience research 
measures to test programs' effectiveness among viewers and 
to evaluate the communication level with the receiving end, 
so as to be aware of the needs of the society and to 
evaluate the performance of the television system as a 
whole. The benefit of this kind of research will be for 
both sides, the sender as well as for the receiver. Perhaps 
this is one of the negative sides of Arab television. 
of television in the Arab states, almost Since the emergence 
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no serious study or research has been done to test viewers' 
feedback in any of the Arab states. As a matter of fact, no 
such study has been made before establishing television in 
any of the Arab states to find out people's and society's 
needs which could be addressed by television service. A 
neutral and objective study of the results of government 
control of the Arab media ..on balance..was used more for 
limited political ends than for social or economic 
development.53 Apparently governments are not concerned 
about the needs and the problems of the receiving end, 
which also means that governments are less concerned about 
the development process. Thus, there is no way that content 
of programs can be changed and adapted to meet people's and 
society's needs. 
Many media managers believe that by themselves they 
have the ability and knowledge to provide a well-round 
broadcast schedule that include news, entertainment, 
and educational programming. For them, the statement 
by former French broadcast official Arthur Conte, "I 
am the public" applies".54 
Wilbur Shramm has emphasized that the media should not 
be used merely to transmit orders from a ruling elite to its 
charges, but as a channel of communication through which the 
people can participate in national government and in 
development planning.55 
Ignoring the other side's opinions has led, 
accordingly, to many other secondary phenomena within the 
public themselves. Since television does not reflect 
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society's needs but reflects the needs of the ruling elite, 
it became very logical for viewers to look at television as 
a medium of monotonous programs. Studies indicate that the 
Arab states are the World's largest market for VCRs. This 
supports the argument that Arab viewers are not satisfied 
with the types of programs offered by their government's 
televisions. Turning to a VCR is a reflection of 
dissatisfaction. Therefore, viewers' stimulation is 
essential to get the sender's message across. As long as 
there is no stimulation for viewers, then there is a gap 
between the sender and the receiver with no message getting 
across. Consequently, the medium becomes worthless. 
Arab viewers have also turned to foreign stations, 
home satellite dishes, and external service programs as 
their sanctuary for seeking satisfaction and truth. 
External services are very popular in the Arab states. 
There are more than forty foreign stations broadcasting in 
Arabic. This issue is a national tragedy in itself, 
considering the fact that their own government had lost its 
credibility with the people who trusted foreign sources more 
than their national government sources, and despite the fact 
that these foreign sources are not as authentic and reliable 
as most Arab people believe— especially when these foreign 
sources have for a long time been considered by the Arab 
people as implacable enemies and as their former colonists. 
Very often these foreign sources present untrue reports and 
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news and programs aimed at distorting images of the Arab 
states, taking advantage of their credibility to the Arab 
people. 
However, it seems that the Arab viewers can not accept 
the official stories any longer where truth is hidden and 
criticism of government and officials is not only 
unacceptable but also prohibited. People in the Arab World 
have started to realize that praising government officials 
as the level of perfection does not alleviate their 
suffering as a result of their being starved for learning. 
All these factors have combined to create a mistrust 
between people and governmental television. Perhaps the 
beginning of this mistrust was in 1967, right after the Six 
Days War when they were told that they were winning the war 
against Israel and the Arab people awoke to the fact, 
broadcast a few days later the foreign external services 
programs, that they had lost the war. After the bitter 
truth had manifested itself from foreign sources, people 
realized that government officials' stories are not 
dependable. This type of situations has created animosity 
between Arab governments and foreign external services, 
especially during crucial political events. Usually Arab 
governments overcome this problem by jamming these stations. 
John Merrill sees that this peculiar relationship 
between broadcasting, government, and people in developing 
countries happens only during the early stages of 
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development where national leadership does not really want a 
mass media system except for the elite communication: 
In fact, the leadership elite feels t-h**- 
iS a dant?er • • not an Lse??. Utile 
f*S g*ven to the masses..to their 
participation in government, in their literacy in 
their rights to know" and all such thinas aii • 
“***■ when the^ation'is8fairly^ thlS 
elite a^iabl^^ui an? haS “hat is considered by the 
elite a viable political and economic base.56 
Merrill's point is somewhat theoretical if the problem 
is a matter of time. Experiences have shown that developing 
countries have been in the same situation for decades and 
decades, and the time Merrill speaks of has not yet come. 
On the contrary, one observes no improvement as time goes on 
but becomes more and more deteriorated. Perhaps, Merrill is 
speaking of the natural process of development under natural 
circumstances. Wilbur Shramm, however, observes that 
governments approach as a one-way medium is intentional and 
they sustain it on purpose. He notes: 
The governments of the Third World countries are not 
unaware of the power and value of the mass media, but 
at the same time they realize that the media can be 
very important in maintaining popular support and in 
encouraging people to obey the government. They also 
seem to concentrate their use of this power in the area 
of transmitting orders from the ruling elite to the 
general population, instead of using it to permit the 
masses of the people to participate in the national 
government and in development planning.57 
Lack of democracy in Arab television is a reflection 
of lack of democracy in the political system of the states 
in the first place. Since no democracy exists in the 
government political structure, it is very natural that 
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there be no democracy in the government infrastructure. 
Also centralization of television is part of the 
centralization of the government structure. 
Generally, the phenomenon of one-way flow of 
television programs is not only a state phenomenon but it a 
global one as well. Television programs flow internationally 
in one direction and from top to bottom, from developed 
countries to developing countries. These programs also flow 
on the state level in one direction, from those who have 
access to the medium to the masses of people. 
Conclusion 
Television in the Arab states is ineffective, not 
functioning well, not playing an important role in the 
development process, and has a marginal role. Many reasons 
can be counted for this situation. The western influence in 
Arab television since the days of establishment is very 
evident in determining its function. The role of Arab 
governments, however, in this matter has a lot to do with 
this state of affairs and holds a great deal for 
responsibility of reaching this level of deteriaration. 
The chapter has supported the view that the Arab 
governments' approach and comprehension of the medium is the 
main question. The chapter has covered several critical 
issues associated with this misconception which has led to 
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other minor issues, some of the outcomes of the 
governments' misconception that the chapter has covered were 
governments' strong control of the medium, the political 
function of Arab television, and the fact of being a one-way 
medium, and the lack of freedom and democracy in television 
programs' content. 
While Chapter III covered these aspects of television 
and governments, it definitly didn't cover all issues. 
Chapter IV, however, will be concentrated on the relation 
between television and culture in Arab states and other 
issues not covered by Chapter III. The next chapter will 
discuss in more detail the other aspects of Arab television 
and its role in respect to Arab culture. 
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Chapter IV 
TELEVISION AND CULTURE IN THE ARAB STATES 
Introduction 
This chapter touches on the main concern of this 
study, discussing the heart of the problems as they relate 
to the connection between television and culture in the Arab 
states. Whereas Chapter III dealt largely with the relation 
between television, governments, and politics, this chapter, 
concentrates primarily on the type and content of 
broadcasted programs of Arab television. First of all, the 
chapter illuminates the role of U.S government policy in 
homogenizing the world cultures through "made-in-America" 
media materials and massive export of U.S television 
programs, and through the Free Flow of Information doctrine. 
The chapter then illustrates the impact of television 
in the Arab people's culture and the impact of the content 
of the imported western programs in affecting negatively the 
original Arab culture. These negatives effects were 
reflected in people's mentality and shifts from an Arab life 
style to western life styles and the daily life practice, as 
a consequence of the large exposure of western programs. 
This chapter emphasizes on the role of the imported 
entertainment programs and the foreign channels as a chief 
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carrier of alien western ideas. All these combined aspects 
seriously threaten the continuity of the indigenous Arab 
culture. 
General Perspectivp, 
Any study of television in the Arab States, should not 
confine itself to superficial measures such as the 
availability of numbers of television receiver sets per 
capita, the type of transmission service (whether it is 
black and white or color), number of transmission stations, 
number of transmission hours, number of availability of 
channels, and other hardware measures. It should go beyond 
these limitations to include essential factors such as type 
of programs broadcast and their relation to the society's 
needs, the level of interaction between broadcast programs 
and receiving audience, the percentage of locally and 
nationally produced programs, the percentage of foreign 
imported programs, the type of these imported programs and 
their relevance to the needs and demands of the Arab 
societies, the function of television in general and how its 
performance is contributing to the national culture and how 
well its programs serve the needs of the society. 
The concern of this study, the relation between 
television and culture, is the main focal point to be 
addressed. It will review and evaluate the extent to which 
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television has served the national culture and whether its 
programs have contributed to the indigenous national 
culture. In this regard, the content of programs is 
actually what counts; it is the most important element in 
the communication process. "The content of the programming 
is all that really matters, for what is broadcast may 
determine, in large measure, the cultural outlook and the 
social direction of the new nations of generations."1 it 
also reflects the state's television policy since state 
television is the voice of the government. Therefore, 
' content will be the focus of our discussion. 
The U.S Cultural Impact 
After the Second World War, the United States emerged 
as a new super power of what has been called the" American 
Century". But unlike other super power countries, the 
United States was distinguished from other super powers. It 
was not only in terms of military force, political, and 
economic but it also added one more super feature that set 
it a part from other super powers, and that was its advanced 
and sophisticated electronic communication power reflected 
in all aspects of electronic media, especially in the field 
of commercial television programs. The United States 
through its media center -Hollywood- became the globe's 
largest source for producing and distributing media software 
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programs in a massive quantity for the rest of the World. 
It took governments and scholars years before they 
began to realize the peril of this phenomenon after it 
manifested itself as a new imperialistic power, after it 
became clear to the international community that this 
phenomenon is a threat to the globe's indigenous cultures. 
It was not until decades later when the issue of the threat 
of American media as a global phenomenon became an 
international one. New terms, terminology, phrases, and 
expression began to arise concerning this issue of "cultural 
imperialism", such as "Cultural invasion", "electronic 
global village", "cultural alienation", and "imported 
civilization". Many studies and much research have been 
conducted on the issue, especially in the last decade. Many 
seminars and conferences under international organizations 
have discussed the issue, demanding a safeguard of their 
cultures and new world information order which would be 
balanced and just. 
One of the early scholars who warned of the threat of 
the American media is Herbert I. Schiller. In his early 
work, MASS COMMUNICATION AND AMERICAN EMPIRE. 
(1969)Schiller argues that the powerful American media is 
part of the American military industrial complex which would 
dominate the world to achieve economic purposes. The 
American military build up was simultaneous with and 
extremely relevant to the electronic communication 
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technology industry built up through the giant multi¬ 
national corporations, especially in the field of space 
satellites. Schiller reaches the conclusion that the 
invasion of "made- in- America" products is not a matter of 
casual coincidence but rather an international well- 
organized conspiracy planned for years as a long term 
strategy of the U.S government foreign policy to dominate 
the world. 
The U.S had to put an incredible effort in this matter 
to monopolize world's media. To do so they had to invent 
what has been called the "Free Flow of Information" doctrine 
and "worldwide access to news". The U.S launched a 
comprehensive campaign and spared no effort to get it 
recognized and backed up by international organizations. 
However, the U.S first had to break the European monopoly on 
the world's information, which took them two decades, their 
power eclipsed that of Europe after they began utilizing the 
space satellite as a new communication medium. 
Schiller observes that the "free flow of information" 
doctrine began with the emergence of the U.S as an colonial 
power, not after the Second World War. The principle served 
as an excuse for breaking the British and French Empires' 
monopoly targeted by American media which accused them of a 
world information monopoly and of distorting the American 
image by confining their coverage of America to Hollywood 
scandals, violence, rubbery and crimes in Chicago. 
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In 1914, Kent Cooper, former executive manager of the 
Associate Press published a book, Barriers Down, criticizing 
the international grip of the European news cartels, the 
first public official statement summing up the U.S policy 
came immediately after the war. William Benton, the 
Assistant Secretary of State (who was to become a U.S 
Senator), outlined, in a State Department broadcast in 
January 1946, the government position on the meaning of 
freedom of information: 
The State Department plans to do everything within its 
power along political or diplomatic lines to help break 
down the artificial barriers to the expansion of 
private American news agencies, magazines, motion 
pictures, and other media of communication throughout 
the world.... freedom of the press and freedom of 
exchange of information generally- is an integral part 
of our foreign policy.2 
John Foster Dulles, the former Secretary of State declared 
that "If I were to be granted one point of foreign policy 
and no other, I would make it the free flow of 
information."3 
In June of 1944 the directors of the American Society 
of Newspaper Editors adopted a resolution urging both major 
political parties to support "world freedom of information 
and unrestricted communication for news throughout the 
world." In September of 1944, both houses of Congress 
adopted a concurrent resolution followeing closely the 
recommendation of the editors and publishers. In November 
of 1944, the directors of the American Society of newspaper 
Editors, declared that "most Americans and their newspapers 
115 
will support the government's policies ...and action toward 
removal of all political, legal and economic barriers to the 
media of information, and ...our government should make this 
abundantly clear to other nations."4 
In spring of 1945, a delegation of the American 
Society of Newspaper Editors in conjunction with the AP and 
UPI toured the world on Army transport planes— including 22 
major cities and 11 allied and neutral countries— to 
promote this doctrine. On December 14,1946, the General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 59, which declared that "freedom 
°f information is a fundamental human right, and is a 
touchstone of the freedoms to which the United Nations is 
consecrated," and the freedom "implies the right to gather, 
transmit, and publish news anywhere and every-where without 
fetter."5 
Within a few years, the American media industry 
dramatically developed a massive production that invaded the 
rest of the world. The immense influx of American media 
products was tremendous and impressive especially in the 
last three decades. 
Depending on American programs became inevitable and 
avoiding them was impossible and threatened developing 
countries as well as developed countries such as Europe and 
even neighboring Canada. 
The American commercial television products has become 
an important and flourishing national export since early 
116 
•60s. In 1964, Wilson P. Dizard, a former U.S.I.A official, 
mentioned that 
American TV products, for better and worse, are setting f°rKt®ievlsion Programming throughout the 
yinUCh the same way HollYWOod did for the motion 
40 Years ago. The United States now leads all 
other countries combined twice over as a program 
exporter...Foreign sales were until a few years ago, a 
source of random profits peripheral to revenues from 
syndication at home... Today, overseas sales accounts 
for 60 per cent of all U.S. television syndication 
activities and represent the difference between profit 
and loss for the entire industry.6 
In 1967, Dizard told a congressional committee that 
"The amount of [TV commercial] export now approaching $100 
million a year, is such that the television screen is 
becoming the main source of the "America Image" for 
increasing millions of people abroad."7 
Jack Valenti, president of Motion Picture Export 
Association of America, reported before the Subcommittee on 
Government Operations of the, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee: 
American motion picture occupy perhaps half of the 
screen time of theaters of the world...Nearly half of 
the theatrical revenues of MPEAA members is derived 
from foreign showings...In 1976, the gross foreign 
billings of our members from theatrical films and 
television programming came to approximately 
$700,000,000, with theatrical movies accounting for a 
little more than two thirds. The foreign theatrical 
market represented 49.5 percent of total film rental 
grosses. For television, the foreign market accounted 
for 23.4 percent of grosses.8 
Commissioner of FCC Fowler stated that media 
activities in the U.S. which was no more than 2% of the 
total American G.N.P in 1880, had reached 66% in 1980.9 
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William Davidson, in his book The Amazing Rar.p (1983), 
estimated the American media industry to be approximately 
$150 billion and that it will increase by 20% annually and 
constitute 40% of the total economic activities in the U.S. 
market.10 
In 1974, UNESCO conducted a study indicating that most 
developing countries with television systems import more 
than half of its broadcast programs, and that 75% of the 
total import of television programs comes from the United 
States. Despite this enormous export, the U.S. imports no 
films or serials except of 2% of educational programs.11 In 
1982, UNESCO statistics indicated that 74% of the world's 
radio sets and 80% of the world's TV sets are in the 
industrialized countries.12 The developing countries 
imported 80% of its news from the industrialized countries 
(mainly from U.S, Britain, and France)13 despite the 
inconsistency that these news programs were irrelevant to 
the conditions in the developing countries. 
Needless to say, the free flow of information doctrine 
did not do the good to human culture that was claimed for it 
in its early days. On the contrary, it put other cultures 
in jeopardy threatening to homogenize the charm of the 
world's seperate cultures and to deteriorate the situation 
in the world. It caused and propounded international 
problems between what has been called North and South, 
exacerbating the huge gap and disparity between developed 
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and developing countries, particularly in terms of media and 
cultural affairs. 
During the early -70s, developing countries realized 
the injustice of the present world information order and the 
hazard that it presented. In breeding primarily on cultural 
structure shock, it caused semi-termination of cultural 
continuity, which maintained a cultural imperialism 
reminiscent of the political and economic imperialism of 
colonial times. 
A variety of calls arose from different parts of the 
world, especially from the Third World countries, demanding 
a new and just world information order. To achieve this 
intent, however, it was not an easy task. The developing 
countries had to struggle hard for years for this crucial 
demand. Within many conferences, meetings, seminars, and 
debates sponsored by regional, national and international 
institutions such as the non-allied movement, UNESCO, and 
the U.N, many proposals have called for more socially 
responsible reporting, a free and balanced flow of 
information, and a large share of the international spectrum 
so that all countries can derive some of the benefits and 
profits of satellite distribution. The United States, 
supported in many cases by Western Europe, rejected these 
proposals as unacceptable restrictions on the free flow of 
information and the free market.14 
UNESCO, the strongest advocate of the free flow of 
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information doctrine at one time, has veered noticeably away 
from its formerly unquestioning support and adopted in 
October 1972 the Declaration of Guiding Principles on the 
use of Satellite Broadcasting for the free flow of 
information. In November 1972, the U.N General Assembly 
supported this view by a Vote of 102 to 1, the United States 
casting the single dissenting vote.15 
The General Conference, in its nineteenth session 
held in Nairobi in 1976, instructed the Director General of 
UNESCO to undertake a review of all problems of media in 
contemporary society. He accordingly established the 
International Commission for the study of communication 
problems in the world, with a membership of fifteen media 
experts from all over the world— or which come to be known 
as the Sean MacBride commission. Within two years the 
commission submitted its comprehensive study in a report 
called Many Voices. One World. In its twentieth session in 
1978, the General Conference adopted unanimously the 
principles set forth in the Declaration of Media. The 
General Assembly of the United Nations, in its 33rd session, 
adopted a resolution assuring the importance of the 
establishment of a new international information order, 
supporting the efforts in this field and the U.N role in 
achieving this goal.16 
Generally speaking, however, despite all these efforts 
and endeavors by the developing countries to hold the threat 
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of the American media at bay, there was no indication of a 
change in the situation and the Americans' programs remained 
as the globally predominant programs. it appears that more 
countries are in relying on them, especially thoe with newly 
established television systems such those in Africa and 
Asia. It seems that the achievements of developing 
countries were theoretical more than pragmatic and they 
still could not put them into action. Obviously, it was not 
expected the situation could be changed within a short 
period of time. It is quite evident that it will take the 
developing countries years to recover from the old order 
before they will be able exercise the new information order. 
Television and Arab Culture 
It is already been noted that Western countries have 
had a great influence in establishing the foundation of Arab 
television during the colonial era. Television in many Arab 
states was not established by the national governments but 
by the colonial Western governments. Despite the fact that 
Westerners have left Arab land a long time ago, and although 
the Arab States have gained their political independence 
years ago, the Western influence still exists and continues 
to have amajor presence on Arab television, probably even 
greater than before. 
This Western influence was never discontinued and 
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became greater and greater as the years went by. Actually, 
this influence was simultaneous with and relevant to the 
development of Arab television systems. The more Arab 
television developed, the more Western influence existed. 
This applies not only to the Arab states whom whose systems 
were founded by colonial governments but also to other Arab 
states whose television was established under the national 
governments. It seems that Western influence does not 
depend on who established television; the problem goes 
beyond this issue as we going to see. 
Most people assumed, that the more Arab television was 
developed, the less Western influence would be. In fact, 
experience has proved totally the opposite. If Western 
influence during the colonial era was through hardware 
equipment and only a few programs for several years, it 
burgeoned to an uninterrupted influx of software programs 
after they left up until the present time. As a matter of 
fact, establishing Arab television during the colonial era 
was only considered the first primitive step for a giant 
coming in the future with many additional giant steps. 
After independence, the newly independent Arab states 
thought they could handle the business of television. 
Surprisingly, that was not the case. Television a serious 
business, was to a large extent beyond their limits and 
capabilities to handle. Despite the assumption that Western 
influence will vanish with the declaration of independence, 
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the truth is that television has nothing to do with 
independence. The relation between television and the 
Western connection has continued through the supply of 
ready-made programs. 
Through the years, television has proved that it is 
not merely a matter of hardware equipment. More 
importantly, in the long run, there is also a software side. 
The software content, however, is a double- edged weapon. 
That, probably, was the point that most Arab governments did 
not perceive. That was definitely that was the gap through 
which Western influence could penetrate. They could fill 
the span of air time not only with ready -made imported 
Western software but also with ready made Western ideas and 
taste. 
Probably one of the features that clearly 
characterized Arab television in connection with Western 
countries is the massive import of software tapes. 
Ironically, at the time when Arab States were putting their 
concentration on television as hardware equipment, the 
Western countries were putting their emphasis on software 
tapes. However, the problem still is not simply a matter of 
software programs: does it cease at this limit? Elihu Katz 
explains why: 
In examining the situation of broadcasting in 
developing countries, one must look beyond the 
importation of tapes and films to the importation of 
program ideas and formats. What is not directly 
imported may be—at second glance—imported as a model 
or "stimulus" for local translation salesmen, for the 
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international marketeers who 
with packages of videotape, 
which are also for sale. ^ 
come equipped not only 
but with catalogs of ideas 
Television in the Arab States has played an 
indisputable role in changing social life and social values 
in general which, as a consequence, changed the patterns of 
people's social behaviors. Since the appearance of 
television in the Arab States, there were early signals 
iri*3 expectation of attachment between people and 
this new medium, which applied to radio before television. 
In general, the Arab people are attracted to and fascinated 
by all types of electronic media technology such as radio, 
television, and video. Many field studies suggest that the 
concentration of radio and television in the cities of Arab 
states have accelerated the immigration from the peasant 
areas to the city, since enjoying these mediums is 
considered by the peasant an advantage of living in the 
city. 
When radio was still a young medium, it was popular 
and abundant. Despite its relative expense before the 
introduction the transistor, there was a strong desire 
among the Arab population, even by low-income people to 
acquire a set. People who had a set got unusual respect 
from the people in the neighborhood, and ownership somewhat 
changed the social status of the person. Boyd noted that 
"In many Arab countries a radio is a status symbol: the 
larger and more intricate the set, the higher the status." 
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Wlibur Shramm delineates the situation in an Arab village: 
°nce in an isolated village in the Middle East I 
watched a radio receiver,the first any of the villagers 
had seen,put into operation in the head man's house. 
The receivers promptly demonstrated that knowledge is 
power. It became a source of status to its owner; he 
was the first to the news, and controlled the access of 
others to it. For him and all others who heard, the 
noisy little receiver became a magic carpet to carry 
them beyond the horizons they had known. But the most 
impressive demonstration of the impact of that radio 
was the scene when a group of villagers-who had 
previously known higher government chiefly through the 
tax collector or a soldier- heard for the first time a 
spokesman of their leaders invite them to take part in 
governing their country. The surprise, the 
incredulity, the rather puzzled hope in their faces 
made an unforgettable picture.19 
The rapid spread of radio in the Arab States went 
above Shramm's scale which was adopted by the UNESCO: 100 
sets for every 1000 population. With the exception of few 
Arab states the average of radio sets for every 1000 capita 
ranged from 150 sets to 204 sets, and in the rich oil 
countries the figure reached 465 for every 1000 capita.20 
From 1971 to 1975 the number of radio sets jumped from 
10,000,000 to 18,300,000, an increase of 83%. With respect 
to television, the case is not much different. The UNESCO 
estimated the minimum of TV sets to be distributed as 20 
sets per 1000 capita, but the Arab states went above this 
limit, reaching an average of between 4 0 and 56 sets. In 
rich oil Arab states the figure probably is the highest in 
the world: 484 sets per 1000 capita, according to 1981 
UNESCO statistics.21 Between 1971 and 1975, the number of 
television sets in the Arab states have increased from 
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1,900,000 to 3,400,000 sets.^ 
The special chemistry between television and the Arab 
people can be attributed perhaps to the social and cultural 
environment. Television is considered a recreation medium 
privately as well as publicly. One of the unique viewing 
pattern in the Arab culture is to watch television in 
groups, either in coffee houses, local restaurants, or even 
in the front yard of private residences, an implied 
invitation for passersby to join them, part of the Arab 
cultural concept of hospitality and brotherhood. Television 
is also considered a major pastime for a family centered 
Arab culture. Acquiring a TV set is considered a big 
advantage and is an essential house appliance for any family 
household, especially in family- oriented Arab societies. 
It is not unusual that purchasing a TV set may be a priority 
over any other household appliance even in rural areas, 
since it serve as a recreational device around which the 
family members can gather. Douglas Boyd who studied 
television in the Arab States observed that television 
service is a reality in all Arab countries, rich and poor 
alike, and it has no competition: 
there is very strong motivation among the poor to 
acquire a television receiver: In Egypt it is not 
unusual for a television set to be purchased by village 
leaders before electricity reaches their area. In poor 
section of Cairo, an extended family may pool resources 
to purchase a used black and white set from a 
neighborhood dealer.23 
Muhammad A. Subhi depicts the impact of television 
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transmission on people's behavior when it first began in 
some cities in Saudi Arabia—Riyadh and Jiddah. He noted 
that people were so interested in television that during 
evening broadcasting hours the radio audience rate had 
dropped in the areas of television coverage. Also, traffic 
in the streets of the capital city of Riyadh and Jiddah had 
declined during the television broadcast hours. Outdoor 
recreation was dramatically reduced as people began to 
prefer to stay in their houses to watch television 
programs.24 
Through the years, Arab people became well known for 
their fondness for watching television, actually their 
addiction for watching television. In 1982, the Arab center 
for audience and viewers research conducted research on five 
Arab states (Iraq, Sudan, Morocco, Jordan, and Kuwait) to 
determine their television viewing patterns. The conclusion 
of the study suggested that the average time the Arab 
viewers spent on watching television ranged between 3 and 4 
hours a day despite the relatively short broadcasting day. 
However, this percentage increased on the weekends and 
during the holidays and special occasions when the 
transmission becomes longer.25 
The power of television shocked both the structure of 
the society and the structure of the family. The impact, 
unfortunately, was negative. Since the function of 
television was not utilized constructively, the outcome was 
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not positive or even neutral. 
Generally speaking, television in the Arab States did 
not play any positive role in contributing to the promotion 
of the national culture or even in preserving it. To the 
contrary to a large extent television was the cause of 
undermining the national culture. in many cases, 
intentionally or unintentionally television caused a 
distortion of the image of the indigenous culture. 
Although all Arab states have stated explicitly that 
their main goal of television broadcasting is to protect and 
enhance the values of the culture, actually that was merely 
theoretical more than actual and has nothing to do with 
reality. None of the Arab states could translate this 
statement into action. On the contrary, we find that most 
Arab states' broadcasts do not meet with their officially 
stated goals. In Egypt, for instance, broadcast law was 
enacted as follows: 
To enhance the standard of all kinds of arts, to 
encourage favorable habits and customs, and to 
discourage improper ones. To deal with social problems 
and to exhort adherence to moral and ethical values, to 
revive the literacy, scientific and artistical Arab 
heritage. To acquaint the people with the best products 
of human civilization.26 
In reality, in reviewing Egyptian television programs, 
totally the opposite is true. More than 40% of the programs 
are imported; and while entertainment occupies the largest 
portion of air time, Islamic programs occupies only 1% of 
the total air time. In radio time, 46% is devoted to 
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entertainment, 20% to news, 9% to culture, and l% to 
education:"As this breakdown suggests, it is not a highbrow 
service.".27 During Nassir's reign, Egyptian television was 
offering American and British series, and, because of his 
close relation with the Russians, he was also showing 
programs from socialist countries. 
Despite its tough and distinctive position, and 
despite its adherence to Islam's teachings in its broadcast 
programs compared to other Arab television, Saudi television 
is no exception in this case. Article 22 of the new 
communication policy stated that the "Saudi media have a 
holy duty to communicate the message of Allah to both 
Muslims and non-Muslims kindly and wisely."28 However, in 
1974, Saudi television purchased 1800 hours of Western 
programs, a package which included 165 feature films, 348 
serials, 452 cartoons, and 835 soap operas and 
documentaries, mostly from the United States.29 The Western 
programs on the first channel in Saudi television constitute 
15% while they constitute 86% of the second channel air 
time.30 
In the field of television it is unlikely that the 
values of culture could be enhanced or even protected under 
the free flow of television programs. Under a massive 
import of Western programs, we reluctantly say it is 
"mission impossible". It is difficult to escape the global 
spread of U.S cultural styles through television programs. 
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Figure 4. Imported programs as a percentage of 
estimated total Arabic region television 
broadcast time. 
SOURCE: International Flow of Television Programs, Reports 
and Papers on Mass Communication, No.100, UNESCO, Paris, 1985. 
Table 1. 
1 30 
Percentage of imported television 
in 1973 and 1983. programs 
Country and 
Broadcasting Institution 
Percentage of 
Imported Programs 
Algeria 
Egypt 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Saudi Arabia/Aramco TV 
Syria 
Tunisia 
People's Republic of Yemen 
1 973 1 983 
— 55 
41 35 
56 — 
40 — 
100 — 
— 33 
— 55 
57 47 
Table 2. Prices for United States television films 
in some Arab states (in U.S. dollars). 
Country Half-Hour Episode Feature Film 
Egypt 400 - 600 1,750 - 2,500 
Iraq 350 - 500 1,200 - 2,000 
Kuwait 450 - 500 1,750 - 2,000 
Lebanon 175 - 200 800 - 900 
Saudi Arabia 650 - 800 3,000 - 3,200 
Syria 70 - 275 150 - 1,250 
Algeria 90 -100 no sales 
SOURCE: Stephen S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, "Interna¬ 
tional Trade in Films and Television Programs", Ballinger 
Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, 1988. 
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Table 3. Percentage 
1983, and 
states. 
of imported TV programs in 1973, 
in prime time 1983, in some Arab 
Country Imported % 
1973 
Imported % 
1983 
Imported % 
1983 
Prime Time 
Algeria 
- 55 55 
Egypt 41 45 41 
Kuwait 56 
Lebanon 40 
Saudi Arabia/ 
Riyadh TV 
31 
- 
- 
Saudi Arabia/ 
Aramco TV 
100 
- 
- 
Syria 
- 33 35 
Tunisia - 55 35 
People's Rep. 
of Yemen 
57 47 
SOURCE: Stephen S. Wildman and Stephen E. Siwek, "Interna¬ 
tional Trade in Films and Television Programs", Ballinger 
Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA, 1988. 
132 
and it is extremely difficult for a society other than the 
U.S society to practice a free flow of media and enjoy a 
national culture at the same time. 
Arab television can be characterized as a ersatz and 
non-authentic television. Its programs do not reflect the 
indigenous national culture and most of its broadcast 
programs are irrelevant to the society's issues despite the 
fact that Arab societies are full of political, economic, 
and social problems. Actually television programs affairs 
in the Arab States in one path and society and cultural 
affairs are in another path. Cairo University conducted 
research on the link between television programs and 
society's issues in Egypt from the period of 1981 to 1983 . 
The finding of the study was that 87% of the broadcast 
programs have nothing to do with the society's issues and 
the rest (13%) have touched on some of the issues.31 In 
Tunisia, study found that programs directed to the women in 
the peasant area are programs of Western musicians such as 
Bach and Beethoven and about Western intellectuals such as 
Sartre and Hagel.32 
Since most of the broadcast programs are Western- 
imported, Arab television has played a primary role in 
reflecting and promoting Western culture much more than it 
did in promoting the indigenous national culture. Muhammad 
A. M, ascribed the source of social change in the Arab world 
to the new technology such as telephone, radio, television, 
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and video; meanwhile he refutes the allegation that the 
direction of this social change is the progressive 
appropriate direction due to lack of proof. Besides, the 
control of this direction is external and attached to those 
who own this technology.33 Thus, it cannot be taken for 
granted that the social change that television might cause 
will be positive change. In 1964, Shramm noted that "There 
is little doubt that modern communication can be influential 
in a developing culture."34 from experience, as the years 
went by, Shramm's statement is very true. 
Actually, with regard to the issue of television and 
its Western impact on the indigenous Arab culture, many 
indictments can be made of television, or to be more 
precise, of governments, who are responsible for running 
this medium. It is no longer a secret that Arab television 
is a mini-copy of Western television and that there is very 
little uniquely Arab in Arab television. There is still no 
independent theory or philosophy of Arab television. Arab 
governments failed to create and present a unique new model 
which would incorporate into television the authentic Arab 
culture and reflect Arab life style. AL-Usmani noted that 
in the Arab Gulf states, it is difficult to identify a 
coherent television philosophy that strongly reflects the 
ideological and national identity. Television, in 
particular, is a new phenomenon that originated in the West 
and became available as a technology before its 
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practitioners fully realized the technological potential.35 
"Mohammad Sanousi, [former] Assistant under secretary for 
Television Affairs in Kuwait, has expressed his doubts that 
any Gulf state has a recognizable philosophy about how 
television can be used...-I don't really believe that we 
know what television is...or how it can be used effectively. 
So far we only have certain ideas.*"36 
If one excludes from the daily television schedule the 
opening recitation of the holy Quran, Arabic news, and a few 
talk shows, it is very hard to believe it is television of 
an Arab state. Abdul—Samad M. comments on the concentration 
of American movies on the Egyptian television as reflecting 
a picture where some one might think that Egypt is one of 
the U.S states.37 Little attention has been given to 
television by governments who failed or ignored the 
utilization of television in a matters of culture, 
indigenous arts, authentic customs and traditions, local and 
national thought and intellectual, religious rituals, 
national history and civilization, and national development. 
This state of affairs might be attributed to the 
misconception and approach with which most Arab governments 
most often viewed the television medium. 
In reviewing the development of Arab cultural history, 
one observes that people were committed and attached to 
their culture before the emergence of television much more 
before the emergence of television. People started to 
135 
change their life style after the Western 
wave that swept 
the Arab world after the Second World War ('50s and -60s). 
Television -and other media-were the main factors relied 
upon by Westerners in transmitting their life style pattern 
to the Arab states. The emergence of television drew a 
clear cut line in terms of cultural continuity. Meanwhile, 
one observes that the rural areas and the remote areas from 
the cities which have not been influenced yet by the medium 
of television are more authentic in their culture and life 
style, since television centralized mostly around the 
cities and the suburbs. However, the attraction of 
television within the cities and suburbs created demographic 
problem that encouraged rural peasant to migrate to the 
cities. 
For the first time in history Arab culture was 
penetrated by Western culture. Throughout history, Arab 
culture was impenetratable despite numerous Westerners' 
endeavors. With the invention of the power of television, 
it seems that Western culture could for the first time 
easily penetrate the Arab culture. 
A common observation regarding the modification of 
Arab culture is the deteriorization of the Arabic language. 
Through out history, the Arabic language maintained its 
strength as one of the ancient Semitic languages. 
Historically, Arabs always have taken pride in their 
language as one of the world's richest languages. The most 
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significant turning point for Arabic language was the 
emergence of Islam in the Arab land and the revelation in 
Arabic of the holy Quran to the Arabian prophet -Muhammad”. 
That event was considered a great honor to the Arabic 
language in which Arab people have always taken pride. As a 
matter of fact, the two main factors that enriched, 
strengthened, and maintained the Arabic language through 
history is the Quran and the Hadith, -the sayings of the 
prophet". Arabic became essential not only for Arabs but 
for non-Arab Muslims as well, since it was the language of 
the Quran and the language of the prophet. 
Through the years, during the spread of Islam and 
despite the interaction with other remote cultures, Arabic 
maintained its strength. Because of its power, the Arabic 
language was not influenced by other languages but other 
languages such as Persian, Turkish, Indian, and those in 
other parts of the world such as Africa, Asia, and even 
Europe, were influenced by Arabic. It was not until the 
Seventeenth Century that the Arabic language began to 
witness some recession when the Westerners, especially 
Portuguese, Dutch, and British, began to dominate some parts 
of the Arab world. With the fall of the Turkish Ottoman 
Empire followed by the fall of the Arab world to Western 
colonialism, the situation deteriorated even further. 
With the recession of Arabic language in different 
parts of the Islamic world such as East and West Africa, 
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South East and central Asia, and Turkey, oral interpersonal 
Arabic even in the original Arab land began to be affected 
by other languages, especially by English and French. In 
fact, during the colonial era, one of the aims of the 
colonials was to weaken the formal classic Arabic through 
encouraging local dialects. Nevertheless, and despite the 
relatively successful attempts of the colonialists, Arabic 
still maintained its strength. 
Nevertheless, damage to the Arabic language continues 
with the emergence of the modern mass media technology and 
its fast spread through the Arab states with, the help of 
the uninterrupted flow of imported Western software. 
Western television programs in all its variety and Western 
pop music have played a major role in advancing the notion 
of the supremacy of the English language. In fact, the 
global Western media has succeeded in promoting the English 
language to the point where it is now recognized as the 
international language despite the fact that those whose 
mother tongue is English constitute no more than 10% of the 
world's population. 
For centuries, the Arabs used to take pride in their 
mother tongue. It is no longer so. With the Westernization 
wave that swept the Arab world since the fifties, there was 
a tendency among governments and some categories of people 
(especially the Westernizers and those who were educated in 
Western countries or by Western educators) to undervalue 
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Arabic and look at it as if it is a thing of the past and no 
longer a valid language to be associated with modern 
civilization science and modernization. Meanwhile, English 
was viewed as the language of science and modern 
civilization. At the present time, science in higher 
education institutions in the Arab states has to be taught 
in English, or in French in some Arab states. 
Unfortunately, Arabic was not given the attention it 
deserved by Arab media in general and television in 
particular. While it used and promoted the English 
language, Arab television did not promot formal classic 
Arabic, instead, it promoted and encouraged what is so~ 
called the "simple media language Arabic" based on local 
dialects. In 1971, Algeria changed programming language 
from French to Arabic. However, they as well as Tunisia and 
Morocco still depend heavily on French programs , Other Arab 
states depend largely on American programs. 
The members of Arab Commission to Study Media Issues 
in the Arab World have expressed their regret for the fact 
that some Arab media policies neglected the Arabic language 
and for the lack of cohesive national strategy to serve the 
Arabic language through the media. They especially 
regretted that common dialects with their lower levels 
constitute a large portion of theater,radio, and television 
programs.38 A study conducted by (ALECSO) Arab League for 
Education, Culture, and Science Organization, concluded that 
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among the Arab states language unity is demonstrated by the 
use of only 7% of the total language expression, and among 
93% dialects and slang dominate media language.39 in the 
final report of their meeting in Riyadh, Ministers of 
Education and Information in the Gulf states affirmed the 
necessity of reinforcing the Arabic language in education 
and the media since it is the language of the Quran, and 
since the Arabic language is of ultimate value. 
Another aspect of changing the social life style was 
through the social movement, Arab women, for example. For 
the first time in the Arab woman's history she followed 
Western woman. Shramm has often noted that change will not 
take place smoothly unless people want to change, and that 
requires both information and persuasion. That's exactly 
what happened in the Arab world and to woman in particular. 
Unfortunately, Arab people in general and Arab women in 
particular were ready for change when the Westernization 
wave swept the Arab world after World War II which had been 
preceded by years of Western colonialism. People were 
persuaded to change after they were brain-washed for years 
with the notion of following the Westernization path to 
modernization. 
Arab Women were vulnerable to the current of Western 
women's liberation movements in Europe and U.S. Hence, a 
group of women began to express publicly their rebellion 
against Arab and Islamic values and began to call for the 
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same changes that Western women were requesting, making 
Western woman their ideal. Noticeably, women began to 
imitate Western women with respect to the notion of "modern 
women". Arab women began to dress in clothing of western 
styles, imitating Western women's appearance. 
In this regard, television through the imported 
programs, played a outstanding role in promoting the 
glamourous image of Western women and in reinforcing the 
notion of the supremacy of modern Western women's life 
style. Meanwhile, the image and historical role of the Arab 
woman was undermined and ignored. Studies in this field, 
especially those which were conducted under the auspices of 
Arab League for Education, Culture, and Science Organization 
(ALECSO), concluded that Arab media has distorted the image 
of Arab women. She was always presented and visualized in a 
negative manner. 
In the field of advertisement, Arab women have been 
misused by the advertisement agencies, especially in 
promoting products such as perfumes, cosmetics, fashions, 
automobiles, and furniture. It was influenced to a great 
extent by the Western style of production which uses women 
to present images of the contemporary woman. This paradigm 
of Arab woman does not exist in Arab reality. Also, studies 
proved that Arab media in general is not giving attention to 
major women's issues in the Arab world or in the world in 
general.40 
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The current of the international flow of television 
programs was so strong that it swept all barriers in its 
way, and all kinds of victims started to fall prey to this 
current. Schiller predicted a long time ago that "it is 
difficult, in fact, to escape the global spread of U.S 
cultural styles featured in the mass media of films, TV 
programs, pop records, and slick magazines. Their influence 
prompts sentiments such as that expressed by the prime 
minister of Guyana,'A nation whose mass media are dominated 
from the outside is not a nation.'41 Anthony Smith ruled 
out the enjoyment of national culture under the roof of free 
flow of media: "It is extremely difficult for a society to 
practice a free flow of media and enjoy a national culture 
at the same time — unless it happens to be the United 
States of America"42 
Repelling this influx of Western programs seems 
impossible and relying on them seems indispensable. None of 
the Arab States succeeded in doing so; neither Egypt, the 
major producer and distribution center for the Arab world, 
which is considered the Hollywood of the Middle East, nor 
Saudi Arabia which is considered the most traditional and 
strict state in the Arab world. Despite Egypt's production, 
it imports more than 41% of its programs, according to 
UNESCO statistics.43 Between 1970 and 1978, Egypt imported 
5732.17 hours of foreign programs, 1126.78 of which were 
rejected (therefore not broadcast).44 Late statistics 
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showed that Egypt import annually 1800 hours from the u.S, 
300 hours from France, and 400 hours from different European 
countries/5 Despite these impressive figures, religious 
programs do not exceed 1% of the total broadcast time. 
After Sadat's open policy to the West in 1977, even more 
Western material was poured into Egypt. 
In fact, even during the reign of President Nasir, who 
was known for his policy of animosity toward the West, Egypt 
could not escape this peril. On the contrary, he encouraged 
the importation of Western programs. 
President Nassir, in the common pattern of the "father 
of the new nation" set his personal stamp on radio and 
television in Egypt. This was a political, Arab 
nationalist stamp but Nassir also encouraged imports of 
some Anglo-American material at Nassir's personal 
directive. During much of the 1960s an entire 
television channel was aimed at expatriates resident in 
Egypt and was filled with mainly Anglo-American 
programming/6 
The flood of Western programs, along with their 
inconsistent alien ideas and values, into the Arab states 
has aroused and provoked many categories of people within 
the Arab world; the conservatives, religious leaders and 
organizations, scholars, academic professionals, 
governmental and professional organizations, all calling to 
counter this current for the sake of the Arab and Islamic 
nation. Accordingly, many conferences and seminars were 
held to tackle this issue. In conferences such as "The 
Intellectual Invasion and Anti-Islamic Attitudes", 
"Civilizational Challenges and Cultural Invasion", "Islamic 
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Media and Human Relations", and ^What Educators Warn- fr-™ 
Broadcasters r the participants are in consensus that the 
current situation is a deliberate conspiracy and attack 
against the Arab and Islamic nation, aiming to transmit anti 
-Islamic values and destroy the morals of the Islamic 
civilization. it was considered a new invasion attempt by 
the West with new technique after all their past attempts 
had failed, a new aspect of the old conflict between Islamic 
and West civilizations. The conferences have warned of the 
wicked consequences of the present situation if it continues 
and demanded that governments take prompt and serious 
actions to counter this destructive current. 
In their final report of their seminar, What Educators 
Want From Broadcasters, the Ministers of Education and 
Information set a strategy for countering intellectual and 
cultural invasion based on two major fronts: Prevention and 
remedy, prevention, would be effected through the cautious 
selection of the broadcast programs and rejecting all that 
opposes Islam's principles. Remedy would be acheived by 
countering the anti-Islamic attitude through educational 
curricula and media programs by means of criticism, which 
would attempt to prove their invalidity and threat through 
logic, dialogue, and persuasion. 
The fourth conference of Arab Ministers of culture 
which was held in Algeria in May 1983 under the auspices of 
(ALECSO) Arab League of Education, culture, and Science 
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Organization discussed one issue "Arab cultural security and 
cultural industries". m the end of the conference, the 
following recommendation was issued: The conference asserts 
that cultural security is attached to the Arab states' 
capability to manufacture all they need of cultural, 
educational, and entertainment products. The rising Arab 
generations have increasing acceptance on imported cultural 
products. The spread of cultural consumption need entail 
the Arab states to be concern of the availability of needed 
facilities to establish cultural industries.47 
The status of Arab television staggering between 
Western and Eastern cultures gave it the character of a 
double standard and a schizophrenic identity, constantly 
giving a contradictory messages to viewers. Very often, for 
instance, a religious program would be followed by a Western 
fashion show or a religious program on the first channel, 
while at the same time "Dallas" would be on the second 
channel. Usually, the daily television schedule begins with 
a recitation from the Holy Quran and ends late at night with 
a Western cowboy movie. Very often viewers can not relate 
the television messages to their real life surroundings, and 
feel they are alien in their own society, which might cause 
inner disruption, anxiety, and confusion for some, 
especially children and teenagers. Frequently many of these 
messages clash with Arab society, family, and school 
An Egyptian psychiatrist, in his commentary on messages. 
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youth's feelings of alienation, depression, and anxiety, 
says youth feels helpless and hopeless because they cannot 
be rescued from their feelings of loneliness. The society 
has eliminated any hope for them, through its radio, 
television, and movies; I have believed eventually, as a 
psychiatrist, that schizophrenia does not affect individuals 
only but it can affect societies as well.4® in the Arab 
States people read in the newspapers, hear from radio, and 
see in television all that our enemies want us to read, hear 
and see.49 
The flood of imported programs along with its alien 
values have created a bicultural society which caused an on¬ 
going conflict between the traditionalists and the 
modernizers. For so many years governments, officials as 
well as many people, were confused between the two different 
irrelevant concepts, modernization and Westernization. It 
appeared to them that the two notions overlapped. 
Therefore, they always tend to associate modernization with 
Westernization believing that Westernization is the only 
path for modernization. 
Despite the failure and invalidity of this theory, 
however, some television officials still insist on 
Westernization of television programs. In fact, at one time 
this misconception used to be the trend of economists and 
sociologists: 
Economists and researchers thought in the 1950s and 
1960s that imported radio, television, cinema, and 
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foreign-owned press were all part of the crocess of 
capitalZaoods W4Ch °onsfsted in the transference of 
oapital goods and other industries. Today it is more 
!?e^d_that machinery of information, if it is 
countr^Tn °u*slde' merely confirms the receiving 
country in the state of perhaps more hopeless 
dependence than before.5^ F 
Even Sociologist Daniel Lerner, Who studied the effect 
of Western mass media on some of the Middle East societies 
in the early '50s and afterward, wrote a book on The Passing 
of The Traditional Society: Modernizing The Middle Fast. 
Even though in one segment of his book he discriminated 
between Europeanization and modernization, he could not 
discriminate between modernization and Westernization or 
between Europeanization and Westernization. It seems that 
in early years in the '50s the influence of Western mass 
media on Arab people's life style was not yet clear. 
Europeanization some years ago penetrated the upper 
levels of Middle East society, and affected mainly 
leisure-class fashions. Modernization today reaches a 
far wider population and touches public as well as 
private aspiration. Central to this change, says 
Lerner, 'is the shift in modes of communication ideas 
and attitudes- for spreading among a large public vivid 
images of its own New Ways is what modernization 
distinctly does.' Euopeanization used the class media; 
modernization, the mass media. The mass media,he says, 
are what chiefly make the difference between the effect 
of these two social movements.51 
Now at the present time after decades of Lerner's 
perspective of "modernization", it becomes clear that it 
served the same end as Europeanization and there is a 
difference between Europeanization and Westernization. In 
fact, "Modernization" became much worse than 
"Europeanization". If Europeanization had Westernized only 
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the upper class of the society at the time, "Modernization" 
has Westernized the whole society and shifted the Arab 
culture from oral culture to modes of communicating Western 
ideas and attitudes. 
Schiller ridicules the allegation that refusing 
Western media means refusing modernity "Some claim that an 
expression of support for cultural integrity is equally a 
traditionalism and reinforces the most 
conservative and repressive elements in (mostly) poor 
societies. According to the most influential group of 
American communication scholars, the Western mass media are 
the instrument of modernity and social change; and resisting 
them signifies an opposition to modernization and an 
endorsement of orthodoxy, illiteracy, and backwardness. 
Actually, the situation is reversed. The objective of 
cultural policy is not merely to exclude material:it is to 
assist the process of shaping consciousness. In its very 
essence it is opposed to established, traditional 
authority.52 
The problem in the Arab states, as in the developing 
countries in general, is that of understanding technology 
and how to combine both the modern imported Western 
technology and maintainance of the heritage at the same 
time. Actually, that was not as easy task as it might appear 
to determine what and how much to take from the West and 
what to reject, how to draw the line between what should be 
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changed and what should be preserved. These were very 
confusing but crucial decisions for the Arab states to make. 
It seems that because of the desire for quick modernization 
and the starvation for technology, the Arab states were not 
able to draw that clear-cut line, which led them to import 
from the West both the good and the bad. Katz and Wedell 
have pointed out that -The quest for speedy modernization 
does not allow new nations to create their own symbols of 
the media it is far easier to buy the symbols of 
modernization wholesale."53 Hamdy Kandil, an Arab media 
expert and director of the Free Flow of Information at 
UNESCO, comments on the problem of technology in developing 
countries "Technology is ahead of us. It controls us and to 
this day we do not benefit from it the way we should."54 
Ibrahim Alusef, the Director of AGJPPI (Arabian Gulf States 
Joint Programs Production Institute) comments on the 
phenomenon of television as a technology in the Gulf region: 
I think we are running behind television instead of the 
opposite process occurring. Technology is changing too 
fast and every day our responsibility to utilize it 
become more demanding. This is in contrast to our 
content, which still lags behind and does not reflect 
the many fields that developed rapidly in the last 
twenty years.55 
Analyses attribute the causes of the Iranian 
revolution to the wave of Westernization that the late Shah 
of Iran was trying to impose over the indigenous Islamic 
culture during his unsuccessful attempts to modernize Iran 
against the will of his people, causing a contradictory 
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dual-cultural society rejected by the masses of people. The 
discrepancy between the indigenous and the alien Western 
values was actually the spark that erupted the revolution. 
Noticeably, after the revolution, all aspects of 
Westernization that were imposed by the old regime had 
disappeared from the country. 
It is obvious that Arab television operate separately 
and apart from other institutions in the society. in fact, 
television frequently clashes with other institutions' 
goals. Due to the absence of planning and cooperation 
between television and other institutions of society, 
television was constantly accused of destroying what school 
and family constructed, and instead of reinforcing family 
and school roles, television functioned to weaken these 
efforts. What is being taught by school and family can be 
easily erased by television programs. Thus, one can observe 
easily the irresponsible role of television and the 
disparity between television and other educational 
institutions in the Arab society. 
While there are exceptions in the Arab Middle East, 
broadcast officials do not seem to have a policy or 
goals for radio and television that are tied to the 
goals of the country and the appropriate central 
planning organization. This is particularly true with 
respect to programming policy for both news and 
entertainment. There is a surprising lack of 
communication and cooperation between ministries of 
information and education.56 
The Ministers of Education and Information in the Gulf 
states along with other Arab media experts and specialists 
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met in Riyadh in 1984 in a conference called "What Edueai-nr-g 
Want From Broadcasters", The participants agreed on the huge 
gap between the two sides and they confirmed their belief in 
the destructive role of media, in the areas of education and 
social fields. In the final report and the recommendations 
conference, the participants called for more 
coordination, cooperation, and homogenization between 
educational and media institutions. 
Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) organized a 
conference in Kuwait in 1975, "Arab Regional Conference for 
Educational Broadcasting." to study the problems facing 
utilization of television in education; on top of these 
problems comes the unclear relation between educational and 
media institutions.57 Despite its young age in the Arab 
States, television had joined and has somewhat replaced the 
role of family and school. It has started to compete with 
them in inculcating new values and tendencies in children. 
The phenomenon of television's impact on changing 
values in people's social life is actually not confined to 
Arab societies. Rather it is global phenomenon, even in the 
original Western countries, which experienced this problem 
long before Arab societies did, although it was much more 
severe and shocking to Arab societies. Soviet sociologist, 
Yurikouf, noted that in the twentieth century, because of 
television, a unique spiritual relation has appeared. 
of television this spiritual relation Before the emergence 
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was between man and another man; but now this relation 
exists between the humankind and the machine. But despite 
of some benefit of this on one hand, there is also unusual 
peril on the other. A new member has appeared as the new 
master of the family. Yurikouf comments on the phenomenon 
of gathering around television and he observes that a new 
phenomenon has appeared: receiving guests and continuing to 
watch television at the same time, as if people do not come 
to visit their friends but to visit their television. They 
are connected spiritually to the television screen and to 
the dining table through their abdomen, but actually there 
is nothing to connect them together. Thus, television 
unites people superficially as viewers only, but from 
psychological point of view it separates people, 
disconnecting their relationships. Mostly the television is 
the speaker and people are the listeners, and they do not 
socialize with people but with television.58 
Canadian K.Taggart observed that those hours the 
family used to spend together in sharing ideas and opinions 
had dispelled because it became the peak hours for watching 
television. For people to gather only in the same place is 
not enough to bring them close socially without interacting. 
More important than that is that the traditional values that 
the family instills in the children started to disappear 
and were replaced by television values derived from cowboy 
movies and violence and crime serials made by television on 
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a daily basis.59 Psychologist White believes that the 
viewing process of television increases the negative 
tendency in the individual, since the viewer stay still, 
accepting all that is presented to him without taking any 
positive action.60 
Needless to say, probably the innocent victims of 
television are the children. German Martin Keihacker 
affirms that today's children are not only spectators but 
also partners in the events and in the acting. They live 
the event and participate in it and are influenced by the 
experiment, an actual living influence.61 Studies have shown 
that pre-school children spent hundreds of hours watching 
television before they reach school age. They learn 
television's values long before they learn school's values 
and before they learn how to read and write. Unmistakably, 
violence and crime programs are more pyschologically 
effective on children's and teenagers' personality. Some 
Arab states had to ban the show, "The Six Million Dollar 
Man", after several accidents involving children were 
reported. Some children attempted to imitate the fictional 
power of the show's main character. 
Nevertheless, while it is not the purpose of this 
study to focus on individual and social problems caused by 
television, many studies have shown that numerous 
individual, educational, social, and pyschological problems 
are linked to television programs and viewing patterns. 
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Within the last several years, as a result of the 
unchanged policy of television programming and after people- 
especially parents- have experienced negative results from 
their children's behavior, many calls came from Arab 
television experts, educators, scholars, religious groups, 
columnist, and parents charging that television is a 
corrupting influence and demanding true nationalization of 
television and Islamization of its programs. 
Noticebly, in the last several years, people 
accordingly tended to form negative impressions of 
television and began to deal with television more seriously 
than before. Some people changed their viewing pattern, and 
others their general outlook on television. Therefore, 
according to their new comprehension of the situation they 
started to react to these changes, especially within the 
educated class and the conservative class. Many people 
started to restrict -viewing hours - after it had been 
unrestricted on the fraudulent ground that television is an 
innocent entertainment medium,- especially for children. 
Now—their viewing is also often attended by one or both of 
the parents. Others, moreover, ban television from the 
household on the ground that television is nothing but a 
corrupting device and that their family and children are 
better off without it. 
This recalls the history of television in Saudi 
Arabia, when some religious groups opposed the establishment 
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of radio and television in the country because it was 
considered a corruptive device coining from the West to 
corrupt the people. At that time their allegation were 
lampooned and ridiculed and they were called ignorant and 
backward by the majority of the people at the time who 
claimed themselves modernizers. Interestingly, and after 
about thirty years, their expectations turned out to be 
true, as indicated by research and studies of Arab media 
experts and by the educated class. To clear up any 
misunderstanding, the accusation that television is a 
corrupting medium, actually is not directed to television as 
a technological device but rather to the type of programs 
broadcast and the way it has been used. 
Entertainment 
One of the clear features of Arab television is that 
it depends extensively on imported Western programs for its 
daily broadcast schedule, and this by itself is not 
unusual. If we think about it, Arab states do not only 
import television programs but they import from the Western 
countries almost every-thing for daily life needs. But the 
prominent feature characterizing these imported programs is 
that Arab television is entertainment- oriented. 
The Arab States import a massive volume of foreign 
Western programs especially in the field of entertainment. 
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Ready-made Western entertainment programs occupy the largest 
portion of air time, filling from 40% to 60% (an average of 
50%) of air time. in some Arab states, the percentage 
reaches as high as 80% of air time. Ironically, meanwhile 
the Arab states import 50% of their programs from Western 
countries, the average of programs importation among the 
Arab states is approximately 13% of the total air time. 
Indeed, this is a dilemma in the Arab States, and in this 
issue lies the ugly face of Arab television broadcasts, 
imports of poisonous programs that are really far from its 
needs or actually not needed at all. 
In the Arab states, television has always been looked 
at either as a political tool or a pastime medium, rarely 
looked at and often ignored as an educational or a 
developmental tool. In fact, it was imprinted on people's 
mind that television is primarily for entertainment 
purposes. Douglas Boyd comments on this point 
To a great extent programming is basically 
entertainment oriented on Arab television station and 
it is not unfair to say that both radio and television 
in the Arab World are believed by consumers to be 
primarily for entertainment. The director of Egyptian 
television observed... that a television set is usually 
bought with the intention of entertainment. Nobody 
thinks of television as a mean of education when they 
go to buy a television set.62 
Nevertheless, the problem does not stop at this limit. 
The danger of this type of programs goes beyond the fact 
that these programs are merely imported as entertainment to 
the fact as disclosed by facts and figures that the content 
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of this type of ready-made programs is entirely irrelevant 
both to the national culture needs and to the national 
development process. That in itself is a national cultural 
tragedy and is considered as committing vicious crime to the 
dignity of the national culture. Wilbur Shramm comments on 
the problem of the use of television and entertainment 
programs in the Third World countries: 
Every new country is under some pressure to install 
television. It is a badge of prestige. It is an 
invitation to entertainment...but the essential 
question, as for radio and film, is where television 
belongs in national development. What the people are 
usually asking for, when they clamor for television, is 
the succession of entertainment programs which have 
made the medium so popular in many countries that are 
further advanced economically. These are the 
"Westerns," the crime mysteries, the advanced programs, 
the comedies, variety shows, and sporting events. It 
is hard to argue that these have much to do with 
economic development.63 
It is quite evident that television management and 
officials in the Arab states realize the irrelevant content 
of these entertainment programs, and yet they insist on 
importing them deliberately. It seems that Arab states' 
television acts like private commercial television in this 
matter as if they are in competition with the commercial 
market. That is the simple and easy method to attract 
viewers by offering pure commercial entertainment programs. 
The director of programming in the state of Qatar television 
admitted that 
We know that many of our imported programs which are 
supposed to be entertainment deal with various 
problems, most of which lack relevance to our own 
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situation. But people like them, and if we cannot 
provide such material for them, they will find 
alternatives somewhere.64 
The threat of this type of imported entertainment 
programs is not only that they convey different ideas and 
values but also because the content of these type of 
programs is in contradiction to the society's indigenous 
cultural values. 
While some warn of the threat of these alien values on 
the cultural continuity of the society, others see nothing 
wrong with having these alien values of other cultures, 
proclaiming that this is the nature of modernization and 
that is how societies and culture change. Interacting with 
and becoming influenced by each other ... is a natural 
process for modernization, by changing values, norms, ideas, 
and attitudes, and radio and television are nothing but 
media for this interaction. 
Modernization is inseparable from traditionalism and it 
is nothing but transformation of tradition. Indigenous 
culture is changed or changed by its contact and 
interaction with other cultures. The new society is 
born on the old, and not superimposed on it. 
Recognizing the great impact of media, the point is 
that not all effects of alien ideas are generally 
negative, and what is considered negative for some 
might be considered positive for others. 
However, the above argument is not the point here. 
They are totally two separate issues. The point in this 
topic is not meant to be a diatribe against foreign cultures 
or against different customs and values. To do so, would be 
against the nature of humankind. In fact, efforts should be 
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encouraged to interact with other world cultures in order to 
accelerate the process of modernization, learning, and human 
and cultural understanding among humankind and to share 
intellectuall ideas. That is a very natural process, the 
question which remains is has this type of program made any 
contribution in this regard, and was it for the sake of the 
world's cultural process? 
It is already been noted that the so-called the 
positive cultural intention is far from the original purpose 
of these programs. The homogenization of the world cultures 
is considered a serious threat which would abolish and 
eliminate the fascination of life on earth by imposing a 
worldwide uni culture on the original one to achieve certain 
goals. The truth is that life is fascinating because of its 
diversity of customs, traditions, languages, food, and 
clothes. "Made in America" messages, imagery, life-styles, 
and information techniques are being internationally 
circulated and, equally important, globally imitated".66 
The massive importation influx of these Western 
commercial entertainment television programs actually were 
the chief carriers of Western values and life-style which, 
as a consequence, caused the people of the Arab states to a 
great degree, consciously or unconsciously to change their 
life-style. Varis and Nordenstreng study reported that 
during the early 1970s the U.S exported approximately 
150,000 hours of programming each year. This was more than 
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three times the total programing exports of the next three 
leading exporting nations combined(U.K, France, and 
W.Germany).67 In 1974, U.S exported 100,000 to 200,000 
hours of television programs. One-third of which was 
exported to Far and Near East.68 The editor of the Boston 
attributed the forsaking of Islam's ethics by Muslims 
nowadays to the influence of the Western life-style. 
Needless to say, there have always been Moslems who 
have ignored these details of behavior, just as there 
are today. But they nevertheless constitute a 
reference point that Moslems can and do turn to, 
particularly in a period when the behavior patterns of 
many people are rapidly changing under the influence of 
Western lifestyle. 9 
Unfortunately, the prevailing misconception among 
people and officials in the Arab States is that these 
imported programs may be enjoyed as innocent entertainment 
for pastime, and there are no specific intellectual or 
cultural ideas behind it. Schiller believes that "The notion 
that entertainment is not instructive must be classed as one 
of the biggest deception in history."70 Erik Barnouw, 
chronicler of American broadcasting, puts it this way: 
To me, entertainment is a poisonous concept. The idea 
of entertainment is that it has nothing to do with the 
seriousness of the world, but that it fills up an idle 
hour. Actually, there is an ideology implicit in every 
kind of fictional story. Fiction may be far more 
important than non-fiction in forming people's 
opinions.71 
Perhaps not too many people realize that alien values 
come more strongly and effectively through entertainment 
programs. What people do not take seriously is actually 
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what effective them more. The magic impact of entertainment 
programs lies within its unconscious and intangible 
penetration that not too many people realize, and since not 
too many people take entertainment seriously, the fact is 
what people do not take seriously is what effect them more. 
Role- playing is an effective method in learning. In 
fact the notion of entertainment depend extensively upon the 
factor of role-playing as an essential indirect way to 
influence viewers psychologically, thus ruling out the 
allegation that entertainment is neutral, 
Recognition of the promise of the media in connection 
with the problem of cultural identity leads to the 
realization that entertainment is not neutral, but an 
active force in the communication of values.72 
Actually, entertainment is a useful medium in 
transmitting Western ideologies even in the pattern of 
music, Dr. Joseph Klapper of the Columbia Broadcasting 
System explained to the congressional Committee on Foreign 
Affairs: 
The broadcasting of popular music is not likely to 
have any immediate effect on the audience's political 
attitude, but this kind of communication nevertheless 
provides a sort of entryway of Western ideas and 
Western concepts, even though these concepts may not be 
explicitly and completely stated at any one particular 
moment in the communication.73 
Governments and television officials believe that they 
are on the safe side and these Western entertainment are 
fine as long as they edited out the violence and excessive 
sex scenes. But actually the influence of these programs 
goes far beyond the limit of violence and excessive sex 
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scenes. These Western entertainment programs,truly, were 
the vital carrier in transmitting and imposing the concept 
of "supremacy" of Western people and of Western culture over 
any other cultures including the Arab culture. Western 
people were always viewed through these images as the best 
and smartest people. Unlike other people, their mentality 
appeared to excel that of other people and the Western 
culture was always viewed as the best culture on earth in 
contrasts to other cultures. 
In fact, masses of Arab viewers are so attached to 
these programs that it sometimes reaches the level of 
addiction and brain washing. The Arab Center of Audience 
and Viewers Research -a branch of ASBU- conducted a research 
study in five Arab states to test the viewing pattern of the 
dramatic entertainment shows. The finding of the study 
suggested that the average number of Arab viewers who watch 
these serials is 80.78%, as follows : Iraq 88%, Sudan 
78.92%, Morocco 72.05%, Jordan 89.33%, and Kuwait 96.44%.74 
The addiction to watching these shows affects very 
impressivly the mentality of Arab viewers, since they 
consider what they see in these programs to be their 
ultimate goal. Through these programs, they visualize the 
Western lifestyle in all its aspects as their supreme 
lifetime aspiration and the only desirable path for 
civilization and modernization; at the same time it makes 
them resent and want to undermine their own culture. 
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Also these programs were an excellent method to 
promote Western goods and were probably more effective than 
standard direct advertising methods. in persuading people 
that it would be better to live like Western, to have a 
Western style house, Western furniture, to use Western home 
appliances, to drive Western cars, to consume Western 
products, to have the Western look, to wear Western clothes, 
even Western style hair cut, and even to have the same 
mentality of Western people. According to the French .Paris 
Match, magazine, the marketing strategy of the 
Americanization television programs, resembles the world 
marketing of Coke. When the producer company of "DALLAS" 
for instance, negotiated and signed contract with 
international television to sell the show, the method and 
procedures were the same OPEC undertaking its marketing 
negotiation.75 
Hollywood television actors and actresses are very 
popular among the masses in all their categories (children, 
teenagers, and women). People, unfortunately, tend very 
often to regard them as their best role model, probably as 
pervasively as do the people in the West. Ironically, one 
might find people who know more about these actors and 
actresses than he or she knows about their own national 
heroes. 
Despite the American and worldwide popularity of the 
American show, "DALLAS", Hassan Al-Tilili, an Arab media 
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specialist in his work Our Ailing describes the impact 
this serial had on people's thought in different partes of 
the Arab world and the Middle East: In Lebanon, despite the 
tragedies of the atrocious civil war, the people in Beirut 
watched it twice a week since 1978. In Morocco, the show 
was also broadcast twice a week, despite the constant 
criti.ci.sm from the opposition pressing to boycott the show 
due to its explicit undermining of virtue, values and 
conduct. However, the television continued to broadcast 
the show because of its popularity among the people; it was 
their favorite topic of discussion. 
In Algeria, and despite its state's socialist system, 
the national newspaper waged a campaign against the show, 
considering that it praises for American capitalism. After 
a short suspension of the show, the Algerian television had 
to continue broadcasting it because of viewer pressure. The 
show had left its fingerprints on the Algerian society, and 
in many cases people began deal with each other according to 
the show's values and notions which people started to take 
as a point of reference. 
In Tunisia, the Electric and Gas company conducted a 
research study which showed that the consumption of water, 
electricity, and gas dropped by 20% during the show's air 
time. In Egypt, the people were frustrated and depressed 
because television ceased to broadcast the show during the 
national period of mourning after Sadat's assassination. In 
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the Arab Gulf states, viewers started to buy the video tapes 
of the show in order not to waste time.76 
Because of the liberal approach in editing employed by 
Bahrain television, in contrast with other Arab television, 
especially in the Gulf region, some viewers tune in to it to 
watch "Dallas". "The tolerance characteristic of Bahrain 
television has attracted many viewers, especially youths who 
prefer to watch Dallas unedited than to see an episode 
that has been severely cut. Officials at Bahrain television 
feels that because of tough competition from the video 
market.,|77 
A Turkish professor ,Awzkok, portrayed the situation 
in Turkey after J.R was shot. "Who shot J.R" was similar to 
the public build-up and high alert during war time. It was 
the main event for people all over Turkey in schools, 
courts, hospitals, and cafes. The mayor of one of the 
Turkish towns, after he found out who shot J.R, had to 
announce the answer in public to the townspeople through the 
loud speaker. Despite the strict censorship on television 
programs since the army came to power, however, they could 
not edit the show. Moreover, the Generals gave orders to 
broadcast the show as it is.78 
Altilili, however, attributes the success of "Dallas" 
among Arab viewers primarily to the cultural vacuum that 
Arab viewers are living in, since television is considered 
almost the only way that Arab viewers can release their 
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tensions. Those in authority in the Arab world still look 
at culture in a negative way and they still consider that 
culture is not an affective element in economic activities 
or in the developmental operations. Therefore, Arab 
television viewers find themselves in a position where they 
have to be consumers of foreign production without bothering 
to distinguish between the good and the bad, as long as 
local production is missing. Even when local production is 
available, it is usually less than expected. No wonder, 
given this situation, that Dallas has a prestige over other 
programs.79 
However, entertainment programs might be a smart move 
on the part of governments to distract people's attention 
from problems and crises their country is facing. Gehan 
Rachty believes that the concentration of entertainment by 
government is intentional: 
There is an increasing emphasis in the Arab states' 
television system on entertainment, especially serials, 
long feature films, and variety shows. These program 
categories account for 53.8% of television time in Abu 
Dahbi, 44% in Saudi Arabia, 56% in Qatar, 60.5% in 
Kuwait and 60% in Egypt, and an average of 55% of 
television time in all Arab states. The purpose is to 
attract the audience and give them what they want, 
since television is considered mainly a medium for 
entertainment, especially in states where there is no 
other public entertainment. Television entertainment 
is consciously used in many cases to divert people's 
attention from social, economic or political 
problems.80 
Also during the British occupation of South Yemen, the 
British introduced television to the people in 1964 to 
divert their attention from the revolutionary liberation 
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movement's activities and from North Yemen's spreading the 
spirit of struggle against the British occupation.81 
The criticism of the epidemic of entertainment 
programs is not confined only to imported programs; the same 
criticism applies also to the locally-produced entertainment 
and drama. The frequent criticism directed to this type of 
program is that they do not deal with important issues but 
often create an alien world that has nothing to do with real 
life. However, even these local entertainments have a 
Western style of production and content. The mentality of 
Arab television was influenced pretty much by the mentality 
of Western television. As viewers are looking at Western 
actors and actresses as their best role model, television 
officials are also looking at Western television as their 
best model. The result was an imitation of Western style 
programs and techniques. Being a mini-copy of Western 
television, cause it to lose essential factors of creativity 
and authenticity. Arab television was not only brain-washed 
in terms of production techniques but even in theories of 
content; 
Television in the Arab Middle East has a predominantly 
Western style...creativity in the television medium is 
moreover tied to electronic requirements and 
technological innovations...virtually all television 
station in the Arab world were purchased from and 
installed by West European and American equipment 
manufactured. Furthermore, various programs sponsored 
by both western and Middle Eastern governments as well 
as private foundations, have taken experts to the Arab 
countries to advise, or sent Middle-East nationals to 
the United States, Great Britain, France, t x 
Germany to train in television production. The natural 
167 
result of all this is a western-type television program 
in Ardbic• 
To the extent that Arab television give its attention 
to entertainment programs, they gave much less to 
educational and religious programs although statistics 
showed that illiteracy in the Arab world reaches more than 
50% of the total population. This percentage reaches 80% in 
the rural areas which constitute 60.7% of the total 
inhibited area. Despite the lengthy daily schedule of 
broadcasting hours of Egyptian television, for instance, the 
percentage of religious programs of the total broadcast time 
does not exceed 1%.83 
In 1982 Arab television produced a total of 30,000 
television hours; the Egyptian television produced 25% and 
the remaining was produced by eight other Arab countries. 
More important is the type of these programs produced, as 
follows:84 
1- Entertainment programs: 16395 hours. 
2- News programs : 5078 hours. 
3- Educational programs : 3499 hours. 
4- Religious programs : 2136 hours. 
The Arab Commission to study media issues in the Arab 
world, in its report,"Arab Media: Present and Future, Toward 
New Arab Information Order," focused on the content of 
broadcast programs in Arab television, arguing that the 
content of programs in Arab television is still (juestionable 
and that the notions of entertaining, educating, and 
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informing are meaningless as long as they are isolated from 
the political and social climate. Entertainment has become 
warning, educating has become propaganda, and information 
has become a hiding of truth. It has been shown that 
television has been used in an improper manner, which does 
not consider the viewer's interests nor ambitions. The 
argument comes to the surface when considering the 
seriousness of these functions of television (to entertain, 
educate, and inform) in a situation where Arab televisions 
import 40%-60% of its programs, some of them accepted to 
allow the advertisement and promotion of goods and 
commodities inconsistent with the existing circumstances.85 
Late statistics indicate that six Arab states broadcast 
annually a total of 850 hours of commercial advertisement, 
but there is no indication that assures the compatibility of 
these goods and products with the economical planning of 
these states.86 
The Foreign Channel 
In almost every Arab state there are two television 
channels, the first channel or what might be called the main 
program, and the second channel or what might be called the 
foreign program. The main channel used to be the only 
channel on Arab television for quite long time. During the 
seventies and early eighties, as a result of the development 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Saudi Arabia 
Saudi Arabia/ 
Aramco TV 
People's Rep. Yemen kst~b 
Key: 
News and Documentaries Fiction, Sports Others 
current and entertainment 
educational and 
children 
Figure 5. Distribution of type of TV program 
materials in some Arab states. 
SOURCE: Television Traffic, A One-way Street?-Survey and 
Analysis of the International Flow of Television Program 
Materials, UNESCO, No. 70, Paris, 1974. 
Table 4. Program structure of some Arab 
countries according to categories. 
(The share of imported programs within each category is shown in parenthesis) 
Program 
Categories 
Algeria 
% 
Egypt 
% 
Syria 
% 
Tunis 
% 
Democratic 
Yemen 
% 
Informational 22 (31) 16 (-) 20 (9) 28 (17) 37 (12) 
Educational 5 (25) 7 (-) 15 (-) 3 (37) 1 (-) 
Cultural 1 (-) 10 (17) 5 (-) 5 (40) 1 (-) 
Children's 9 (-) 7 (-) 2 (-) 5 (47) 1 (12) 
Religious 9 (96) 5 (50) 14 (75) 9 (77) 11 (66) 
Entertainment 48 (80) 48 (60) 38 (55) 51 (74) 48 (73) 
Unclassified 5 (-) 5 (39) 2 (-) - - 
Advertisements 
- 3 (-) 4 (-) - - 
Total % 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 1 00 
Total minutes 7,669 20,292 7,443 6,322 6,963 
Import % (55) (35) (33) (55) (47) 
SOURCE: International Flow of Television Programs, Reports 
and Papers on Mass Communication^ No.100, UNESCO, Paris, 1985. 
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and increase of broadcast hours, some Arab television 
systems started to broadcast another channel, which became 
known among the people as the foreign channel or the English 
channel. Ironically, some Arab governments insist on 
it the educational channel. Soon the epidemic of 
adding the foreign channel affected many other Arab 
television systems. Establishing another channel, however, 
should not be judged as a big step in television 
development. What counts is not the number of channels nor 
the number of broadcast hours, but what the content of the 
broadcast programs on this channel. 
Before establishing the foreign channel, the main 
channel used to be a mix of Arabic and foreign programs, 
since the number of Arabic programs were not sufficient to 
fill out the transmission time. It was expected that 
foreign programs would fill the foreign channel since Arabic 
programs can barely fill the main channel. Thus, most of 
the broadcast time was filled with imported foreign 
programs. In Saudi Arabia, for example, the percentage of 
foreign programs on this channel reaches 86%; in Kuwait, 
87.4%, and in Qatar, 78%.87 
Establishing the foreign channel to serve foreign 
communities was the purported justification for allowing 
more foreign programs to penetrate Arab culture. Actually 
the foreign channel worsened the question of importing 
Western programs, which did not do any good for the native 
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cultural development. While the problem already existed 
before the establishment of the foreign channel, the 
complexity of the issue has increased with its emergence. 
Although Arab television management justified these 
channels as needed to serve non-Arab communities in the Arab 
states, undoubtedly, this kind of justification is illogical 
and cannot be taken at face value. Unmistakably, the 
establishment of this channel can not be explained in any 
way as arising from the governments' concern for foreign 
communities. While this channel may be serving the foreign 
community, it is at the same time causing severe damage to 
the indigenous society which still does not have its own 
genuine channel and was already suffering from the foreign 
programs on the main channel. Besides that, the Arab native 
majority should be given priority service by the 
establishment of a full, authentic Arabic culture channel. 
Moreover, it is not true that the foreign channel 
attracts non-Arab viewers only. It also attracts Arab 
viewers of the first channel who have a desire to watch 
foreign programs. As a matter of fact, the foreign channel 
seems to attract more Arab viewers than the first channel 
does. It is a prefered by many people, and Arab community 
watches this channel more than does the non-Arab community. 
Probably no governments in the world other than the 
Arab governments offer a whole independent channel by itself 
to serve foreign minority communities at the state's 
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expense. In addition to that, serving foreign communities is 
not accomplishment through importing western programs. Most 
of the programs broadcast on this channel are globally 
Western, pure entertainment shows which have nothing to do 
with "serving" the foreign communities. 
The truth is that establishing foreign channels is a 
delibrate move by Arab governments to allow more foreign 
entertainment programs into the Arab states to entertain 
people and offer them what they want which serve as a 
distraction tool to people. Arab television systems are 
engaged in competition with each other. They are in a race 
among themselves with respect to availability of channels 
and transmission hours. Establishing the foreign channel 
was a deliberate move by governments, not to serve the non- 
Arab community but to show off what might be considered as a 
technological development which could be accomplished only 
with foreign programs. They tend to take pride in their 
channels' availability they offer and the length of their 
daily broadcast hours length to dominstrate the television 
facilities they offer regardless of the broadcast content. 
Thus, those Arab states with one television channel tend to 
feel that they are at a lesser advantage and less fortunate 
than those who have more than one channel. Actually, there 
is no need for this kind of channel; the trouble already 
existed on the first channel. Two problems have replaced 
one problem. 
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News 
Arab television not only imports entertainment 
programs from Western countries, they also depend on them 
for news importation as well. As regular television 
programs are filled with imported Western programs, news 
editions are filled with Western news. As viewers become 
attached culturally to the West through entertainment 
programs, they become attached politically to the West 
through the news. 
Facts and figures indicate that the world's 
information and news are controlled and dominated by a few 
Western countries. They come from four sources (Reuter, 
Agence France Press, AP, and UPI) and from three cities in 
the world (London, Paris, and New York). Figures also 
indicate that developing countries import approximately 80% 
of their news from Western countries, although 20% to 30% of 
which is news related to the developing countries. However, 
an argument can still be made about the type of negative and 
distorted implied even in this 20 to 30%. 
Arab media in general and Arab television in 
particular are no exceptions in this regard. Imported 
Western newscast out-number any local or national Arab news. 
In 1981, the average Western news constituted a total of 40% 
in the newscast in the Arab states while Arab national news 
constituted 30% and the local news 10%.88 However, these 
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figures vary from one Arab state to another. 
Ironically, Arab states do not import news of Western 
countries but do import news of other Arab states from 
Western sources. Despite the close geographical distance 
among Arab states, news has to go to Europe first and then 
distributed to the Arab states. During the civil war in 
Lebanon and the Israeli invasion, most Arab television 
obtained their news from Western agencies. In 1988 and 
during the riots in Algeria, Arab television got the news 
from France Press news agency, among others. 
If we review the content of these imported news 
programs, we will end up with the same result as effected by 
imported Western programs, the meaninglessness of these 
programs and irrelevancy to people's and society's needs. 
Western news is covered in greater detail than events and 
major news are covered in other Arab states. Probably Arab 
viewers know more about what is happening in Western 
countries than what is happening in their own home land. 
All studies conducted in the field of the flow of news among 
Arab states, either on international level or Arab world 
level, indicate the paucity of this flow. Despite all that 
been said about the unity of the Arab states and the common 
elements they share, and the existing organizations they 
have established, the news flow activity among them range 
89 
between 10% and 30% of the total flow. 
Arab television present Western news in considerable 
176 
detail. The President of the United states, officials of 
the White house staff, State Department, and Pentagon appear 
almost daily on Arab television with their daily statements 
and press conferences. Even in such events as sports and 
news of the weather is covered. Anthony Smith observed that 
Third World media pays as much attention to the private 
lives of American celebrities, to the dangers of another San 
Francisco earthquake, to the problems of drug-taking among 
American students, to the health of the American president, 
as they do to the comparable personalities and issues of 
their own societies.90 
The British royal wedding in 1981 received a 
tremendous coverage, giving it as much attention as it was 
paid in the West. The health of the President of the United 
States, the first lady activities, Baby Jessica who was 
trapped in a well pipe in Texas, the Geraldo Rivera incident 
of fighting during his show, the two whales who got trapped 
in an icy area and the effort to rescue them for days, all 
are examples of incidents receiving the attention of Arab 
television newscast. 
Conclusion 
The disfunctioning of Arab television has continued and 
spread to the Arab culture. The impact of imported western 
television programs on aspects of Arab heritage and Arab 
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people is very obvious. The chapter has demonstrated that 
television in the Arab states is far from playing a 
constructive role in terms of Arab cultural continuity. 
Arab television is playing neither a neutral role nor even a 
marginal role toward preserving Arab heritage. 
Unfortunately, Arab television has become a negative 
and destructive weapon against Arab culture through its 
irresponsible broadcasting of alien content of programs 
which contradict and are incompatible with the basic Arabic 
values. Therefore, Arab television is accountable for its 
harmful role and holds a great share of responsibility for 
the damage that pervaded the Arab culture. 
Chapter V narrows down the situation, turning the 
study's attention from the Arab world in general to the 
state of Kuwait as a case study for the research, studying 
the issue in more depth. More of the effect of imported 
western television programs on the Arab culture will be 
demonstrated in the following chapter. The chapter will 
take a close-up look at the model of Kuwait television. 
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Chapter V 
THE CASE STUDY: THE STATE OF KUWAIT 
Introduction 
This chapter is the heart and the core of this study. 
It narrows down the issue from the Arab states in general to 
the state of Kuwait specifically as the case study of this 
research. In this chapter, Kuwait television will be 
studied as a model of Arab television in terms of the 
relationship between television and Arab culture. In this 
chapter, the case study will be discussed in depth through 
critical analysis in order to arrive at the final results 
and conclusion of the research. 
Many topics and issues are covered in this chapter. 
In addition to providing a brief history of Kuwait and the 
structure of the state, this chapter reviews in critical 
analysis the development of broadcasting in Kuwait with 
special emphasis on the television medium. The review of 
Kuwait television tackles some issues such as policies and 
strategies of broadcasting, censorship, types and 
characteristics of broadcast programs. In terms of program 
content, the chapter will examine the content of the 
imported western programs, especially entertainment programs 
and the role of the foreign channel. Most important, this 
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chapter will touch on the issue of cultural domination and 
illustrates how the Arab culture in Kuwait was damaged 
through broadcasting alien imported western programs. 
Location and Tonography 
Kuwait is located between latitudes 28,45 and 30,05 to 
the north of the Equator and between longitudes 46,30 and 
48,30 to the east of Greenwich. The state of Kuwait 
occupies the north- east corner of the Arabian Peninsula and 
the north-western corner of the Arabian (Persian) Gulf. It 
is bounded in the east by the Arabian (Persian) Gulf, in the 
south and west by Saudi Arabia, and in the north and west by 
Iraq. Due to this location, Kuwait is the veritable gateway 
to the north eastern section of the Arab Peninsula. 
The total area of the state of Kuwait is 17,818 square 
kilometers, mostly flat desert, or approximately 7,780 
square miles (nearly the same size of the state of 
Massachusetts). Kuwait also owns six Islands which add some 
3 00 sq miles to the area; however, most of these Islands are 
uninhabited. The Neutral Zone (5,700 sq km) was partitioned 
between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 1966; revenue from oil 
production in the zone is shared between both states. There 
is also another Neutral Zone between Kuwait and Iraq. This 
zone has been under a long political and border dispute for 
and still has not been solved. Kuwait has one of the years 
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few finest natural harbors (Kuwait Bay) in the north portion 
of the Gulf. The weather of the state is typical of the 
desert climate geographical region. The temperature is very 
hot in the summer, the average summer day temperature 
ranging between 110° and 120°F ,in the shade, In winter, it 
ranges from 46° to 66°F, with occasional winter rains that 
bring some grass and small flowers to the desert in early 
spring. Dust and sandstorms are frequent in the summer and 
humidity aggravates the severe summer heat making air 
conditioning indispensable. 
Background History 
Although the history of modern Kuwait as an inhabited 
city started in the early eighteenth century when some 
tribes from central Arabia (Najd) immigrated to what became 
known later as "Kuwait", its history as uninhabited land 
goes back much further than that. It is known that people, 
particularly seamen from other nations, had reached its 
shores many years ago. 
Archaeological findings at Failaka island, south of 
Kuwait Bay, indicated that pre-historic settlements of the 
early Bronze Age existed there some 4,000 or 5,000 years 
ago. The island became in later times a Greek settlement 
(Ikaros), as is evidenced by the ancient remains of a stone 
temple built about 334 B.C. at the time of Alexander the 
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Great by his army, a bust of whom was found and the 
discovery of a hoard of coins from Hellenistic times. 
For centuries, Kuwait land has been an important trading 
rout due to its strategic location on the northern Gulf. 
Through this strategic route of water, goods have passed 
from China and India to Kuwait and Shatt Al-Arab, continuing 
overland to Arabia, Syria, Iraq, the Mediterranean and then 
to Europe. However, no such evidence indicated any kind of 
habitation on the mainland of Kuwait in the very early 
times.1 In 632 A.D, the Muslims under the command of the 
famous leader, Khalid ibn al Walid defeated the Persians 
under the famous Persian leader, Hormus, in the battle of 
"That Alsalasil" or the "Battle of the Chains", which took 
place on Kuwait land in "Kadhma". 
In the sixteenth century, the European influence 
started to penetrate the Gulf area when, following the 
exploration of Bartholomenw Diaz and Vasco de Gama, 
Portuguese ships reached these waters. Their presence 
lasted unchallenged for entire century. Because of their 
powerful naval fleet, the Portuguese influence was strong 
and obvious and they established a chain of forts along the 
coast from Oman in the South of the Gulf to the north of the 
Gulf in Kuwaiti island, then known to the Europeans as 
"Grane" (the little horn), meaning high hill. It was 
located opposite Kuwait Bay and served as the center for 
their naval fleets which dominated and secured the region 
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mainly for maritime route trade purpose. The Gulf maritime 
route and Grane Island were familiar to the Dutch, French, 
and British marines as well who sailed these seas in the 
seventeenth century to challenge the Portuguese during the 
struggle for dominating maritime trade routes. Eventually, 
the British emerged as the prevailed power. 
It believed that the present town of Kuwait was 
founded in the beginning of the eighteenth century when in 
1710 a terrible and continuous drought hit the interior of 
Arabia, driving some families of the Anazah tribe to 
immigrate from central Arabia (Najd) in search of a less 
difficult place. After searching in several places, they 
found the conditions to be even worse than where they came 
from, till they reached to the shore of the Gulf where they 
settled eventually near the harbor or bay where a fort or 
"Kut" stood. The name Kuwait is derived from the Arabic 
diminutive word of "kut" meaning small fort. 
It seems that from the early settlers' time, the 
people of Kuwait decided to appoint a "shaik", or chief, to 
rule them. In 1716, the chiefs of the most important three 
tribes entered into alliance. The conditions of the 
alliance provided that Sabah bin Jabar bin Salman bin Ahmed 
will have the leadership in the affairs of government, in 
consultation with the other chiefs; Khalifah bin Mohammed, 
would have the leadership of the financial affairs in 
commerce; and Jabar bin Rahmat, chief of the Jalahmah, would 
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control the affairs of work on the sea. All profits were to 
be equally divided among them.2 In 1766, the whole of 
Khalifah followed by the majority of al-Jalahmah left Kuwait 
to settle in Bahrain. With the migration of al-Khalifah and 
al~Jalahma, there was no serious challenge left in Kuwait to 
Sabah authority.3 A member of Al-Sabah family ruled Kuwait 
ever since through selection among the family and the Al- 
Sabah family has been the ruling dynasty of Kuwait since 
that time. Unfortunately, many people and writers tend to 
associate and recognize Kuwait with the oil era. The post¬ 
oil era has been much covered; many have written on that 
subject, which was given too much attention. However, less 
attention has been given to the history of pre-oil era. 
Kuwait had a long glorious heritage of maritime 
history. Those Kuwaiti men and women who lived in the pre¬ 
oil era and bore much hardships associated with surviving 
mother nature sacrificed much and committed their lives to 
their land, indeed should be given full credit for their 
great achievements in establishing and maintaining the 
modern Kuwait. They all proved they were sea and state 
craftsmen. 
Despite the nomadic origin of the Kuwaiti people, they 
quickly adapted to the sea life environment. Prior to the 
oil era, the Kuwaitis always looked to the sea as a source 
of livelihood. Soon, they took from the sea occupations 
such as pearl diving, fishing, and maritime commerce and 
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turned the small town into the maritime trading center of 
the northern Gulf. British traveler-author, William G. 
Palgrave, who made a trip to Kuwait and the region in 1862, 
delineated the skills of Kuwait's seamen as follows: 
Among all the seamen who ply the Persian Gulf, the 
marines of Kuwait hold the first rank in daring, in 
skill, and in solid trustworthiness of character. 
Fifty years since their harbour with its little town 
was a mere nothing ; now it is one of the most active 
and the most important port of the northerly Gulf.4 
The pearl diving industry played a major role in the 
state economy and some of the finest pearls in the world 
came from the Arabian Gulf. At one time, the estimated 
number of pearl harvesting boats in the Gulf were 5000, of 
which 700 came from Kuwait.5 By 1912, a fleet of 812 ships 
employing 30,000 sailors and divers was engaged in these 
maritime activities. During the summer months, nearly one- 
third of the entire population would be at sea for the pearl 
diving season.6 
The long and hard sea life had shaped the Kuwaiti 
people to be one of the best talented and skilled vessels 
craftsmen in the world. They succeeded in building vessels 
that sail in the oceans and cross seas with no navigational 
aids except the qualifications and skills of the men. 
In 1944, Lieutenant-Colonel Harold R. P. Dickson, the 
former British political agent in Kuwait made this note: 
Kuwait to-day is still a most interesting and old-world 
spot for any one who wishes to study the various types 
of sailing-craft in the Persian Gulf...Many a sailor of 
the Royal Navy or other visitor has taken away with him 
as a souvenir a perfect *odel of [sailing -boats], or 
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one of the types of pearling boat. About nine years 
ago, an admiral took home one of these perfect models 
and presented it to the Science Museum, South 
Kensington.7 
Not too many years ago, a Kuwaiti ship craftsman built 
a classical Kuwaiti style yacht (boom) for the ruler of 
Qatar; John Daniels portrays the amazement of British naval 
architect when he saw this art masterpiece of Kuwait 
craftsmen; 
A senior British naval architect, greatly impressed by 
this particular craft, asked if he could see the plan. 
His embarrassment must have been greater when he 
learned that the craft had been made entirely from the 
creative genius of Kuwaiti craftsmen with their 
specialised skills and that no plans are ever used! the 
builders merely got down on the keel and proceeded with 
the job with no more ado.8 
In 1776, Kuwait served as a starting point of a desert 
trade and mail route to Aleppo and the Mediterranean to 
replace Basra which was captured by the Persian during the 
war between Turkey and Persia. Before the turning of the 
nineteenth century, the British East India company moved its 
trade headquarter for the northern Gulf from Basra to Kuwait 
to avoid the threat to its trade route. Years later, Kuwait 
was the intended termination point of Berlin-Baghdad 
railway. William Palgrave depicts the condition of Kuwait 
during his visit in 1862: 
The import duties are low, the climate is healthy, the 
inhabitants friendly, and these circumstances, joined 
to a tolerable roadstead and a better anchorage than 
most in the neighborhood, draw to Kuwait hundreds of 
small craft which else would enter the ports of Aboo 
Shahr or Basra....In its mercantile and political 
aspect this town forms a sea outlet, the only one for 
jabal Shammar, and in this respect like Trieste for 
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Austria.9 
It is worthy to note that Kuwait history as a land has 
always been part of Arabian history. When Islam emerged in 
the Arabian Peninsula in the 7th C. , the whole Arabian 
Peninsula converted to the new religion and Kuwait as 
uninhabited land at the time became part of the Islamic 
caliphate ever since. When Kuwait was established in the 
18th C. , it was already under the Islamic Ottoman caliphate 
and flew the Islamic Ottoman flag. 
International powers dominated the Gulf region since 
the 16th C., the British eventually emerging as the 
uncontested power over that of the Dutch or the Portuguese 
who used to be the only power operating in the Gulf prior to 
the arrival of the British. With the emergence of Kuwait as 
a new trading center in the northern Gulf, the British 
started to manoeuver around this new strategic center. The 
British relationship with Kuwait started when they 
transferred the British East India company of the southern 
terminal of its overland mail route through Aleppo from 
Basra to Kuwait. Meanwhile, the British interest in Kuwait 
did not stop there. 
Kuwait Under Britain 
In the struggle for power in the region between the 
Ottomans and the British, with a significant British 
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connection a bloody coup took place in Kuwait and Shaik 
Mubarak came to power in 1869. The legitimacy of Mubarak's 
reign, who ruled Kuwait until 1915, is still questionable. 
The rules that were made by Kuwaiti people since the 
establishment of Kuwait town in early 18th C. concluded that 
the seat of power should shift through selection. This was 
agreed upon as a common sense rule. This procedure was 
carried out peacefully and smoothly through the years until 
Mubarak's reign, when he broke these rules. 
Mubarak was known to be so fond of the throne that he 
would do whatever it took even if he had to kill his two 
brothers. The British took advantage of Mubarak's fondness 
for the throne and backed him in the coup with many 
promises. According to an official memorandum by the legal 
adviser to the British Embassy in Istanbul, prior to the 
coup Mubarak spent one month in Bushire with the British 
Resident in the Gulf, F.A.Wilson, a point not denied by 
Wilson.10 
In May 17, 1896, Mubarak carried out his coup and 
seized power from the ruler, his elder brother, Shaik 
Muhammad, by murdering him along with another brother, Shaik 
Jarrah, in a vicious and atrocious slaying while they were 
sleeping. Unlike other rulers of Sabah family who came to 
power through selection, Mubarak proclaimed himself ruler of 
Kuwait, breaking the rules of succession by selection, which 
made the people of Kuwait regard him as an illegitimate 
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ruler. The Ottomans, however, to avoid bloodshed, did not 
interfere in the event, regarding it as an internal matter 
of Kuwait. 
Although Kuwait had always been proud of being part of 
the Islamic Ottoman Caliph territory and raising the Islamic 
Ottoman flag, Kuwait enjoyed full autonomy and the Ottomans 
actually never interfered in Kuwait's internal affairs. 
However, that was not the case after Mubarak came to power. 
During Mubarak's reign, Kuwait became an official British 
colony. It was clearly evident that the British, in 
conjunction with Shaik Mubarak, had planned and determined 
the future of Kuwait long before Mubarak's coup. 
Through the years, Mubarak gained a reputation for 
selfishness, ruthlessness, tyranny, and sought to have many 
exclusive privleges. These attitudes put him on many 
occasions in confrontation with the people of Kuwait. It is 
not true that Mubarak was a "great man," despite the 
description in British-written history books and other 
foreign sources. A prominent and authentic Kuwaiti 
historian, Abdul-Aziz Al-Rushaid, described Mubarak's 
character and assessing Mubarak's reign: 
Mubarak was a tyrant, stubborn and unjust. He was an 
absolute ruler who loved the accumulation of wealth and 
was always seeking ways to increase his wealth. He 
assessed high fines against law-breakers; continuously 
invented taxes...and made himself partner in all 
building and property. He received one-third of what 
was sold or rented, even if this was repeated a number 
of times a day.11 
Kuwaiti historian, Al-Shamlan, delineated Meanwhile another 
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Kuwait as a just and peaceful society, and the 
characteristics of rulers before Mubarak: 
[They] were not privileged from most of the Kuwaiti 
population in any way. They were similar to the shaik 
of the tribe. There was no distinction between the 
shaik and members of his tribe. The power of the ruler 
was limited, and there were some Kuwaiti leaders who 
had more authority than the ruler himself.12 
Beside his fondness for ruling, Mubarak was also well-known 
for his anti-Islamic rule attitudes and pro-British. All 
Kuwait rulers before Mubarak held the title of Qaimqam 
"District Governor" from the Islamic Caliphate. When he was 
offered this title in January 1897, he refused to accept it 
and sought British assistance instead. Mubarak was known 
for his lavish and extravagant life and during his reign 
some immoral conduct that opposed Islam's teachings appeared 
in Kuwait. Years later it provoked the followers of the 
famous Islamic movement (Wahabbis) to attack Kuwait to 
suppress these evil acts. Right after he came to power, 
Mubarak sought British assistance against the Islamic 
caliphate; they were more than happy to accept Mubarak's 
offer. 
On January 23, 1899, Mubarak signed a secret agreement 
with the British incorporating humiliating stipulations. 
Mubarak agreed not to cede territory to, or to direct 
relations with another power, without Britain's consent. 
Under this treaty, Mubarak agreed that Kuwait's foreign 
relations were to be handled through the British Foreign 
Office. Mubarak bound himself, his heirs and his successors 
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not to receive the Agent or Representative of any power 
or government at Koweit [sic], or at any other place 
within the limits of his territory, without the 
previous sanction of the British Government; and 
further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to 
cede, sell, mortgage, or give for occupation or for any 
other purpose any portion of his territory to the 
government or subjects of any other power without the 
previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these 
purposes. This engagement also to extend to any 
portion of the territory of the said Shaik Mubarak, 
which may now be in the possession of the subjects of 
any other Government.13 
The agreement affixed no obligation upon Britain despite 
Mubarak's insistence upon British protection. Later, the 
British Political Resident in the Gulf, Lieutenant Colonel 
Malcolm John Meade, I.S.C., paid a visit to Kuwait and 
assured Mubarak in a letter of the good offices of the 
British Government to him, his heirs, and successors as long 
as Mubarak scrupulously and faithfully observed the 
conditions of the said bond. The letter also agreed to pay 
Mubarak Rs. 15,000 (1,000 £) and added "A most important 
condition of the execution of this agreement is that it is 
to be kept absolutely secret, and not divulged or made 
public in any way without the previous consent of the 
British Government."14 Mubarak's two brothers, who 
witnessed the agreement, refused to sign the agreement 
unless Britain assured protection of the family palm tree 
groves in Fao from the Ottomans. As a guarantee of their 
silence on the secret agreement, the British agreed to do 
so.15 This treaty was humiliating to the dignity of Kuwait 
all Kuwaiti people, making many Kuwaiti people believe 
and 
196 
that Kuwait was sold to the British. Ironically, despite 
all these negatives, the British called Mubarak "Mubarak the 
Great". 
In 1899, the Ottoman Caliph supported a proposal that 
the Islamic Ottoman caliphate should give the Germans 
consent to build the famed Berlin— Baghdad railway and to 
extend and terminate it in Kuwait; the British intervened to 
block the extension of the project, depriving Kuwait of a 
vital means of contact with the external world. This was an 
early indication of Britain's tight grip on Kuwait and 
domination of Kuwait decision-making. 
In 1904, the British Political Agency was established 
in Kuwait. Since then, the British Political Agent became 
the de facto ruler of Kuwait. Among its other functions, 
the Agency was given the right to establish and conduct its 
own jurisdiction law court for non-Muslims in the state. 
The Agency was the only foreign government post in Kuwait 
until an American Consulate was opened shortly after World 
War II. During the First World War, which caused the fall 
of the Islamic Ottoman caliphate, the British promised 
Mubarak that his palm tree groves in Fao would be 
permanently exempted from taxation and they would guarantee 
his protection if they occupied Basra, taking it from the 
Islamic rule of the Ottoman in exchange for his assistance 
to the British forces region. When the Ottoman Caliph 
called all Muslims for Jihad against the British, it was 
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expected that Mubarak would not respond to the Caliph's 
call. However, many of the tribes in neighboring Iraq 
responded to the Caliph's call and rebelled against 
Mubarak's ally, Shaik Khazal of al—Muhammarah, because of 
his support of the British. Shaik Mubarak attempted to 
rescue his ally by mobilizing Kuwaiti forces and forcing 
Kuwait people to quell the tribes who responded for the 
Jihad. The Kuwaitis surprisingly stood against Mubarak and 
refused to fight their own Muslim brothers for the sake of 
the British. As a result, Mubarak was forced to change his 
mind. Al-Rushaid comments that Mubarak "was disturbed by 
the degree of enthusiasm for the rebellion common among 
Kuwaitis, something he had not seen the equivalant of all 
his life".16 In 1914, after the fall of the Islamic Ottoman 
Caliphate, Mubarak and the British formally agreed that 
Kuwait would come under the British colonial system. Since 
that time, Britain had full control of Kuwait. Mubarak died 
suddenly in January, 1915. 
In 1922, following a short conflict with Saudi Arabia, 
Britain once again betrayed Kuwait at the Uqair conference, 
gl^ Percy Cox, then the British High Commissioner in Iraq, 
and Major J.C.More, the British Political Agent in Kuwait at 
the time, drew boundaries giving two-thirds of Kuwait 
territories to Ibn Saud. When he heard the news, Kuwait's 
Shaik Ahmed Al-Jabir resented the unjust agreement and felt 
Even though he signed the agreement, 
that he was deceived. 
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Ahmed was constantly considering how to regain 
Kuwait's lost territory. "To the day of his death he 
believed that he had been unjustly treated."17 
In January 1961, the government announced that Kuwait 
was now responsible for its foreign relations. It was not 
till June 19, 1961, when letters were exchanged between the 
ruler of Kuwait, Shaik Abdullah Al-Salim, and Sir William 
Luce, then the British Political Resident in the Gulf, that 
the British Government recognized Kuwait's independence and 
sovereignty.18 The 1899 protectorate treaty was replaced by 
a treaty of friendship and consultation. Britain and the 
Untied States have established embassies, replacing the 
Political Agency and the former American Consulate. 
Post-Oil Era 
The pearling industry at one time played a major role 
in the state's economy and Kuwait was one of the chief pearl 
centers in the Gulf and the region. But the economic 
depression in the 1930s and the advent and growth of 
cultured pearl industry led by Japan, brought depression to 
the industry as well to the state and threatened people's 
life source. But God never closes a door without opening 
another. An unexpected miracle was on the horizon. At that 
time, the mid-30s, early signs indicated great potential of 
oil in the area; then the discoveries were confirmed. Oil 
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was first discovered in 1938, stopped for several years due 
to the onset of the Second World War, and resumed in 1946. 
As a consequences of the new discoveries, the pearling 
and fishing industries suffered a drastic declined and 
people of Kuwait could no longer look at the sea as a source 
of life. Instead, this time they turned to the forsaken, 
abandoned desert land as a new source of life. 
Unfortunately, the discoveries of the "black gold" lured the 
people and made them forget somewhat their pride in their 
past. The shipbuilding industry likewise fall sharply. 
Compared to 812 ships operating in 1912, there were only 
five boats operating in 1956. The last Kuwaiti deep sea 
dhow was purchased by the Office of Education in 1954 for 
preservation as an historical memorial. Such tragedy to the 
glorious industry of maritime heritage! 
In some ways "black gold" has usurped much of the 
romanticism, the quaintness and the attractiveness of 
the old Kuwait. Nevertheless, even in recent years, we 
have been reminded of the remarkable achievements of 
the former era....one could not escape from a vivid 
sense of character, an inseparable link of the 
romanticism of the past as one toured the Kuwait 
waterfront of yesterday and saw the various craft 
silhouetted against the setting sun.19 
Needless to say, the discovery of oil did not only 
shock the economic system but caused an upheaval to the 
whole structure of the entire society, changed all 
expectations, and created new stages of life. In fact, the 
oil boom in the region drew a very thick clear-cut line not 
only in Kuwait's history but in the history of the Arabian 
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Peninsula. As a matter of fact, oil was considered the 
major variable that shifted the primitive town to a modern 
state. When the oil tap was turned on, Shaik Ahmed Jabir 
Al—Sabah, in his address to his people referred to Kuwait 
for the first time as a state, not as a shaikhdom.20 
Harold R.P. Dickson, former British Political Agent, 
who lived in Kuwait both before and after the oil era and 
then wrote many history books of Kuwait, expressed his 
admiration toward the will of the people of Kuwait and the 
challenge they met in living in the harsh environment. 
Sun and sand are formidable enemies in an almost 
waterless country where the rainfall is less than five 
inches a year, and where day shade temperature rise to 
110, 120, and even 128 F. These difficult conditions 
under which men had to work and live, particularly 
during the early eages, make the success which has been 
achieved all the more remarkable.21 
One of the state's first planning advisors, Dr George 
Saba Shiber described the sudden disparity between the pre 
and post oil eras: "Yesterday there was old Kuwait; today, 
new Kuwait. Yesterday and today are literally a stone's 
throw away in space and fifteen years apart in time. The 
story of pre-oil and post-oil Kuwait is extraordinary and 
unique.".22 British author John Daniels, who lived and 
studied Kuwait's society in its first stages of the post oil 
era, describes the thriving rapid progress in the state as 
unparalleled in the Middle East, if not in the world.23 
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Resources 
In general, Kuwait lacks natural resources 
particularly sources of drinking water, and depends 
thoroughly upon desalination technigues to provide water and 
drinking water. Kuwait has the largest water distillation 
plant in the world. Water has been always Kuwait's main 
problem in the either pre or post oil era. In fact, 
drinking water was a big business before oil was discovered; 
usually imported from the Shatt Al-Arab river in neighboring 
Iraq or obtained from springs under the sea by divers who 
would trap it in jugs and bring it to the surface. Some 
ground water has been found but most of it is brackish 
water. Interestingly, the highest budget item in the state 
is not the defense or the educational budget as one might 
expect, but it is the budget of water and electricity. 
Despite the heavy cost to the government of this burden on 
the budget, both water and electricity are subsidized by the 
government and people are charged below cost prices. In 
Kuwait, producing a barrel of distilled water costs more 
than producing a barrel of crude oil. 
The lack of water combined with the poor quality of 
soil and the harsh weather makes agriculture almost 
impossible. Arable land represents only 1% of the total 
area. In recent years, the government has been concerned 
with issues of natural resources such as agriculture, 
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and animal husbandry. The government set 
strategies to increase production of fishing, animal 
products, plantation, green land, arable and potential 
arable land in the state, and green houses. However, it was 
clear that these ambitions would not succeed or survive 
without government support. Therefore, the government began 
to allocate lands, loans, and providing facilities to those 
who are interested in investing in the land. Nevertheless, 
this industry has not be able to attract many Kuwaities due 
to the more lucrative opportunities in the oil and 
commercial sectors. Moreover, this is a long-range 
government strategy. The result in the best cases, is not 
expected to reach commercial level and still far away of 
reaching local self-sufficiency level. 
Kuwait's oil resources, owned and controlled by three 
government oil companies, is the vital natural source for 
the state. More than 90% of the state's revenue is from oil 
and oil products. Kuwait's oil reserves, approximately 
68.53 billion barrels, is estimated to last for another 188 
years if the oil production remains with the average of one 
million barrel a day, as it presently is.24 Kuwait has one 
of the largest oil fields in the world, "Burgan" oil field. 
The International Bank Mission which visited Kuwait in 1961 
indicated in their report that the oil resources of 
Kuwait, about one-fifth of the world's total, give the 
shaikhdom a much larger role in the economic affairs of 
Kuwait Figure 6. National income and expenditure for 
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the Middle East than its modest geographical dimensions and 
population might indicate. Due to the wealth of the 
government, Kuwait provides its citizens with one of the 
most comprehensive welfare systems in the world. The per 
capita GNP in Kuwait is among the highest in the world for 
an average of $13,500. While a barrel of Kuwait oil sells 
for about $29, a U.S Department of Energy official has 
estimated its cost of production to be 25 cents.25 This 
compares to 6 to 8 cents in 1961. 
Population 
The story of population in Kuwait after oil was 
discovered is a unique one. Due to the oil boom that got 
under way in the early 50s, and due to the government needs 
for labor and skills not available in Kuwait at the time to 
carry out the government jobs and services, Kuwait became 
the mecca for immigrants. Due to the huge state's budget 
and the government announcement of the first development 
plan and the massive governmental projects and the rapid 
expansion of civil services, Kuwait was swelled by the 
influx of immigrants from both Arab and non-Arab expatriate; 
skilled and unskilled. Ragael El Mallak noted that "With the 
possible exception of America at the turn of this century, 
no other country has witnessed such a mass movement of 
people, proportionately, as has Kuwait.". Fakhri Shehab 
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described the immigration in Kuwait in early 1950's: "A 
uniquely attractive market for labor was created and a flood 
of skilled and unskilled workers flocked from the four 
corners of the globe, but mostly from neighboring 
countries. "27 
Although the government for the time being has set 
very tough restrictions on entrance visas to the country, 
the immigration to the country was unrestricted and 
unsupervised until 1954. It was not until 1955 when the 
Office of the Social Affairs drew the government attention's 
to the fact that only 13% of the labor force was made of 
Kuwaiti nationals.28 In spite of government restrictions on 
entry visa to the country and work permits, it is still 
having some difficulties in controlling immigrants and 
reducing their number. It seems that the need for the 
immigrants, especially the skilled, is indispensable to 
carry out the massive expansion in government civil jobs and 
services. 
In 1900, Kuwait population was estimated at 10,000 and 
in 1937 it was 75,000. In 1950, after oil was discovered, 
it reached 150,000, then 160,000 by 1952. In 1957, the 
first Kuwaiti census indicated that Kuwait population was 
206,473, of whom 45% were Kuwaitis. The censuses following 
in the years 1961, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, and 1985 have 
consistently indicated that the non-Kuwaitits out-number the 
Kuwaitis. In 1975, Kuwait's population was 994,837; the 
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Kuwaitis constituted 47.5% of the total poulation. In 1980, 
Kuwait population was 1,355,827, of which 58.6% were non- 
Kuwaiti. The estimated population of Kuwait according to 
the 1985 census was 1,697,301, of whom approximately 40.1% 
were Kuwaiti citizens. The population at mid-1988 was 
estimated at 1,958,000.29 
Kuwait's population have increased very rapidly over 
the years after the discovery of oil. Within the eight year 
period from 1957 to 1965, the population increasd 128 %. 
Between 1957 and 1975, Kuwait population increased 557%, an 
annual average increase of 24%. Between 1957 and 1980, the 
population increased by 656%. The annual population growth 
between 1957 and 1961 was 12%, probably the highest in the 
world. Both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti populations have grown 
rapidly. Kuwait population has one of the highest growth 
rates in the World (about 4.5% from 1975 to 1980). Over the 
years, the growth rate among Kuwaitis increased dramatically 
despite their decline in number against the non-Kuwaitis. 
In 1980, for instance, there were about five times as many 
as in 1957, an increase of 494% over a twenty-three year 
period. Meanwhile, the growth among the non-Kuwaitis for 
the same period was even greater, 854%.30 The average rate 
of growth of the non-Kuwaiti population has been decreasing 
very noticeably, from 10.3% in 1975-1980 to 5.6% in 1980- 
1985. It is estimated to have been 1.9% in recent years, 
with Kuwaiti population growing by 3.9%. 
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Of these figures, about 80% of the immigrants are 
males. The non-Kuwaiti population, because of its immigrant 
nature, has an unusually high proportion of young and 
middle-aged adult males (61.8% in 1985), many in 
construction and service jobs. The foreign population 
consists primarily of workers, sometimes accompanied by 
their families, who are in Kuwait to take advantage of the 
relatively high wages and the shortage of labor in all areas 
of employment. Jobs held by immigrants range from manual 
labor to important government and managerial positions. 
Palestinians and Jordanians constitute about 22% of the 
total population; Egyptian, 4%; other Arabs about 15%; 
Iranians, Pakistanians, and Indians about 10%; and the 
remaining 2% come from Europe, the U.S and the Far East. 
The population is relatively young: 58.3% are under 25 
years old, and highly urbanized, with 91% of the population 
living in the urban areas. The population density is 80.2 
per sq km.31 
The definition of citizenship in Kuwait is a very 
strict one, and probably is among the most strict in the 
world. Article 1 of the citizenship law of 1959 (Amiri 
Decree #15, issued December 5, 1959) amended 1960, 1965, and 
1969, officially defined the Kuwaiti nationals as those 
people and their descendents who were present in Kuwait 
prior to 1920 and maintained residence there to 1959. 
Kuwaiti law allows granting of citizenship to non-Kuwaitis 
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if they meet certain requirements. It requires, for 
instance, residency in Kuwait for a minimum of 15 years, a 
knowledge of the Arabic language, possession of a skill 
needed by the country, and a legal source of income in 
Kuwait. By 1975, 29.9% of the non-Kuwaiti population were 
born in Kuwait, 16.4% had been in Kuwait for 10 to 14 years, 
and 12.7% had been in Kuwait for 15 or more years, However, 
they were still considered non-Kuwaiti.32 Until 1980, the 
number of those who could be naturalized was limited to 
fifty persons annually.33 Those who are granted Kuwaiti 
citizenship have the same rights and obligations as other 
citizens except for some political rights. 
Despite this citizenship law, the government granted 
naturalization for a large number of Bedouins with full 
political rights for the purpose of political and 
demographic reasons. Till 1979 there were 132,490 persons 
naturalized. Most of these bedouins were from Saudi desert 
(66.9%), Iraqi desert (21.6%), and Syrian desert (2.9%).34 
However, there is still a large population who 
permanently reside in Kuwait but still do not hold a Kuwaiti 
nationality. Most of these people are tribesmen who used to 
travel constantly in northern and inner Arabia searching for 
better life or better jobs. As a desert tradition, those 
tribesmen had not recognized the concept of boundnes and 
many of them would spread over today's states. Therefore, 
it was rather difficult for some of these tnbsmen to 
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determine their identity within a geographical borders. 
Immigrant population has always been a problem for the 
government. Since most of the services in the state are free 
or subsidized, and since there are more immigrants than 
citizens, the immigrants are benefiting more from these 
services than the citizens. Also this means that the 
government spends more on these services on immigrants more 
than it spends on citizens. It was also difficult for the 
government to control the political movements within groups 
of these immigrants which for years have influenced the 
political movement in Kuwait. From the security point of 
view, most of the crimes, robberies, and smuggling illegal 
materials to the state are carried out by immigrants. The 
government never considered the immigrants as permenant 
residents. Usually these immigrants are viewed as temporary 
employees for the purpose of doing temporary jobs. Very 
often the government urges these migrants to leave the 
country when their contracts expire. 
Despite the rapid birth growth among the citizen 
population after the oil boom, there was also a rapid growth 
rate among the immigrants which always outnumbered the 
Kuwaiti people. For years the government encouraged 
population increase among the Kuwaitis; nevertheless, it 
never reached the government's aspiration and the problem 
has not been solved. In recent years, the government gave 
much attention to the issue of the massive expatriation in 
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the state since foreigners out-numbered the native citizens, 
considered by the state to be a threat to the internal 
security. The government called for a balance in the 
population structure between native and migrant people. 
Right before the onset of Iran-Iraq war and during the 
increasing Iraqi-Iranian hostility, the government waged a 
massive deportation campaign and termination of contracts 
for security reasons. In the last three months of 1980, and 
after a series of bombing and explosions in the state a 
total of 18,000 repatriates were deported.35 
Political Background 
Kuwait became independent of Britain in 1961, and was 
threatened immediately, within hours, by neighboring Iraq 
claims to sovereignty of its territory. British and Arab 
League forces were sent to maintain Kuwait independence. In 
1963, after the military coup in Iraq that overthrew the 
Qassim regime, and after international pressure and a 
substantial financial inducement payment from Kuwait of 30 
3 6 
million KD ($84 million), Iraq dropped its claim. 
Official Iraqi policy recognizes the state of Kuwait without 
accepting the legitimacy of its border. A border dispute 
over what appeared to be the oil rich-border zone still 
unresolved, flared in 1967, 1973, and 1990. Since the 
leftist regime came to power in Iraq in 1958, Iraq has been 
211 
the major threat of destabilizing the security of Kuwait and 
the Arab world because of its territorial and oil ambitions. 
The last threat was the barbaric Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990. 
The Iraqi Invasion 
During the course of the final stage of writing this 
thesis Iraq invaded Kuwait because of territorial and oil 
field ambitions. The invasion which shocked the world 
occurred after the secular leftist government of Iraq 
promised Kuwait's government, and many other Arab states and 
western countries that it would not invade Kuwait; it 
alleged that it would peacefully settle the border and 
disputes about oil fields with Kuwait. 
On August 2, 1990, in a deceptive and unprovoked 
attack, the dictator of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, ordered his 
army to occupy Kuwait. The Iraqi army took Kuwait by 
surprise and swiftly invaded and occupied the whole country. 
The Emir of Kuwait and his government officials, who were 
the prime target of the invasion, successfully fled the 
country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia to lead the 
resistance. Within a very short period of time, they asked 
the U.S to intercede militarily in their behalf. 
Despite a worldwide condemnation of the invasion and 
extensive international diplomatic pressure on Iraq to 
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withdraw from Kuwait, Iraq refused. The U.N Security 
Council unanimously issued a resolution condemning Iraq's 
aggression, imposing economic sanctions against Iraq. 
Despite Iraqi denial of any territorial ambition in Kuwait, 
and an Iraqi promise to withdraw, two days later Iraq 
announced its "annexation" of Kuwait. The U.N again 
unanimously voted that the annexation was null and void. 
Furthermore, Iraqi troops moved southward and 
threatened to invade neighboring Saudi Arabia and amassed 
troops along its border. The U.S, together with some 2 5 
other countries, including many Arab countries, responded to 
a request from the Saudi government to send troops to defend 
Saudi Arabia as well as put pressure on Iraq to withdraw 
from Kuwait. The Arab emergency summit in Cairo, also 
condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded immediate 
withdrawal of Iraqi troops. The summit announced that many 
Arab states would send troops to the Kuwaiti-Saudi border 
and join a massive international military buildup of forces 
to repel any Iraqi aggression. It has become very obvious 
that Saddam Hussein's aggression against Kuwait was not 
merely a dispute over part of Kuwait's territory but a 
conspiracy which had been planned for years. The plan to 
occupy Kuwait and Saudi Arabia was developed in conjunction 
with King Hussein of Jordan. 
Within a few days the whole world stood against Saddam 
Hussein, and Iraq became isolated from the rest of the 
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world. Saddam Hussein responded to his isolation by taking 
thousands of foreigners in Iraq and Kuwait as hostages 
including women and children to use them as a human shield 
any international attack on Iraq. This move was 
denounced by the international community. Within two months 
the invasion, the U.N Security Council issued nine major 
resolutions against Iraq. 
Meanwhile, Sheik Jabir Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, the Emir of 
Kuwait, and the Kuwaiti governmental authorities who sought 
refuge in Saudi Arabia vowed to fight for the liberation of 
Kuwait until all the Iraqi invaders were withdrawn. The 
Kuwaiti people have shown extraordinary solidarity and unity 
behind their leadership in resisting the Iraqi Army. Right 
after the invasion, eye witnesses and international 
organizations reported massive destruction and wholesale 
looting of the country of both public and private 
possessions. The Iraqi military personnel began torturing 
and executing thousands of Kuwaiti civilians, including 
women and children. As these lines are written, the 
situation is still tense and unclear and the fighting is 
still going on between Kuwaiti resistance and Iraqi troops. 
Thp. Political System 
Kuwait is a traditional hereditary constitutional 
monarchy with a ruler (Emir) . Succession of the Emir is 
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restricted to the heirs of the seventh ruler of Kuwait, 
Mubarak Al-Sabah, chosen alternately as a tradition from one 
of the two branches of Al-Sabah family, Jabir and Salim 
named for the two sons of Mubarak AL—Sabah. According to 
Kuwait's constitution, the Emir chooses his successor and 
must obtain the approval of the Kuwaiti National Assembly. 
The constitution provides for a tripartite 
governmental structure. The Emir is the head of the state 
and is the highest authority. He is assisted by an 18 
member cabinet which he appoints, headed by the premier. 
The National Assembly (parliament) , formed by 50 members 
elected to four-year terms, has legislative functions. A 
judiciary authority constitutes the third branch of 
government in which the Emir acts the High court of Appeal. 
Although the political authority revolves around the 
royal family of Al-Sabah, there are other prominent groups 
in the society, such as merchants and principal tribal 
groups which share the power with the royal family. 
Political parties are not allowed in Kuwait; however, there 
are several informal groups and organizations operating 
unofficially. 
Unlike other Arab states, Kuwait enjoys a relatively 
Western-style democracy. Two years after independence, in 
1963, election for a 50- member National Assembly took place 
for the first time on a very limited franchise. Candidates 
for the National Assembly are elected by a very narrow 
215 
electoral base. In 1985, the electorate only 57,000. 
Suffrage has been restricted to first class citizen male 
adults who prove that their families were resident in Kuwait 
in 1920 or before. 
The National Assembly has always been a vocal forum 
for criticism of government domestic, regional and 
international issues and policies. Since it was 
established, the National Assembly had been influenced by 
different ideologies, from Nasserists and leftist groups in 
the sixties until mid-seventies, to the rightist and Muslim 
groups in the eighties. Despite the limited seats they won 
in the Assembly (four seats), the Islamic groups were viewed 
as the only active and prominent opposition group. 
Nonetheless, on two occasions, the Emir had to 
interfere and dissolve the National Assembly by Emiri 
decree. The first occasion was in 1976, after overt 
criticism of neighboring countries caused the Emir to view 
the Assembly as a disruptive influence. In August 29, 197 6, 
he dissolved it and suspended some articles of the 
constitution including the free press article, a decree 
which lasted for five years In February 1980, the 
government appointed a committee to review the constitution 
and report in six months. After its reconstitution in 
February 1981, Arab leftist and Nasserist groups were 
defeated and victory went to right, independent, and Islamic 
groups. The Assembly became increasingly effective and had 
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almost constant clashes with government, especially over 
economic issues. After the 1985 election and despite a 
significant number of prominent candidates; independent 
members of the de facto opposition described as nationalists 
and Islamic groups were elected. 
Even though the opposition stopped far short of making 
any revolutionary demands, it consistently embarrassed the 
government over its economic policy. A member of the ruling 
family was forced to resign his position as a Minister of 
Justice in May 1985 after a hearing before an Assembly 
commission proved his lack of integrity. Another member of 
the ruling family —the Oil Minister— and three other 
Ministers— persistently came under fire, the two Ministers 
actually tendering their resignations without having them 
accepted, a unique state of affairs by the autocratic 
standards of the region. Eventually, and apparently due to 
external pressures, the Emir stepped in to dissolve the 
Assembly for a second time in June 1986, citing internal and 
external threats to the state's security. The Emir once 
again suspended some articles of the constitution, including 
the free press article, and imposed a pre-censorship law 
over the press. But since the cease-fire in the Gulf War 
took effect, there has been increasing domestic pressure for 
new elections and reconstitution of the National Assembly. 
However, the government seems to be unwilling and 
unenthusiastic about restoring democracy in its original 
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style unless major changes occurred. Nevertheless, in May 
1990, after public pressure, the Emir announced the he would 
accept the restoration of democracy through the "National 
Council", composed of 75, members in which he has the right 
to appoint 25 members; the other 50 members are elected 
secretly. 
Historical Background of Broadcasting in Kuwait 
Introduction 
There are two major factors which played a vital role 
in establishment and emergence of broadcasting in Kuwait:1- 
external factors and 2-internal factors. 
1- External factors: influence of the Europeans, especially 
the British, during their domination of the country and the 
region in general, the impact of broadcasting systems from 
other Arab states especially Egypt and Iraq. 
2- Internal factors: the discovery of oil which led to the 
wealth of the state as an economic power and the achievement 
of independence and formation of a formal state with a 
modern political system. 
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Radio 
It was during the Second World War that the British 
installed a small low-power radio station in a small room in 
the security force building to broadcast two hours daily in 
Arabic for purely political purposes; to counter the 
powerful Nazi station in Basra in neighboring Iraq, and to 
propagandize for the Allies' policies during the war. At 
that time was part of British strategy to establish many 
radio stations in different parts of the Arab world to 
counter Nazi stations. 
Officially, Kuwait's radio, founded in 1951 with one 
and 1/2 kilowatt transmitter operated by two employees for 
two hours daily, covered Kuwait's city only. In 1953, the 
number of employees increased to five and the transmission 
hours increased to three hours and half, which lasted for 
five years. In 1959, four rooms in an old army built on the 
land of the army workshop were turned into a temporary 
studio and eight rooms became officies. Until 1959, a one- 
kilowatt short wave transmitter handled the broadcasts. The 
next year a five—kilowatt medium—wave transmitter started 
operating; within months a five-kilowatt short wave 
transmitter was added to the strength, while before the end 
of 1960 both the new transmitter had been increased to ten- 
kilowatt each. Summer, 1960, saw the six evening hours of 
daily air time increased to ten and half hours; three and 
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half in the morning and seven in the evening and news 
bulletins were broadcast for the first time.37 
Unlike some other Arab states, radio in Kuwait was 
from the beginning a governmental station long before 
independence. After independence in 1961, because of the 
wealth of government and the image of the modern state, 
Kuwait's radio expanded considerably and powerfully 
especially after the emergence of radio as a political 
weapon. 
In the 1950s and 1960s, during the cold war among some 
Arab states or what had been known as the Air Waves War 
among Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, Kuwait was 
attacked through the air waves by some leftist and 
revolutionary regimes such as Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, 
especially during the 1956 tri-attack on Egypt. These 
developments alarmed the Arab states against Britain, 
putting Kuwait official policy in a crucial position, since 
Kuwait is a good ally to the British. The government found 
that many people were listening to and influenced by these 
stations causing the government to accelerate the expansion 
of its radio service to attract the people to listen instead 
to their national government voice. 
The emergence of radio in Kuwait can not be separated 
in any way from politics. The relationship between radio 
and politics in Kuwait is very obvious both prior and after 
independence. Abdul Aziz Jafar, Assistant Under- Secretary 
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of Ministry of Information in Kuwait, who lived through the 
long years of experience with Kuwait radio since the early 
1960s, stated that politics was the loudest and most 
effective voice in the world and has been the Arab world 
from the time that on opene one's eyes on life. When the 
world was engaged in the World War, the Arab world was 
engaged in two parallel wars; the war of liberation from 
colonialism and the war of reformation of the state 
structure and political system. Kuwait, despite its small 
size, was not in isolation; actually Kuwait's maritime 
history and constant travelling among different coasts of 
Persia, India, and Africa in addition to its location on the 
Eastern Arabian Peninsula and its location in the vicinity 
of Iraq, made politics an integral part of the Kuwaiti 
existence.38 In early 1960s, when radio was still annexed 
to the police force, the political department of the radio 
was annexed directly to the office of the ruler.39 
In 1956, when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, 
Britain initiated the Suez conference in London in 
condemnation of Egypt's action which eventually led to the 
Anglo-French air attack on Egypt on October 31 1956. The 
Suez Canal crisis set the Cairo radio to spreading anti- 
Western views, especially against the British and provoked 
Arab Nationalism feeling which sparked an increasing anti- 
British sentiment in the Arab world in support of Egypt. 
attack by Cairo radio "Voice of Kuwait was under air wave 
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the Arabs," which put the Kuwait government in a crucial 
situation since Kuwait was still under British Protectorate 
and the British Political Agency still existed in Kuwait as 
a representative of the British government. As a result and 
as positive response to Cairo's radio, Kuwait's government 
was under popular pressure to end British domination of the 
country. In 1958, the Voice of the Arabs recorded: 
AL Sha'ab [name of newspaper, means, the people] of 
Kuwait has demanded the abolition of the Political 
Agent's court in Kuwait, as the British are acting as 
Rulers and this is a transgression against the dignity 
of Kuwaitis.40 
Before all these powerful and severe air waves 
attacks, Kuwait's radio was unable sufficiently to counter 
or even match Cairo's radio attacks. In 1960, an Arab 
ship,Cleopatra, picketed in New York as a result of Zionist 
activity. The Arab ship picket incident brought forth a 
spontaneous reaction from Kuwaiti dockors indicating that 
they would blacklist all American ships, and that no further 
United States tankers would be loaded at the two Kuwait's 
oil ports of Mina al-Ahmadi and Mina Abdulla. This message 
evidently pleased the Egyptian radio station "Voice of the 
Arabs". The station's announcer gave this dramatic 
commentary: 
Today and for ever we have a date with glory. 
Today, our workers, from Casablanca to Ahmadi and Basra 
will wage their triumphant battles. 
We shall assert our Arabism to the World. 
We shall prove to the World that we are united -from 
Morocco to Kuwait and Iraq^ 
We shall redeem Palestine. 
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Despite these air waves tensions, the Egyptian's 
hostility actually was not considered a serious direct 
Kuwait's security or intended to overthrow the 
ruling government. Nonetheless, in 1958, a military bloody 
coup took place in neighboring Iraq and the pro-British 
government was overthrown to be replaced by hard-line 
military communist government. The new government began 
gradually to antagonize relations with Kuwait, criticizing 
the British presence. In 1961, however, a serious and 
direct threat came from Iraq. Right after Kuwait's 
declaration of independence from Britain and signing of a 
new agreement with her, the dictator of Iraq, Abdul Karim 
Kassem, claimed the territory of Kuwait, a claim arising 
from years of build up of borders disputes and antagonism. 
Iraq's radio launched a propaganda attack against Kuwait: 
Everybody knows that Kuwait is a district belonging to 
Basra Liwa (Province). Iraq has helped the inhabitants 
of Kuwait to expel the ghost of British imperialism. 
Kuwait is an inseparable part of Iraq. 
"Kuwait's inhabitants are being ruled by a gang robbing 
them of their money and toying with the country's 
interests; they have been preventing Iraq's water from 
reaching Kuwait. Our country depends on oil resources 
and this gang toys with these resources . . .We shall 
appoint Shaik Abdulla [Kuwait's ruler] as District 
Commissioner in Kuwait.42 
Kassem, on different occasions, demanded every inch of 
Kuwait's territory. "Tomorrow Iraq would inform all nations 
of her position with regard to the territory.'1 He rejected 
the new Anglo-Kuwaiti agreement and called it an "especially 
dangerous blow” against the integrity and independence of 
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Iraq and the people of Kuwait. "From the date of the 
abrogation of the 'illegal 1899 agreement', Iraq had decided 
that nobody inside or outside Kuwait, of whatever status, 
should rule Kuwait. 'We would stand up to imperialism if it 
intervened in her (Kuwait) peaceful movement.'"43 
On June 26 1961, Kuwait's radio broadcast a strong and 
clear statements explaining its position of the issue which 
were not empty ones: 
The Government of Kuwait declares that Kuwait is an 
Arab independent state with complete sovereignty 
internationally recognized and that the Government of 
Kuwait, backed by all the people of Kuwait, is 
determined to defend Kuwait's independence and protect 
Kuwait. The Government of Kuwait, while announcing 
this, is fully confident that all friendly and peace 
loving states, and especially the Arab states, will 
support her in safeguarding her independence. 4 
A few days later, at the Kuwaiti government's request, some 
6000 British troops, landed in Kuwait, enough to provoke 
Cairo Radio's "Voice of the Arabs" against the presence of 
British troops on Kuwait's land and accusing Britain of 
plotting to occupy Kuwait, demanding an immediate withdraw 
of British troops. 
It is worthy to note that General Qasim was not the 
first Iraqi leader who attempted to annex Kuwait. King 
Ghazi (who ruled Iraq from 1933 to 1939) also attempted to 
absorb Kuwait into iraq territory. King Ghazi tried to 
arouse the Kuwaitis against their ruler through a private 
broadcasting station in his palace. In 1938, the King 
summoned the Chief of the staff and ordered to arrange for 
224 
the army immediatly to occupy Kuwait, but the acting Prime 
Minister persuaded the King to abandon his scheme.45 
Within the trauma of these sizzling political events 
jeopardizing its security, Kuwait had two major aims for 
developing its broadcasting system now the power of radio in 
reaching and shaping people's opinion had became clear: to 
extend its voice to other countries as far as possible, to 
prove its existence, and to attract its people to listen to 
their national radio by offering them alternatives in radio 
programming instead of listening to other countries' 
stations. Therefore, In 1958, Kuwait government had a 
contract with two experts in radio and television to set up 
two strategies— an urgent short-term one, and another 
long-term one to develope and expand radio services. 
It seems that Kuwait has succeeded in achieving these 
two goals. Compared to two hours of daily broadcasting in 
1951, Kuwait's radio now broadcasts more than 62 hours a day 
on eight channels, four of them in non-Arabic languages. 
The 1960s were crucial years for Kuwait's radio. It is 
evident that the Arab air waves "Cold War" was a big lesson 
for Kuwait to learn from. In 1960, the transmitter had a 
power of 10 kilowatts and broadcasted for about 17 hours a 
day. Right after independence, the government gave 
considerable attention to expanding and developing its radio 
services, taking advantage of the oil wealth. In 1961, the 
number of the employees increased to 267 and transmission 
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was through two powerful transmitters. One with 100 
kilowatts operates on medium wave and another with 50 
kilowatt operates on short wave. The archives of audio 
tapes increased to a total of 2013 hours, compared to not 
more than 15 hours in 1958.46 
In early 1960's, the government published a report 
stating that the government is boosting its medium-wave 
transmitter to 400 kilowatts and its short-wave transmitter 
to 250 kilowatts, the report continued: 
All these equipment is either ordered or already in the 
country and it is designed to give a very comprehensive 
coverage to the Middle East through an aerial array of 
29 beamed aerials covering an aerial "farm" area of 
two-and-a-half miles square. 
When this project is finished in 1966 the Voice of 
Kuwait may be heared as far as the United States of 
America. The final expansion planned at the moment is 
for a very high power medium-wave station to be built 
within the next two or three years. It could make 
Kuwait the loudest Arab voice over an area covering 
Alexandria, Beirut, Northern Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Karachi, the Gulf towns and round to Aden, Riyadh and 
Mecca.47 
In its early stages, Kuwait's radio depended on 
Egyptian programs. Many were written and recorded in Egypt 
and Lebanon especially for the Kuwait radio service, but in 
the 60s Kuwait had its own recording studios. Radio 
receivers spread very rapidly among the people and became 
very popular. In early 1960's, the estimated number of 
radio receivers in Kuwait was 80,000 set.18 Many factors 
accelerated the popularity and the availability of radio in 
Kuwait; the opening of Kuwait's market on international 
markets after the oil boom, the wealth of the people who can 
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very easily afford to purchase even expensive radio sets, 
and needless to say the wide spread interest in politics. 
In 1968, there were an estimated 400,000 radio sets in the 
state for an estimated population of 650,000, probably the 
highest rate in the world.49 
During the 1970s, Kuwait's radio continued expanding 
and its signals covered most of the Arab world and in the 
1980s, Kuwait's radio programs reached as far as Australia, 
New Zealand, North and South America, Far East, and East and 
South East Asia. Abdul Aziz Al-Mansour, the director of 
Kuwait radio, described the status of Kuwait's radio in the 
1980s as passing from amature level to professional level.50 
At the present time, Kuwait's radio broadcasts through eight 
programs four of which are non-Arabic. These programs are: 
General program, Second program, Holy Quran, European, Urdu, 
Persian, Directed, and F.M program. The total of broadcast 
programs is about 23,315 hours a year. 
Entertainment programs receive most of the air time in 
most radio channels and constitute more than 60% of the 
total broadcast time, while cultural programs are allocated 
the least number of hours. Like most other Arab states, 
Kuwait's radio offers FM service which is filled with 
Western pop songs and music such as American, British, 
French, and Spanish. Most of the audience for this station 
are teenagers and Europeans, however, It is not clear yet 
what is the real purpose of this station. 
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Despite the incredible development in Kuwait radio in 
the last thirty years and despite the success of the 
government to attract the people to listen to the national 
radio, external programs, still have some popularity among 
the people and are considered credible sources of 
information. Audiences usually tune in to these stations 
during political crises and crucial political events as a 
way of seeking truth in contrast to evasive official stories 
of government. Some of these external stations include 
(RMC) Radio Mont Carlo, BBC, VOA, and RM. 
Television 
Just as in radio, Kuwait's television was developed 
and expanded very rapidly beyond all expectations in a 
relatively in very short period of time. Due to the Arab 
air waves "cold war" in mid-1950's and 1960's and the 
Kuwait-Iraq crises in 1961, Kuwait's government had a 
substantial desire to develop radio and television services 
as well. Nonetheless, due to the relative complexity of the 
nature of television compared to radio, television 
development in Kuwait was less rapid than radio. In spite 
of this, television development in Kuwait is impressive and 
extraordinary. If television service is a reality in the 
Arab states, it is no doubt a reality in Kuwait. It seems 
that the early political events made the Kuwaiti officials 
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realize the significance of this medium and its development, 
since early stages, as a means of expressing Kuwait's 
policy, getting its message cross, and defending its 
opinion. 
Indeed, the government succeeded in making television 
a distinctive phenomenon and in attracting people and 
families around the television set and building credibility 
of the national television. Moreover, The nature of 
economic, political, and social environment of Kuwait have 
played key roles in spreading the phenomenon of television. 
The high income of the government and the people as a result 
of the massive oil revenue, the political events that 
surround Arab states in general and Kuwait in specific as a 
post-independence era, and the image of forming new modern 
social life as a post-oil era equipped with television set 
which served as a technological aspect and entertainment 
medium at the same time were all factors behind the rapid 
spread of television in Kuwait. 
Early statistics in 1968 indicate that there were 
about 80,000 television sets in use in the state for an 
estimated population of 650,000.51 The United Nations late 
statistics of 1980 give impressive figures, indicating that 
Kuwait has the highest ratio of television set per capita in 
the Arab states, 490.91 sets for each 1000 capita, and the 
second in the world after the U.S., 631.99 set for every 
1000 capita.52 A study conducted by Kuwait Ministry of 
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Information in 1985 suggested that more than 80% of the 
families living in Kuwait acguire a television set and many 
of them acquire more than one set; more than 99.5% of the 
population watch Kuwait's television and 58.8% watch other 
neighboring states' television stations.53 However, 
according to 1982 statistics, the estimated viewers within 
the population of the state was 1,300,000, which a 
constitute 96% of the total population.54 It has been 
estimated, however, that the viewers of Kuwait television in 
the region of the Gulf area number 10,000,000.55 The number 
of television receiver sets in the state were estimated in 
1982 for 400,000 sets and in 1985 for 423,000 sets. Kuwait 
television gained good reputation among other Arab 
televisions particularly in the Gulf region. In all past 
Gulf Televisions Festivals, Kuwait television always 
occupies the first position in major categories such as 
programs and development. 
Since Kuwait Television (KTV) is the first system in 
the Arabian Peninsula region, it helped other states and 
played a primary role in the development of television 
services in the region. Kuwait's concern for developing its 
television service was not limited to its geographical 
border but it was extended to other neighboring states in 
the Gulf region. In each stage of development to increase 
its transmission power, Kuwait always take into 
consideration the desirability of its signals reaching to 
230 
neighbouring states so they can make use of the television 
service for one reason or another. 
In early 1960's, right after Kuwait television went 
officially on air, Kuwait government announced that it is 
building a powerful VHF signal transmitter to cover Basra, 
Abadan and southern parts of Iraq. "As well as this the 
ministry [of Guidence and Information] may build a 
transmitter in Bahrain, and send down complete video-taped 
programs for broadcasting; at the moment reception in 
Bahrain is feeble and unreliable."56 In 1974, Kuwait 
financed the construction and furnishing the television 
building in Bahrain.57 
In 1969, Kuwait built a television station in Dubai. 
This station was operated under the name of Kuwait 
Television Service in Dubai. This station was under the 
control of the General Board for the South and the Arabian 
Gulf until Decamber 197 2 when it was handled to the 
government of Dubai after the formation of the federation of 
U.A.E.58 
Background of Kuwait Television 
Whereas Kuwait's radio was established as a government 
property from the beginning, Kuwait's television, to the 
contrary, was established as a private commercial station. 
The beginning of Kuwait television started when a Kuwaiti 
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businessman who happened to be a local RCA television 
receivers dealer purchased a low-power American standard 
television transmitter (525 lines) from the American 
company, RCA, in 1957. He started simple daily broadcasting 
of cartoons and motion pictures to promote television set 
that time, many Kuwaitis already had TV receivers 
to receive program signals broadcast from Abbadan in 
neighboring Iran from the opposite bank of the Gulf on 
American standard signals. 
Within a few years of broadcasting, on November 15, 
1961, and right after independence, Kuwait government bought 
the small station? a 100 watt transmitter was used to 
broadcast experimental programs for a year. On January, 17 
1962, Kuwait television was annexed officially under the 
supervision of the Ministry of Information, formerly 
Ministry of Information and Guidance, according to Article 
#1 of the Amiri decree #2 of 1962 issued in January 17, 
1962.59 In 1962, the government changed the system from the 
American standard to the European standard when a European 
two-kilowatt transmitter was purchased, and it began to 
broadcast on channel 8. Therefore, all American receivers 
in Kuwait were adapted to receive the new European channel 
of 625 lines. Kuwait television started with four hours of 
daily broadcasting. 
A round 1962, the government announced that a stronger 
ten-kilowatts transmitter working on the European channel 10 
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was ordered to start working in 1963. The government also 
announced that this transmitter will for a while broadcast 
the same programs, and later it will be used to provide a 
second channel.60 
In 1963, Kuwait television started broadcasting 
The residents of the Eastern province of Saudi 
Arabia, who used to receive American standard signals from 
Kuwait and ARAMCO (Arabian-American Oil Company) in Saudi 
Arabia, had to purchase dual systems receivers to pick up 
the new European system in Kuwait. Kuwait was the first 
state in the Arabian Peninsula to have its own television 
broadcasting system. ( Actually the first television station 
in the Arabian Peninsula is the American oil station ARAMCO 
and which is beleived to be the second in the Arab world 
after the American air base station in Libya) . Kuwait 
television played an important part in television 
development in the area, which obviously paved the way for 
other Arab states in the region to have their own national 
system, too (Saudi Arabia in 1965, U.A.E in 1969, Qatar in 
1970, Bahrain in 1973, Oman in 1974, and Yemen in 1975). 
In 1964, after the government felt that the Iraqi 
television from Basra and Iranian television from Abadan 
were begining to gain audiences in Kuwait, the govenment 
made a decision to increase the transmission power to cover 
the whole state through a transmission station in Al-Rudtain 
with 2 kilowatts (video) and 0.4 kilowatts (audio). In 
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1966/ Kuwait government signed a contract with the Japanees 
company Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Limited to improve 
and develop the state's communication system and to build 
the first earth satellite station in the Arab world, "Umm 
Al-aish", which operates via the Indian Ocean's satellite. 
The station was inaugurated in 1969 and broadcasted live the 
trip of Apollo 11 which carried the first man to walk on the 
moon on July 16, 1969. 
In 1971 a substantial change in transmission occurred 
with the establishment of a powerful transmission station in 
the island of Failaka, with two transmitters for a total 
power of 20 kilowatts (video) and 4 kilowatts (audio). The 
purpose of this new station is to cover the eastern province 
of the Arabian Peninsula and parts of other Gulf states such 
as Abbadan in Iran and southern Iraq. One of the 
transmitters is broadcast specifically to Basra in southern 
Iraq in order to provide a television presence in a country 
that threatened to invade Kuwait in the 1960s and 1970s. 
On March 15, 1974, Kuwait television began 
transmitting in color on the German system PAL (Phase 
Alternation Line) with 625 lines on the channels 5-8-10-6. 
The last channel "6" was directed especially to Basra. The 
reason for adopting the German system was partly as an 
expression of desire for political unity with some other 
Arab Gulf states such as Qatar, Bahrain, U.A.E, and Oman 
which adopted the same system. Meanwhile, other Arab Gulf 
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states like Saudi Arabia and Iraq adopted the French system, 
SECAM, as an appreciation for France's moderate policy in 
the Middle East associated with the transaction of French 
"mirage" military airplanes and other arms supplies sold to 
some Middle East countries.61 
In March 27, 1977, the German company (Semins) 
inaugurated another earth satellite station beamed at the 
Atlantic Ocean satellite. In 1979, the television moved to 
its new and modern French built TV and radio complex. On 
December 2, 1979, Kuwait television began broadcasting 
another channel designated for foreign programs only and for 
four hours a day. In 1981, the Japanees company Nippon 
built another satellite earth station beamed also at the 
Atlantic Ocean satellite. In September 28, 1985, another 
earth station was inaugurated which operate through the 
ARABSAT satellite system. 
Broadcasting hours have also increased since 1961. 
From 24 hours weekly in 1961, it reached 42 hours in 1964, 
52 hours in 1969, and 58 hours weekly in 1975. The second 
channel which began broadcasting for 21 hours a week has 
been raised to 45 hours a week in 1986 for a total of 131 
hours a week on both channels. In 1981, the total broadcast 
hours were increased 350% in contrast to 1961.62 In 1986, 
the annual broadcast hours on the first channel was 4,488 
hours and on the second channel was 2,307 for a total of 
6,795 hours a year, an average of 130.5 hours per week. 
235 
At the present time, Kuwait television uses five ground 
stations linked to the satellites over the Atlantic Ocean, 
the Indian Ocean, and Arabsat. 
The Structure of Television System in Kuwait 
Television in Kuwait is a government institution 
owned, controlled, financed, and operated by the government. 
Kuwait television is part of the Ministry of Information 
which is the one in charge of operating and supervising the 
broadcasting system in the state. The head of this Ministry 
is the Minister of Information, who is appointed by the 
Emir- the head of the state-. This position has been very 
sensitive and important to the government since television 
came under governmental authority. The position is always 
occupied by a member of the ruling family. The director of 
television (formerly Assistant Deputy under Secretary for 
Television Affairs) is the one who is directly in charge of 
the television organization and reports to the Minister, 
followed by the Programming Department Executive hwo is 
responsible for the whole planning process and everything 
broadcast on television. The television organization is 
composed of six departments as follows: 
A-Programming Department: This is the main and largest 
department in the television which is in charge of 
programming service either planning or production. Also 
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this department is responsible for evaluating and approving 
the programs. There are nine other sub-departments which 
come under the administration of this department related to 
the work of programming: 1-drama programs division, 2-sports 
programs division, 3-news division, 4-variety division, 5- 
production services division, 6-second channel division, 7- 
coordination division, 8-cultural programs division, and 9- 
production division. 
B-Financial Affairs Bureau: Responsible for all financial 
work and transactions that are related to television, it has 
a connection with the main financial Department of the 
Ministry. This Bureau controls four divisions:1-marketing 
and bidding, 
2-advertisement and commercials, 3-archives, 4-treasurer. 
C-Managerial Affairs Bureau: Responsible for all 
administrative and organizational work, this department is 
formed of four divisions: 1-staff affairs division, 2-public 
services division, 3-secretarial and registration division, 
4-and typing division. 
D-Films and Cinema Bureau: This Bureau is in charge of 
preparing and producing films and footage of films that are 
needed by television for its programs, either documentary or 
informative. 
E-Censorship Bureaus This bureau is in charge of censoring 
all materials reviewing then, for suitable content and 
artistic quality. This bureau determines the compatibility 
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of the programs with the overall policy of Kuwaiti 
television. This bureau has two sections, one for censoring 
Arabic materials and the other for censoring foreign 
materials. 
F-Technical Office: This office deals with technical 
affairs such as making arrangements for receiving and 
sending materials through satellite, receiving and recording 
the daily news editions through the Euro-vision and 
distributing it, in turn, to other Gulf states' television 
systems. Since Kuwait is the Center of News Exchange and 
Coordination for the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, this 
office is in charge of this mission. 
As in most other Arab states, there are no television 
fees; obviously this is the case because the government is 
wealthy enough and capable of funding the whole system and 
because it wishes to make sure that every thing is under 
government control and because it is in the government's 
interest that no one else should claim any sharing of this 
power. Centralization is very obvious in television 
organization and management. This can attributed to two 
main reasons; since television is a government property, 
then it is very natural to become the voice of government. 
Perhaps the other main reason of television centralization 
is the nature of centralization of the political structure 
of the state, which leads automatically to centralization of 
other sub-system institutions in the state. 
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Policies and Strategies of Television System 
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In reviewing the historical background broadcasting of 
the Arab world in general and in the Gulf area and Kuwait in 
Par"ticular/ we find that the circumstances which surrounded 
the emergence of broadcasting have pretty much shaped the 
policies and strategies of broadcasting in Kuwait and other 
Arab states. Not only that, but they have also shaped the 
function and structure of television broadcasting. Since 
television in Kuwait is a governmental property, it is very 
natural that television operate and function within the 
framework of the state policy. 
The planning process for programming in Kuwait 
television goes through two main steps: first, it sets up 
the general annual programming and proposes the budget for 
it, and second, divides the annual programming to four 
seasons (each season is 3 months). To carry out these steps 
, the management requests all programming departments and 
sections to submit their plan for programming over the next 
four seasons along with estimated budget and technical 
needs. The programming department through its committees 
study, review, and evaluate all bidings of Arabic and 
foreign materials from local, regional, and international 
companies and prepare a report of these materials. After 
preparing a whole cohesive plan based on information from 
the different departments, it submits to the Director of 
240 
television for approval. The Director of television in turn 
submits the plan to the supreme commission of radio and 
television programs which is headed by the Under-Secretary 
of the Ministry of Information and membership of Assistants 
Under Secretary, Directors of radio, television, technical, 
and engineering departments. The commission then submits 
the whole plan to the Minister for final approval. 
Kuwait television usually begins its daily programs in 
the evening at five clock in the winter and six clock in the 
summer during the weekdays. There is no day television 
broadcasting in Kuwait. However, there are exceptional 
cases on the weekends, holidays, national days, and special 
occasions when television broadcasts morning programs. 
Since early 1974, Kuwait television began broadcasting daily 
morning programs for only four hours during the three month 
school summer vacation period. There have been suggestions 
to have regular daily morning broadcasting all year long, 
even when schools are in session. 
Kuwait television broadcasts on two channels, the 
first channel and the second channel: 
The First Channel (KTV1): This is the main channel and the 
predominant one. Kuwait's oldest channel, operational since 
November 15,1961. It started broadcasting four hours a day, 
increased to 6 hours a day in November, 1964, to 7.5 hours 
in November, 1969, and to 9.2 hours in November 1975. This 
station used to broadcast both Arabic and English programs 
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(with Arabic captioning) until the establishment of the 
second channel in December, 1979. Most of the foreign 
programs were then shifted to that channel. Currently, most 
of the programs in the first channel are in Arabic and 
foreign programs constitute about 15% of its air time. It 
broadcasts longer than the second channel, especially on 
special occasions such as weekends, holidays, and special 
events. 
The Second Channel (KTV2): This channel was established in 
December, 1979, with 4 hours of broadcast a day, increasing 
in the following years to nearly 6 hours a day. The main 
purpose of this channel, officially, is to serve the non- 
Arab community in the state. All the programs in this 
channel are in the English language. More than 80% of the 
programs broadcast over this channel are imported; about 55% 
are drama and entertainment programs. This channel also 
broadcast many of educational and cultural materials, 
accounting for 35% of the channel's air time. 
Censorship 
Censorship on broadcast programs in general can be 
described as moderate, but conservative especially of 
excessive sex scenes, violence, and anti-governments 
materials particularly any which criticize heads of states. 
Since the emergence of television in Kuwait, censorship has 
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changed its trend; during the 1960's until mid-1970's 
censorship was liberal. Noticeably, in late 1970's, 
censorship took a conservative trend. Since 1979, 
censorship toward moral issues became very strict, 
concentrating and focussing more than before on religious 
programs. This trend can be ascribed to the timing of many 
political events of the time in the Islamic World, such as 
the Iranian revolution, the takeover of the Holy Grand 
Mosque in Mecca by a religious group, the communist Soviet 
invasion of Muslim Afghanistan, and the signing of Camp 
David treaty between Egypt and Israel. 
In searching for written rules that KTV might apply in 
its censorship procedures, the writer could not find any 
such rules. However, he was told by television officials 
that any such written restrictions or guidelines do not 
exist and most of these rules are unwritten ones. In many 
cases, it depends pretty much on the common sense of the 
censor person or the committee. 
Al-Usmani, who studied Kuwait television, noted that there 
are three main requirements for program acceptance in Kuwait 
TV; a program must not violate the religious beliefs of the 
state, it must not violate the state's traditions or social 
values, and it must be compatible with the government's 
overall broadcasting policy; "These conditions are obviously 
vague to the point where one has difficulty understanding if 
they are really applied.63 
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Nonetheless, Kuwait television, for instance, would 
tolerate such scenes as love scenes or dancing. Kuwait TV 
would not mind showing drinking alcohol or showing drunk 
persons on the ground that these problems are common 
problems even in the Gulf region and cannot be ignored; "We 
cannot put our head in the sand and pretend everything is 
okey" argues Salim Al-Fahad, the former director of Kuwait 
television and programming department.64 The censorship 
department has two committees, one to censor Arabic programs 
and the other to censor foreign programs. 
Advertising 
Even though Kuwait television is state television and 
not commercial television, the government had allowed 
commercial advertisement in this medium for a limited period 
of time during the day. Government policy toward commercial 
advertisement had been also changed through the development 
of Kuwait television. Generally speaking, there has been a 
great deal of reluctance to allow commercial advertising on 
Arab television. This reluctance reflects the governments' 
desire to remain the sole supporter of the service so it can 
maintain full control over it. Also, part of this 
reluctance arises from the belief that introducing 
commercial advertising to state television is incompatible 
with the dignity of a medium which is ultimately the voice 
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of the government. 
Although Kuwait television began in 1961, 
advertisement was not allowed till October 1969, about eight 
years after starting transmission. In fact, Kuwait had 
preceded many other Arab states who had restrictions and 
were forbidding commercial advertisements in government 
television in their first stages. 
In 1969, the administration of Kuwait television 
formed a committee the study the possibility of allowing 
commercial advertising in television without destabilizing 
the objectives or the principles of television as a 
governmental medium and at the same time to serves as 
additional income source to the government. The committee 
after studying many commercial advertising laws in some Arab 
and foreign countries, and after studying the international 
treaties that deals with commercial advertising specially in 
television, elicited the law of commercial advertising in 
Kuwait television.65 
From the beginning, advertisement became very popular 
due to the nature of the free economic system of Kuwait, the 
nature of Kuwait's consumer society, the high income of the 
people, and low state customs tax on imported merchandise. 
In the fiscal years 1970-1971 and 1971-1972, the commercials 
income were 59.5% and 78.2% consecutively from the total 
television programs budget. In 1972-1973, the commercials 
income covered the whole programs budget with slight surplus 
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and with later years there were great surplus. In 1975- 
1976, the income increased 217.9% than the previous years. 
This increase can be attributed to the timing of the 
beginning of the color transmission. In 1978-1979, there 
were 199.5% increase in contrast with the previous years 
1977-1978. In the fiscal year 1980-1981, the commercial 
income was more than ten times as it was in the fiscal year 
of 1970-1971.66 
The time designated for commercial advertisement in 
Kuwait's television is very limited since television is not 
a private commercial institution and since advertisement is 
not considered the major source of television income. 
Commercials are usually broadcasted at specific time between 
programs and not within programs; programs cannot be 
interrupted for commercials as the case in some western 
countries. 
In 1980, Kuwait television determined the air time for 
advertisement with a maximum of 2 0-2 5 minutes a day, an 
equal of 4.1% of the broadcast time on the first channel and 
3.1% of the air time on both channels. However, 
advertisement in the years 1972, 1973, and 1974 was 4.6%, 
5.7%, and 3.9% consecutively.67 According to 1987 
statistics, advertisement constitute 5% of air time on both 
channels; 3% (132 hours) on the first channel and 2% (50 
68 
hours) on the second channel. 
Perhaps the noticeable criticism of most of these 
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broadcast commercials is that they promote Western products 
most of which were designed and produced especially for 
Western environment. Most of these commercials contain 
materials which are not compatible with the norms and values 
of the indigenous culture of the state. Since television is 
a government property, the revenue of advertisement does not 
go to the television treasury but to the state's treasury. 
Types and Characteristics of Broadcast Programs 
It was mentioned earlier that broadcasting in Kuwait 
emerged during World War II to propagandize for the Allies 
and counter the Nazi stations in the region. Then, 
broadcasting in Kuwait emerged within a political atmosphere 
surrounding it and it was introduced by the British as a 
propaganda tool. Althgouh the original cause disappeared 
other analogous variables emerged maintained this original 
function. Hence, it was natural that it continued, 
especially after the emergence of a series of complicated 
developments in political events in the Arab world in 
general and the Gulf region in particular. 
Government Politics 
Since the end of the World War, the political 
situation in the Arab world was at its peak of political 
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seething, ideological struggle, and the struggle for 
political independence. As a result, the function of 
broadcasting in the Arab states was devoted to purely 
political purposes. Therefore, we can conclude that 
political broadcasting is actually considered the foundation 
of Arab media. 
In late 1950's and during the 1960's, Kuwait in turn 
was vulnerable to air waves attack from radical Arab states 
especially Egypt, Iraq and Syria. Since the bloody coup in 
Iraq in 1958 when the military came to power, the Kuwait- 
Iraq relation crisis was aggravated; the Iraqi broadcast 
system began attacking Kuwait and since then Iraq threatened 
to invade Kuwait several times. Kuwait reluctantly found 
itself pushed into a war of the air waves. The government 
became more concerned when it found out that people in 
Kuwait began buying television sets to receive signals from 
neighboring countries. These external threats began to 
jeopardize the national unity of the state and the 
government decided to make more contact with its people 
through a national television medium and sought to use the 
television medium as a means to unify the people of the 
state under their national government policy. 
In early 1970's, with the expansion of Kuwait 
television transmission, Kuwait set a separate transmitter 
(channel 6) beamed at southern Iraq (Basra) to provide a 
presence of statehood and independence. Due to Kuwait's 
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crucial geographical size and location, which makes her more 
vulnerable during critical political times, Kuwait also had 
to beam its television signals to other two countries as 
well Saudi Arabia and Iran. Douglas Boyd attributes 
Kuwait's powerful transmission as overcoming the 
psychological disadvantage of a smallness by having a 
powerful radio and television service.69 
Since early 1970's, the Gulf region and Kuwait in 
particular witnessed a few political movements as a result 
of immigration of a large group of Nasserites, mainly 
Palestinians, who held positions in Kuwait Ministry of 
Information and other Kuwaiti press. Previously, Iran 
claimed the territory of Bahrain and occupied some Arabian 
islands in the Gulf that belong to U.A.E. Kuwait, in turn, 
became cautious about foreign intervention. Meanwhile, the 
nationalism movement was sweeping the region all along the 
Gulf shore. Salim Al-Fahad, former director of Kuwait 
television, said since the 1970's "Nationalism has been an 
essential element in the policy of the Kuwait television. 
Nationalism as a policy for Kuwait television has 
become a more and more essential element as the years go 
by. In the late 1970's and early 1980's, Kuwait witnessed 
profound and complex political developments. Throughout 
Kuwait's history, nothing has been more threatening to its 
national security than the Iran-Iraq war. Since 1980, 
Kuwait witnessed a series of explosions, assassinations and 
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assassination attempts as a result of increasing Iran-Iraq 
hostility. After the breakout of the Iran-Iraq war, Kuwait 
came under constant severe attack from Iranian media. These 
air wave attacks reached their peak with the assassination 
attempt of the Emir in May 1985 and several missile attacks 
on Kuwait's territory in the following years. Kuwait 
television in turn, through all these years of events, 
emphases nationalism more than usual on many different 
occasions. 
Television in Kuwait is the official voice of the 
government and always been used as an integral part of the 
government, working within the framework of the state policy 
presenting and supporting the official state's policy and 
the political system. It presents only one point of view of 
official reports and reflects very much official political 
content in its programs, which serve in general as 
propaganda for the head and seniors of the state, state's 
policy, and other Arab states' heads and officials. News 
programs- content are loaded with government reports and 
there is special focus on government seniors' daily 
activities schedule. Often these activities are presented 
in a meaningless and dull manner such as official meetings, 
airport receptions, royal motorcades, and state's banquet 
dinners. 
Kuwait television also present a large portion of 
foreign imported news. 
In fact, the imported foreign news 
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are the prevailed and they overshadow both local and 
national Arab news. According to a study conducted by Arab 
Center of Audience and Viewers Research in 1982 concluded 
that international news in Kuwait television form 32.7% 
while Arab news forms 25% and local news 9.1%.71 In another 
study of news in Kuwait television concluded that in 1982 
news was 15.7% of the total air time in which 60.7% were 
imported from Arab and non-Arab countries, in 1983, news 
formed 9.9% of the air time in which the imported formed 
33.3%, and in 1984, the news air time was 10.65% of the 
total air time, imported news constituted 56.1%.72 The 
President of the U.S, members of his cabinet and 
administration, officials and staff from the White House and 
State Department, members of the Senate and the House 
appears almost daily on Kuwait television news. Another 
study also showed that the News viewing pattern among 
Kuwaitis toward Kuwait television news is very high and it 
reached as high as 85.7% in contrast to 71.5% in Egypt, 
93.3% in Jordan, 75% in Sudan, 85.7% in Qatar, and 61.2% in 
North Yemen.73 
Kuwait television receives its daily imported news 
bulletins through Eurovision and Visinews. Because of the 
communication facilities in Kuwait, and its long experience 
in dealing with internatinal and European news agencies, 
Kuwait became the Center of News 
Exchange for the Gulf and 
Peninsula region. 
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Compared to other Arab states, Kuwait enjoys a 
relative freedom and democracy. Freedom of individual 
opinion and freedom of the press are guaranteed by the 
constitution according to the articles #36 and #37, subject 
to the will of the Emir: 
Freedom of opinion is guaranteed to everyone, and each 
has the right to express himself through speech, 
writing or other means within the limits of the law. 
The press is free within the limits of the law, and*it 
should not be suppressed except in accordance with the 
dictates of law. 
Freedom of expression in Kuwait is a right but not through 
the broadcasting system. Government and government 
officials and institutions are usually the ones who have the 
privilege of access to television. Public criticism of 
government and its policy through television is highly 
unlikely if not forbidden. However, criticism of television 
programming might be acceptable. Muhammad Al-Sanousi, the 
former Assistant Under Secretary for television affairs in 
Kuwait, has pointed out that "Criticism of the press is 
usually taken into consideration when it is objective and 
comes from a knowledgeable person who knows what he is 
talking about."74 
Unfortunately, Kuwait's democratic life was not 
reflected on Kuwait's television, which did not present any 
news of its political governance. Despite the relatively 
democratic political system in Kuwait, the unique Kuwait 
democratic experience in the region and the Arab world, the 
active National Assembly sessions, and vital discussions and 
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debates among its members over significant national issues, 
Kuwait television ignored totally this aspect of Kuwait's 
life. It never covered any of these events. The chairman 
of the National Assembly, “ranked the second most important 
official in the state" and other members of the Assembly, 
were never shown on television and had no opportunity to 
make any statements to the viewers. 
Therefore, the television system in Kuwait can be 
characterized as a one-way medium and a one-way flow of 
information. Being a one-voice medium is against the nature 
of television as a medium of communication. With the 
absence of participation in planning and programs' content, 
many messages have been ignored and bounced by both ends, 
which has led to miscommunication between the sender and the 
receiver. Ithiel de Sola Polo describes a broadcasting 
system supported by the government as follows: 
Run the risk of becoming boring and reflective of the 
tastes and views of civil services. There are no 
incentives to attract audience, since the revenue does 
not decline if the audience fall off, and the only 
people who must be satisfied are those who hold the 
purse-strings.75 
The absence of democracy in the structure of television has 
led to the absence of cooperation and coordination with 
other developmental organizations, especially those in the 
non-governmental sector. Consequently, the message does not 
stimulate much interest at the receiving end due to the lack 
of dynamism in the transmitted message. Usually in a 
situation like this, a thin connection at least is required 
to work as a channel for 9etting the message across. 
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Entertainment. 
Like any other television in the Arab states and 
developing countries, needless to say, entertainment 
programs dominates air time in Kuwait television. in 1975, 
a study conducted by the UNESCO suggested that light 
entertainment constitutes the major programs in both 
Kuwait's broadcasting systems, radio and television. The 
study reported that Kuwait radio broadcast over 129 hours a 
week, of which 97 hours are light entertainment, 14 hours 
for a special audience, 13 hours for news, 4 hours for 
cultural programs, and 1.5 hours for education. In terms of 
television, the same study concluded that Kuwait television 
broadcast programs for a total of 38 hours a week. Light 
entertainment occupies 25 hours, news 8.5 hours, programs 
for special audience 4 hours, cultural and educational 
programs 1 hour.76 
Light entertainment still forms the majority of 
Kuwait's television programs, outnumbering any other 
programs. In spite of the development of Kuwait television 
since 1975, there was no development in this particular 
aspect. As a matter of fact, entertainment program time 
increases every time the state increases the transmission 
hours. In reviewing the development of transmission hours 
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in Kuwait television, we observe that with each expansion in 
transmission hours, there is expansion in entertainment 
hours as well, with establishment of the Second Channel, 
the Foreign Channel, air time of entertainment programs 
became even more prominent since the purpose of this 
channel, purely devoted to Western programs, is to serve the 
non-Arab community in the state and the availability of 
these programs in English language. 
Kuwait television broadcast approximately a total of 
6,795 hours a year on both channels, according to 1986 
statistics. The first channel broadcast 4,488 hours and the 
second channel broadcast 2,307 hours. it was already 
mentioned that the predominant broadcast programs are 
entertainment. One must examine and diagnose the type of 
the broadcast programs on this two channels in order to be 
able to assess the role and the function of television since 
the content of programs is what really counts. 
Between 1976 and 1980, Kuwait television purchased 
7154.4 hours of foreign programs for an average of 1430.9 a 
year. However, drama programs constituted 69% of these 
hours. Meanwhile, the Arabic programs Kuwait television had 
purchased for the same period (1976-1980) were 2550 hours 
for an average of 510 hours a year. Arabic soap operas 
programs -serials- constituted 61% of these hours, followed 
by feature films, drama, varieties, plays, children programs 
and cartoons.77 Table # 5 and Table # 6 elaborate the total 
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broadcast hours according to classification of the types of 
foreign programs for the years 1985 and 1986. 
In analyzing the two Tables, we can make very clear 
observations of features that characterize the types of 
programs on Kuwait television: 
1- Drama programs (includes shows, serials, plays, and 
films) are the dominant programs on both channels. They 
consume 27% of the total broadcast time on the first channel 
and 36% on the second channel. 
2- Entertainment or recreational programs (includes light 
music and songs, music shows and songs programs, and sports) 
are second on the list, constituting 20.5% of the total 
broadcast time on the first channel and 27% on the second 
channel. 
3- Special Group programs (includes women's, youth, 
children, family, education, army and police) come in the 
third place and they constitute 14.4% of the total broadcast 
time on the first channel and 12% on the second channel. 
4- News and information ( includes news, political programs, 
and commentaries) occupies the fourth place with 14% on the 
first channel and the fifth on the second channel with 8%. 
5- Cultural programs (include poems, talk shows, seminars, 
contests, global music, and physical education programs) 
form about 10% of air time on both channels. 
6- Religious programs (includes recitation of the holy 
Quran, Athan "call for daily prayer", live broadcast of 
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weekly Friday prayer, and religious talk shows) form the 
least number of programs within the total broadcast time, 
coming at the end of the list. 
Noticeably, drama programs do not count as 
entertainment programs according to Kuwait television 
officials definition which include shows, serials, and 
films. If we combine both drama and recreational as 
entertainment, they would form a total of 47.5% on the first 
channel and a total of 63% on the second channel. 
Nonetheless, the argument in this matter does not terminate 
at the fact that these programs are merely entertainment 
programs, but it gets more serious when it goes beyond that 
to the fact that most of these entertainment programs are 
imported from Western countries. 
In reviewing and analyzing the content of these 
• the problem consequently, becomes more profound. 
There is a danger of finding that the content of these 
imported entertainment is irrelevant to the values of the 
culture of the state. In most cases the content of these 
programs is not only does not help in the process of 
development in the state, but also cause sever damage to 
aspects of culture and play a negative role in the 
development of the culture. 
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Table 5. TV transmi 
1985. 
ssion hours by type 
of program, 
SOURCE: "Annual Statistical Abstract," Central Statistical 
Office, Ministry of Planning, Edition XXIII, Kuwait, 1986. 
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Table 6. TVg transmission hours by type of program 
Programs 
Hours of Second 
Channel 
Hours of First 
Channel 
Percent Hours Percent Hours 
Informative 8 184 1 4 633 
Recreational 27 618 20.5 922 
Cultural 1 0 230 9.3 416 
Drama 36 826 27 1,212 
Religious 5 114 11.8 526 
Group programs* 1 2 285 14.4 647 
Commercials 2 50 3 132 
Total 1 00.0 2,307 100.0 3,902 
'Includes children, household, and safety programs 
SOURCE: "Annual Statistical Abstract," Central Statistical 
Office, Ministry of Planning, Edition XXIII, Kuwait, 1987. 
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Table 7. Classification 
percentage of 
standard (the 
of program categories and 
broadcast time as a fixed 
main channel) . 
Types of Programs 
Percentage 
(A) Cultural and Special Programs 
1. Cultural, Scientific, Art, Literature 10 
2. Religious 10 
3. Children 10 
(B) Information Programs: 
1. News and Political 10 
2. Information about State Activities 10 
(C) Entertainment 20 
(D) Sports 10 
(E) Drama 15 
SOURCE: Kuwait Television in Twenty Years, Ministry of 
Information, Kuwait, 1982. 
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Table 8. Classification 
percentage of 
channel). 
of program Categories and 
broadcast time (the second 
Types of Programs Percentage 
Drama 
Cultural 
News 
Entertainment 
Sports 
50 
34 
10 
3 
3 
SOURCE: Kuwait Television in Twenty Years, Ministry of 
Information, Kuwait, 1982. 
Western Proaramc 
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Historically, Western programs in Kuwait television 
are not a new phenomenon. They can be traced back to the 
period when television was first established in Kuwait. In 
its early stages, Kuwait television was more heavily 
dependent on Western programs. Ironically enough, this 
dependency still prevails, despite the increase in local 
production and may be even more extensive than before. 
Furthermore, the new development of increasing transmission 
hours and establishing the second channel mainly for foreign 
viewers has created an even greater demand for Western 
programs. With the establishment of the second channel, the 
problem of imported foreign programs has become more 
aggravated. 
The Second Channel: The idea of establishing this channel 
goes back to early sixties before it actually went on the 
air in December 2, 1978. This time of delay was 
intentional, according to a government report, designed to 
give the project enough time to be more mature and developed 
through studies aimed at determining its objectives, 
content, and type of viewers. However, it was clearly 
determined from the beginning that the purpose of this new 
channel is to serve the non-Arab community in the state. 
Prior to making the final decision, the television 
officials conducted a pilot study to seek different opinions 
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and views of knowledgeable people and those who have 
experience in the field, consulting with them to elicit 
suggestions which might be helpful in the planning process- 
especially the type of programs to be broadcast. 
Eventually, the prevailing thought among the officials 
regarding the type of programs was that they should 
concetrated on dramatic and cultural types of programs.78 
In its first stage, the channel used to broadcast mixed 
programs of Arabic and English. After a short time a 
decision was made to devote the channel to English programs 
and shift most of the foreign material from the first 
channel to this channel. Currently, all the programs in 
channel are in English or other foreign languages with 
Arabic subtitles. They accounted an average of about 80% of 
the channel's air time: the other 20% are still in English 
but are locally produced, or produced in other Arab 
countries. These programs are confined to programs not 
available through ready-made importation, such as local news 
and reports, religious programs, and special occasions 
reports. Although this channel is aimed at the non-Arab 
community in the state, nonetheless it has very wide 
popularity among Arab viewers. 
The U.S is the major supplier for this channel but 
other sources include Britain, Australia, France, Japan, 
China, New Zealand, Italy, Germany, and Russia. Programs 
are purchased for this channel either through local or 
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international agents or through a direct contact with the 
companies. 
A heavy schedule of foreign shows, serials, drama, 
comedy, and feature films are shown on this channel. They 
form 50% of the channel time. Officials commenting on this 
phenomenon in Kuwait television to the desire to satisfy a 
large portion of viewers' taste in addition of the wide 
range of availability of this kind programs which is mostly 
produced internationally. However, officials said, 
television receive and review hundreds of films every year 
for evaluation and selection, many of them cannot be 
broadcast for one reason or another; either for technical, 
content, rights reserved, high prices, or boy cut rules. 
Other light foreign entertainment programs such as 
music, songs, and dancing shows and concerts and other 
variety of programs are also shown in this channel. 
Officials say that despite the popularity of this kind of 
programs and the great demand of viewers to increase this 
type of shows, but the television cannot obey this kind of 
demands since most of these shows contain scenes and actions 
do not fit with the norms and values of Kuwait's society. 
These programs form 3% of the channel air time. 
Foreign sports are also shown in this channel such as 
British and Italian soccer games, U.S NBA, international 
Tennis tournament and matches, and other world sports 
programs such as the Olympics games. These programs form 3% 
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of the air time. Many cultural programs are offered in this 
channel, apparently because of the availability of this kind 
of programs in English. 
The availability of educational and cultural programs 
that this channel offer is probably the only advantage of 
this channel over the first channel. A large group of 
viewers described as the educated class recognize this 
channel through this type of programs. A large variety of 
educational programs such as Geography, animals' life, 
world's cultures, documentary, travelling, science and 
invention discoveries are shown in this channel as well. 
They quite occupy a large air time of 35%. Even though all 
these programs are with Arabic captioning or commentaries, 
noticeably, local programming almost does not exist. 
News bulletins in English was the first thing was in 
mind when this channel was first established. This channel 
offer two daily English evening and late night news 
bulletins, political programs, especial reports, 
commentaries, and other informative reports. The news and 
informative programs constitutes in this channel 10% of air 
time. 
In Kuwait, the average ratio of imported programs of 
the total broadcast time is 50%; on the Second Program 
Channel -which is the foreign channel- the percentage of the 
foreign imported programs has reached 81.8%, 79%, and 79% 
for the years 1979, 1980, and 1981 respectively. Between 
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1976-1980 Kuwait television purchased a total of 7154.4 
hours of foreign programs; of this 69% were considered 
entertainment programs. 
In 1987, Kuwait television imported more than 3011 
hours foreign programs and, in 1988, imported more than 3120 
hours. Douglas Boyd observed that officials at Kuwait 
television are not concerned about the cultural affect of 
imported programs because they believe that it is up to the 
viewer to make a choice between what is offered on the two 
services. They indicate that even if western entertainment 
programs were not offered on Kuwait television, they are 
available in local cinemas or on videotape for home video 
systems. 
In this matter, however, it is important to examine 
the type of these imported programs where we find that 
entertainment programs constituted more than 60% of the 
total imported programs. 
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Table 9. Imported television 
fication according 
in Kuwait in 1987. 
hours and their classi- 
to types of programs 
Types of Programs Number of Hours 
Drama - shows - serials 1,030 
Cultural and scientific 710 
Children 420 
Light entertainment 110 
Sport 100 
Religious 40 
Total: 2,410 
Table 10. Number of featured films broadcast in 
Kuwait in 1987 (average of 2 hours each) . 
Source of Films Number of Films 
American and British 246 
Indian 10 
French 35 
Italian 10 
Total: 301 
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Table 11. 
Imported television broadcast 
in 1988. in Kuwait 
Types of Program Number of Hours 
Drama - shows - serials 1,080 
Cultural and scientific 710 
Children 520 
Light entertainment 120 
Sports 100 
Religious 40 
Total imported hours: 2,570 
ble 12 . Number of featured films broadcast in 
Kuwait in 1988 (average of 2 hours eac 
Source of Films Number of Films 
American and British 240 
Indian 25 
French 5 
Italian 5 
Total: 275 
268 
Television and cmt1]re in 
Television service is a reality in Kuwait and it 
considered one of the tools that has a broad effect on 
Kuwait's society, as it does everywhere. Television viewing 
patterns are very common and popular among Kuwaiti people. 
People in Kuwait are well known for their fondness of 
acquiring and watching television. As Zahra Freeth noted, 
the Kuwaitis are confirmed TV addicts.79 
British author, Violet Dickson, wife of the former 
Political Agent, who witnessed the development of 
Kuwait in the 1960's and the emergence of television in its 
early days, describes the situation in Kuwait in the early 
days of television and the great desire of Kuwaiti people to 
have a television set even among women in the desert. She 
recalls a story when two bedouin women, black draped figures 
wearing veils wearing over their face-masks who made a 
surprise visit to her asking her help to acquire television 
set. 
After sitting and chatting for some time, I ask Sarah, 
the young girl, what is on her mind: 
She replies, 'you are my mother and I am Sarah, your 
daughter; 
I have come to ask you to give me a television set. 
Everybody has one except me, and a small one is quite 
cheap-only sixty dinars (60 £) 
'My dear little girl, I cannot give you this. Even my 
own daughter has not got one, neither have I. 
Perhaps one of the ladies at the palace will give you 
one. 
'No; as you are my mother, surely you can do this for 
your daughter? 
'I will bring you a nice piece of silk to make into 
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adress for the Id.' [holiday] 
No, I don't want that- only a television.' 
She is very disappointed at my firm refuel «-w 
get up and glide out, for au'tj ™o ' Uki ?wo * 
clippers under full sail. 
I°sawdthat1?h^r however- as 1 passing their house, 
I saw that there was a television aerial on it: so 
perhaps she got one after all. 
In 1982, a study was conducted on a random sample of 
families in Kuwait which represent and cover all areas in 
the whole state. The study indicated that 96.8% of all 
families in the state are television viewers. The same 
study also indicated that the average family in Kuwait —— 
both Kuwaiti and non-Kuwaiti— acquire 1.6 color television 
sets. The average Kuwaiti family has 2.2 3 sets as opposed to 
1.17 sets for each non-Kuwaiti family in the state. The 
study also indicated that the spread of videos’ popularity 
confirms the television viewing pattern. The study showed 
that 58.11% of the total families in Kuwait acquire a VCR 
set, the average share of each family of VCR is .70, the 
Kuwaiti family is .97 and .52 for non-Kuwaiti family.81 
Nonetheless, the nature and features that 
characterized the Kuwaiti society traditions were the chief 
factor that helped in many ways the acceleration of the 
spread of television in Kuwait. Beside the easy approach of 
television as a major entertainment medium, the nature of 
the Arab Kuwaiti culture as a family oriented culture 
encouraged a family gathering around the television when 
they gathered daily. Also the traditions and customs of 
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Kuwaiti society of evening group gathering out doors or in 
public places have created a group viewing pattern. One of 
the interesting and unique group viewing pattern in Kuwait 
is to place television in public places such as coffee shops 
or restaurants in local quarters, which imply an invitation 
for others or passers by to come and join the group. A 
British visitor found that what most particularly interested 
her in Kuwait was to see that at a refreshment kiosk on the 
sea-^ron^' television set was placed on the ground, and 
men bought their drinks and sat on the ground to watch it;82 
this scene in particular reflects the tradition of the 
ultimate enjoyment of Arab culture, sitting. Needless to 
say, the high average income of the people and the unusual 
hunger for acquiring technology mediums, make the desire to 
obtain a television sets striking to the observer. in 
reviewing the history of Kuwait, it is evident that Kuwait 
society had been enjoying cultural continuity and a self- 
sufficient cultural environment. The society and the people 
of Kuwait were secure in terms of culture until oil was 
discovered in the late 1930’s compined with British presence 
over years of domination. The British have a great influnce 
on Kuwait's social life and the legal system as well. 
It was already mentioned earlier that the discovery of 
oil in the region and in Kuwait has changed all expectations 
and drawn a thick and clear-cut line in the history of 
Kuwait. Not only that, it caused a severs shock to the 
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customs and traditions of the society and people. Jaqueline 
S. Ismael ascribes the social change in Kuwait to the 
physical modernization of Kuwait, the dependence of 
utilities, transportation, and communications 
infrastructures upon technologies produced in the central 
capitalist nations, and the increase in the standard of 
living.83 Although this trend was to be expected to be as a 
result of the advent and wealth of oil revenue, but it seems 
that there was no way to evade these social changes even 
though there was some control aimed at minimizing the degree 
of this damage. 
Harold R.P. Dickson, former British Political Agent in 
Kuwait and one of the prominent figures of the story of oil 
in Kuwait in the early days, had warned the ShaiK Ahmed Al- 
Jabir, Shaik of Kuwait at the time, of the probable social 
outcome of the oil discovery on Kuwait society, but the 
Shaik had no other choice except to sign the oil concession 
agreement. 
Not long before oil concession was signed, Shaik Ahmed 
confided to Colonel Dickson his feeling about the 
advent of wealth. 'You must realise,' the Political 
Agent told him, 'that this probably means that Kuwait 
will become very wealthy; a large number of outsiders 
will have to come to your country to work the oil; it 
will bring both good and bad... it will mean the 
building of a power station for lighting and air 
conditioning, modern building materials for houses. 
Think very carefully about these things.' Shaik Ahmed 
did not reply at once. But a few days later he told 
Dickson: 'I must do this for my people, even if it will 
bring undesirable things to my country. We are poor, 
pearling is not what it used to be, so I must sign.' 
...he accepted the need to develop the country's oil 
272 
fol!ow?e«4 regrettedCthatd that ?hange would inevitably 
very^austerity^ l?**? lead"ahiP which^r^oSfof'th. 
surge of techL!^ 2^2=2^^^ 4°* in 3 
In early 1950-s, Harold Dickson's earlier expectations 
began to become true. He observed some of the early signs 
of the social changes in Kuwait society as a result of oil 
wealth. The changes were due to the impact of the West. 
Dickson sums up the early Western impact in Kuwait in two 
major factors: motor-car and radio. Dickson explains how 
these two major factors made some changes in people's 
behaviors in the early days: 
Probably no single factor has done so much to alter the 
thinking of the desert Arab as the motor car.. .more 
insidious is the effect of the motor-car on the ladies 
of the town...women hear more and see more, and it is 
likely that the motor-car will be an important factor 
in the eventual removal of the veil, through this is 
very, very far distant where tribal Arabia is 
concerned. . .the radio brings them into a world of 
music, people, places and happenings of which their 
mothers did not even guess the existence...these same 
women have growing interest in cosmetics, perfumes, 
powders and soaps.85 
Dickson also noted that radio was so popular in Kuwait 
and that people like to be informed regarding world affairs, 
that they would tune to Arabic-speaking programs from 
London, Ankara, and Moscow as well as to other Arab states' 
radios such as those of Beirut, Jordan, and Baghdad. Radio 
became so popular among the Kuwaitis that since early years 
it was in every home, even of the humblest villagers, as 
part of the government's strategy of entrance into the 
modern world.86 Dickson estimated the number of radio sets 
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available in Kuwait alone at that time as some eight 
thousand receiving sets87, a very high figure in contrast to 
the small population at the time. 
After the emergence of television, it was very evident 
that the people of Kuwait also had great desire to acquire 
television sets. Very soon the popularity of television 
spread very rapidly among the people, high classes and lower 
classes alike. 
During the reign of Shaik Abdulla Al-Salim (1950- 
1965) , Kuwait was in the first stage of opening to the West. 
Nevertheless, Shaik Abdulla was very keen to introduce 
Western media to Kuwait society. At the beginning of his 
rule, he resisted the introduction of films to the Kuwait 
public as a whole to avoid any political or social 
instability which might result. However, after waiting for 
few years and giving the intensive educational drive a 
chance to develop more and more, and after introducing 
radio medium in 1951, he reconsidered his attitude towards 
films. With the spread of education and radio communication, 
Shaik Abdulla acceded to public opinion and allowed the 
establishment of Kuwait National Cinema Company, founded in 
1953.88 
British author John Daniels, who lived in Kuwait 
during that period and witnessed the introduction of Western 
mediums of radio, cinema, and television in Kuwait, 
attributes the Shaik of Kuwait's cautious resistance to the 
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introduction of films to his understandable reluctance to 
permit his people to run before they were able to walk. The 
Shaik of Kuwait knew that films would inevitably sink 
Western ideas deep into the Kuwaiti mind. If the best of 
the Western world were to be absorbed and the worst 
rejected, the Amir was acutely aware of the need for an 
extensive education and development program in order that a 
progressive new world could be introduced to the people.89 
It was clear that during 1950's and a result of many 
factors such as the long period of time of Western 
colonialism which resulted dependence after independence and 
the Westernization wave that swept the Arab world after the 
second World War, people in Kuwait, like those in other 
parts in the Arab world, were fascinated by western 
civilization. It was viewed as the only path for 
modernization. Therefore, and for a certain period of time 
and according to this approach, people began to shift to 
everything western in order to be called modern, 
underestimating their indigenous values and customs which 
were viewed as things of the backward past. 
Kuwaitis attitude toward foreigners in the early 
1950's was reflected in their dress; Kuwaitis felt that to 
compete in the modern world they must abandon their national 
gowns as impractical and get into shirts and trousers. Even 
Kuwaitis of the merchant class were experimenting with suits 
of European style.90 In early 1960's, the Ministery of 
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Guidence and Information published a report in which proudly 
described the influence of western culture over Kuwait's 
radio listeners as follow: 
Kuwaitis enjoy 'listeners choice’ programs as much as 
qetsearmanv°as ^*1" ^ £ans' The radi° Nation gets as many as five hundred letters a week with 
^hits^" f°r tunes' including Western 'pops' and 
Another weekly music programme tells about the lives of 
the classical European composers and presents their 
works on records.9r 
However, in the 1960's, Daniels noted, many new 
patterns have emerged in Kuwait society mainly as a result 
of contact with the outside Western world in the U.S and 
Europe. When he asked a low income local Bedouin taxi 
driver if he ever took his wife to the cinema, he answered 
immediately "No need to do that. She can watch television at 
home.".92 John Daniels describes some changes that occurred 
in the situation of Kuwaiti women in the late 1960's, in 
contrast with her former status few years earlier: 
In any event, Kuwaiti women of today have made their 
presence felt and nowadays a European visitor meeting a 
sophisticated businessman may be introduced at a social 
gathering to the wife of his contact. Formerly this 
would never happened. 
. . .where the former Kuwait wife at home wore a plain, 
simple dress with long sleeves, the young wives of 
today dress in the latest Western fashion. Furthermore 
the veil, which was traditionally worn whenever the 
women left the house, has been discarded by the younger 
generation. True, some of the older women still wear 
it, but it seems clear that the veil will probably 
become almost extinct in a few years from now. 
Although Kuwaiti women's dress was always receptive to 
external influence in fabric or detail of cut, the wearing 
of European styles did not become widespread until the late 
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1950-s and early 1960-s right after the emergence of cinema, 
films, television, and the flood of Western magazines and 
printed media which were the chief carrier introducing 
Western culture and lifestyle to the people. The newly 
introduced lifestyle attracted the younger generation and it 
spread more rapidly among young women lured by the notion of 
joining the "liberated generation." 
"At first, girls would compromise with family concern 
f?ra.fepUt^tl0n and modestY and would cover their new 
clothes with the, Abbaya, when out of doors. Family 
photographs of the 1960's, however, show groups of 
girls cheerfully posing in the then current European 
fashions of short skirts, stiletto-heeled shoes and 
bouffant hairstyles."94 
One of the outrageous incidents that took place in 
Kuwait, which proves the western influence on Kuwaiti 
people's mentality in general and Kuwaiti women in 
particular, happened in the early 1960s when a group of 
young Kuwaiti women under the influence of women liberation 
movements in Europe and U.S, publicly expressed their 
rebellion against the traditional Islamic of purdah "abayah" 
and demanded western style women's freedom, regarding 
western women as their best role model. Furthermore, these 
group of young women on several occasions burnt the Islamic 
purdah in public. 
When formal education began in Kuwait, Kuwaiti girls 
and women wore the Islamic purdah "abayah" to school 
according to Islam's teachings. However, this group of 
westernized Kuwaiti women burnt the Islamic purdah in 
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school yard and demanded permission to come to school with 
western clothes.95 The social movement in Kuwait was very 
active, especially in the 1960s. -As television arrived, 
they were eager to discover how much they could be part of 
this new medium."96 Their active role was very evident 
their early appearance and participation in 
television which caused them to be viewed by women in the 
region as liberal women. 
Women's group are still very active in Kuwait and play 
an important role in influencing programming input. Their 
representatives hold semi-annual meetings with the 
television Director to discuss the portrayal of women in 
television and other related issues. In 1975, for instance, 
they opposed a Kuwaiti series portraying a Kuwaiti female 
teacher as careless and more concerned with her appearance 
than her teaching.97 
British author, Zahra Freeth, who lived in Kuwait 
before the oil era and who made a visit to Kuwait in the 
early 1970's after about twenty years of absence, expressed 
her ultimate astonishment of the cultural shock that 
occurred to her old town. Freeth noted that no country 
could have moved further or changed faster than Kuwait and 
that changes which in Europe took place gradually over 
centuries, in Kuwait have taken only twenty-five years. She 
observed how the Kuwaitis became Westernized and no longer 
care for their old customs and "with their new affluence, 
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the Kuwaitis have not only destroyed their old town, they 
ba^e discarded a whole culture."^® 
In contrast to the Kuwaitis extreme adherence and 
commitment to their religion before the oil era, she was 
surprised by the lack of enthusiasm among the new generation 
of Kuwaitis toward Islam's basic principles and teachings. 
Freeth explain more: 
While we were out on the mole the sun dipped below the 
canefro!l0^ZOn' and at °nCe the muezzins began their 
cail from the mosques of our quarter. My son stood to 
listen to the call for prayer, and I could see that he 
was watching the busy stream of cars on the highway 
the pedestrians who walked on the sea-front. It 
seemed they paid no heed to the cry from the minarets. 
Isn't everybody supposed to stop whatever they are 
doing and make the sunset prayer when the muezzin 
calls? he asked. We explained that in a perfect world 
that is would happen; this was what used to happen in 
the unsophisticated town of my youth." 
Moreover, Freeth expressed wonder at how the 
traditions of old Kuwait were wiped out so thoroughly and 
replaced by everything Western, including Food, clothes, 
morality, values, and people's attitudes. 
It is only twenty years since the first really modern 
shops began to appear in Kuwait, and now the main 
streets are lined with stores which in equipment and 
stock are totally European. To me, the interest of such 
shops lay in the way they reflected the changing 
consumer tastes in Kuwait. Fifteen years before I had 
not seen European-type restaurants, dry cleaners and 
laundries, hairdressing salons, shops full of prams and 
modern infants' clothes, and women's dress shops. Now 
they are all here. The dress shops even have model 
female figures in the window to display their goods - 
some thing so contrary to the traditional Muslim ban on 
representation of the human form that I found it hard 
to believe that such things were now accepted without a 
second glance.100 
Freeth recalls women's status when she left Kuwait in 
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the 1950's. She noted that at one time it was hard to 
imagine that one day the Kuwaiti woman would break out of 
her purdah. Women, she added, who wandered unveiled about 
the streets and spoke boldly to strange men, were 
prostitutes, and there was no middle ground; nor could a 
woman appear unveiled among her husband's friends. For a 
woman to be eyed openly by others in the street was in 
itself a defilement, and no man then would have wanted a 
bride who had been thus sullied. Twenty years later and 
under western influence, she noted, Kuwaiti girls move about 
the streets freely in European dress with mini-skirts and 
the men allow their young wives to meet their own male 
acquaintances. Freeth portrays some of the practices of 
western life style in one of Kuwait high class houses to 
show how far some Kuwaitis gone in westernization; 
These modern families live in luxuriously furnished 
houses in the best suburban areas, and entertain in the 
European way. In most of these houses the cocktail bar 
is the most prominent feature of the sitting room and 
there is a lavish supply of drink. The wife welcomes 
the guests at the door and moves freely among 
them...often at parties there will be dancing to the 
record- player, and some of the Kuwaiti girls, with 
their husband's consent, will go so far as to partner 
other male guests.101 
The costumes worn in Kuwait nowadays are clear 
examples of social change in the society as e result of the 
impact of the Western culture. The change of costumes was 
not confined to women but to men as well. In contrast to 
the past, where every one wore the traditional local Arab 
dress which had steadily evolved to suit climatic and 
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cultural conditions, present practices are more varied. 
Western-style suits and clothing are worn not only by 
Westerners working in Kuwait, but also by Kuwaitis and Arabs 
in professional and service jobs. Working clothes of jeans 
and T-shirts are favored by the various nationalities 
involved in technical and construction work.102 
Furthermore, the Kuwaitis not only changed their 
customary clothing to a European style but they also changed 
their homes. After demolishing the old traditional houses 
in the old part of the city, the Kuwaitis, unfortunately, 
did not live in a newly developed version of the traditional 
home but rather moved out into the suburbs in European style 
houses that do not harmonize with the natural climate of the 
Kuwaiti environment. Dr, George Saba Shiber, one of the old 
and first planning consultants to the Kuwait Municipality in 
early 1960's, wrote a book on Kuwait urbanization in which 
he expressed his regret for the missed opportunities. Dr. 
Shiber expressed his admiration and amazement at the old 
Arab Kuwaiti forms of architecture and how they had evolved 
to suit the climate of the east. In contrast, he found that 
the new buildings lack any feeling of continuity with older 
traditions, and were often designed without the slightest 
thought for the climate conditions of Kuwait.103 
About old Kuwait, Dr Shiber writes: 
Its buildings were a closely-net labyrinth that 
repelled heat and sandstorm to the maximum, having 
thick walls, narrow apertures, and properly located 
slits for ventilation, [about the new buildings] 
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discover^of^il"^110"5 °f Dinars sPent since the 
functionali^S "V* the'iaw^of^ functionalism and organic design.104 
In 1954, Harold R.P. Dickson commented on the early 
effect of western modern technology on Kuwait's Islamic 
culture. Dickson wrote "Materialism, popularized by modern 
science, has weakened Islam...material prosperity, which of 
itself is neither good or bad, but, like fire, depends on 
how it is used, has tended to weaken rather than strengthen 
Islam. In 1972, his daughter, Zahra commented on the new 
western look of Kuwait. She wrote, "The new Kuwait has the 
best and the worst of the western civilization that it so 
assiduously set out to emulate. What of its Arab identity? 
What has remained to act as a visual and spiritual link with 
the past? Not much."106 
Conclusion 
This chapter took a close-up look at the issue in the 
state of Kuwait, as a model of Arab states. It is very 
evident that the imported television programs has left its 
deep negative cultural effect on the indigenous culture of 
Kuwait. 
Many factors combined can be counted as responsible 
for this phenomenon, including the financial capability of 
the government to purchase packages of western programs even 
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for high prices because of the wealth of the government • s 
revenue, and the availability and the widespread use of 
television sets among Kuwaiti people because of their high 
average income. Largely this negative effect is caused by 
viewers' wide exposure to western programs, the designated 
special channel for foreign programs, and the fact that it 
is an entertainment-oriented medium. 
Yet, there is still insistence on the part of the 
government on importing these programs. The chapter has 
also demonstrated that Kuwait television like in any other 
Arab television systems is not playing a primary role in 
preserving and protecting the Arab national culture. 
Chapter VI will describes and analyzes the successful 
experiment of the Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs 
Production Institution (AGJPPI). The chapter will look for 
the secrets of success of this pioneer experiment which 
considered the first successful and professional Arab 
educational television production. The AGJPPI can be used 
as an excellent small-scale model for a national Pan-Arab or 
regional television production industry. 
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Chapter VI 
THE EXPERIMENT OF THE ARABIAN GULF STATES JOINT PROGRAMS 
PRODUCTION INSTITUTE (AGJPPI) 
Introduction 
After the successful launch of the popular Arabic 
children's program, Iftah Ya Simsim, the Arabic version of 
the American program, Sesame Street, as the first 
professional Arab educational television production, Hamdy 
Kandil wrote: 
This may be the first time in the Arab world that such 
sums have been allocated to an educational and cultural 
programs; for the usual practice has been to lavish 
funds on entertainment and drama programs and their 
producers while educational and cultural programs, and 
perhaps serious programs in general, have occupied 
second place in the concerns of administrators and 
financiers.1 
Indeed, the experiment of the AGJPPI, with its high standard 
of productions is a pioneer work and considered a 
breakthrough in Arab television production, and set the 
paradigm for any Arab television work. This unique 
experiment is actually the beginning of authentic Arab 
television history and offers a new generation of Arab 
programs and set the foundation for the Arab television 
industry. It is the kind of production house, as Hamza Bait 
Al-mal put it, that every state in the region, if not in the 
Arab world, wishes to have.2 
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Although the AGJPPI is a regional institute and not a 
Pan Arab institute, it is probably the only Arab institute 
in the whole Arab world that produces television programs on 
behalf of all Arab states. The AGJPPI is a good example of 
regional cooperation among Arab Gulf states which might be 
applied in other different parts of the Arab world. 
Therefore, it is worthwhile to take a look in more detail at 
this pioneer experiment. 
Background of the AGJPPI 
In 1976, the Ministers of Information in seven Arabian 
Gulf states (Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, and U.A.E.) held their first conference in Riyadh to 
discuss some media problems facing their states, including 
the television production problem. At the end of that 
conference, the Ministers agreed on the establishment of an 
institution which would be in charge primarily of producing 
television materials for the members' stations. The 
institution was called the Arabian Gulf States Joint 
Production Programs Institute. 
The headquarters of the institute is in Kuwait and 
enjoys complete independence from governmental authority. 
The Board of Directors is composed of the Under Secretaries 
of the Ministries of Information of the members states, or 
who represent them, and is headed by the Minister of 
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Information of the headquarter state. The General Director 
of the institute is appointed by the Board of Directors and 
reports to the Board. The structure of the AGJPPI is 
composed of four major departments: 1- Planning and 
Programming, 2- Production, 3- Public Relations, and 4- 
Administrative and Financial Affairs. 
The Institute is not a commercial establishment and 
does not seek commercial profits as much as it seeks social 
development through television production. The Institute 
sells its production to the member states for at cost and to 
other non-member Arab states for low prices. The Institute 
gets all kind of governmental support including the 
financial support. Financing the Institute is achieved 
through a contribution quota distributed among the member 
states. The reasons for establishing the AGJPPI, as Ibrahim 
Al-yuosif, the Director General of the AGJPPI, indicated 
are:3 
1- The need for high standard, good quality television 
programs that have a common subject and appeal to the people 
in the region. 
2- The need for cooperation among the Arabian Gulf states 
based on what they have in common. 
3- The need to unify efforts and avoid duplication in the 
production of these kind of programs to save time and money. 
4- The need to help develop a feeling of closeness among 
people of the region. 
Objectives of the agjppt 
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According to Article IV of its charter, the AGJPPl's 
purpose is to produce radio and television programs for its 
members as well as other Arab and friendly countries. The 
subjects of these programs should achieve the following 
objectives:4 
1- Revive Arabic and Islamic history, showing the high 
morality of the heavenly religion of Islam, and portray the 
honorable conduct of Islamic heroes and leaders. 
2- Revive the Gulf traditions, specifically those related 
to indigenous arts, and work on recording them in a 
documentary fashion so that they become a historical 
reference and a source for upgrading the artistic and 
literary level of the Gulf in various fields. 
3- Providing information concerning the Gulf region from 
all aspects of geography, population, and tourism. 
4- Upgrade technical production od radio and television 
programs, and highlight all artistic, literary, and 
scientific work done by the Gulf's people. 
5- Discover young talents in the field of art, literature, 
and science; work on training them; show their talents; and 
provide them with all mass media facilities. 
6- Give the personnel working in radio and television 
stations of member states a chance to upgrade their artistic 
and vocational skills, and help them earn new experience as 
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a result of their continuous interaction with people working 
in this production. 
The Experiment of ''Iftah Ya Simsim" 
The AGJPPI has produced many successful and 
professional educational, cultural, and documentary programs 
and series such as Islamic and Arab Civilization (156 
episodes), Your Safety (104 episodes), stop (100 episodes), 
The Discovery (65 episodes), It's Time (65 episodes), The 
Mirror (30 episodes), Our Life. Oil and Water. Arab 
Medicine. Treasures of the Red Sea. Treasures of the Gulf, 
and many other children's works. 5 However, the most 
distinguished and prominent program for which the AGJPPI is 
known throughout the Arab world is their first production of 
the children's program of Iftah Ya Simsim. meaning "Open 
Sesame", an Arabic version of the Sesame Street series, 
composed of 260 half-hour episodes. The popularity of the 
program attracted both children and adults, becoming one of 
their favorite programs. The result has encouraged the 
AGJPPI officials to produce more and more similar works and 
made the AGJPPI to give considerable attention to children's 
programs. 
Although the original purpose of the AGJPPI is to 
produce programs for the Gulf States stations, its 
noticeable success encouraged it to respond to the various 
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demands to distribute its production all over the Arab 
world. Although the AGJPPI is neither an educational nor 
cultural institute, it became specialized in and known for 
its educational, cultural, objective drama, and documentary 
programs. It presented a great mix between television and 
education, for the first time in the Arab world. The 
Director of Production of the AGJPPI, however, call this 
mixed "Pure coincidence, but a happy one like the ones that 
happen during the historical discoveries."6 
The beginning was an initiative in 1976 from the Arab 
Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), 
headquartered in Kuwait, to produce an educational program 
for the Arab children. Officials at AFESD eventually chose 
the American program, Sesame Street, which is produced by 
the Children Television Workshop (CTW) to be the ideal 
program.7 
Since that time, the AFESD invited Arab experts to 
study the possibility of adapting this program to the Arabic 
language. The experts involved were educators, 
psychologists, socialogists, and linguistics. The result of 
the studies supported the project. It is very evident that 
they succeeded. The Arabic adaptation won the first prize 
in Amsterdam for the best adapted version using the American 
"Sesame Street" format. Among the participants in this 
contest were Germany, France, Sweden, Britain, Mexico, 
g 
Puerto Rico, Japan, Holland, and Canada. The AFESD 
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initiative was based on five points:9 
1- The AFESD believe that financing social development 
projects is not less important than financing economic 
development projects. 
2- The absence of a unified Arabic program addressing pre¬ 
school children in the Arab television. 
3- The positive impact of the American program on American 
children. 
4- The possibility of adapting the American program to 
other languages especially after the successful adoption by 
some European and Latin American languages. These attempts 
gave the program an international characteristic. 
5- The availability of the AGJPPI as a new, up coming 
production institute which might adopt this project since it 
has the potentials to execute such a giant project. 
After many preliminary meetings of experts and 
specialists, the three main institutions involved in the 
project met together in order to start planning and carry¬ 
out the project. These three main institutions were: 
1- The Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development 
(AFESD). 
2- The Arabian Gulf States Joint Programs Production 
Institute (AGJPPI). 
3- The Children Television Workshop in New York (CTW). 
In May 1977, the AGJPPI signed an agreement with the 
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CTW for $2.5 million. The AGJPP1 paid $1,000,000 for the 
rights of, Sesame Street,10 valid for 9 years. The 
agreement included: 
™thevA!;ab ”or}d's rights to the "Sesame Street" 
concept for a nine-year period, as well as CTW's 
^T?iCal as®lstance» research and production advice 
, the services of a resident consulting producer 
during the production period in Kuwait. Under the 
agreement, CTW was also to provide 15 hours of cross- 
^ltJJ^al material, such as animal or nature films, from 
the US programme, which would be selected by the 
institution as appropriate for Arab children and dubbed 
into Arabic.11 
The project was to produce 130 half-hour episodes of 
the program aimed for the pre-school children from 3-6 years 
old. The AFESD financed the first stage of the project 
which included conducting research, studies, and tests on 
Arab children. For this stage, the AFESD paid KD 80,000 
($300,000) .12 The AGJPPI supplied the project with human 
resources and staff, equipment, training and studios, and 
the CTW provided its technical advice, consultation, 
experience, and some materials and clips which can be 
adapted to Arabic. 
The first step of the production process was training 
five leadership personnel in New york for three weeks. The 
personnel were chosen among Arab educators and media 
specialists selected from different Arab states. During the 
training a total of 15 hours of clips, footage, and 
materials were selected from the original American program 
which were thought to be useful and fitted for adaptation to 
the Arab environment. After full and extensive training, 
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research, discussion, and consulting, the personnel returned 
to Kuwait to undertake the project as a well trained team.13 
The team work was formed of experts who specialized in 
Arabic language, education, psychology, researchers, 
writers, producers, and other production staff. The whole 
team worked under the supervision of a resident consultant 
producer and education researchers from the CTW.U That was 
in mid-1977, and by September 29, 1979, the Arabic program 
was on the air of the Arabian Gulf States televisions. 
The production of the 130 episodes took 30 months and 
the final cost reached $7,500,000; it was distributed to 14 
Arabic stations.15 The total amount of cost brings down the 
cost for each 30-minute episode of about $7,500. It is 
rather expensive when compared to the average price of $1000 
per hour of foreign imported programs, but for this kind of 
good-quality of Arabic program make such costs reasonable. 
The work experience of people involved in producing this 
show cannot be measured in terms of money.16 Although the 
AGJPPI programs sells to non-members Arab states for low 
prices, there was some complaints from states of the high 
prices in contrast to foreign imported programs. Prices to 
non-member Arab states is determined by the financial 
capability of the state. An hour of AGJPPI programs, for 
instance, costs Libya $4000, Algeria and Syria $2000, Jordan 
$1500, Tunisia, Yemen, and Sudan $1000.17 
The remarkable success and the positive results of the 
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project, ascertained through studies and feedback undertaken 
during and after the program, has encouraged the AGJPPI to 
make a decision to produce another 130 half-hour episodes 
directed to the children of age 3-9 years old with several 
developments and improvements learned from production of the 
first part. 
The Secret of the AGJPPI Success 
Yasir Al-Malih, the Production Director of the AGJPPI 
who is one of the prominent figures of the Institute since 
its establishment, attributes the success of the AGJPPI 
experiment to several major reasons seldom to be found in 
other Arabic television work: 
1- The support of the regional governments: The AGJPPI is a 
governmental institute shared by the Arab Gulf states; and 
the Board of Directors is formed by the Under Secretary of 
the Ministries of Information of these member states. The 
AGJPPI gets all kinds of support from the member states, 
either financially or materially. The member states offer 
and provide their television facilities to the AGJPPI. The 
AGJPPI is supported financially through a contribution quota 
distributed over the member states' governments. For the 
time being, the AGJPPI does not have financial deficiencies; 
however, in its first stages and despite the governmental 
support, the AGJPPI ran into some financial difficulties and 
299 
almost went bankrupt four years after its establishment.18 
Mohammad Al-Sanousi, the first Director of the AGJPPI noted 
that some member states did not pay their quota and did not 
take the matter seriously.19 Fortunately, it was rescued by 
other institutions and departments such as Education, 
Health, and Interior Departments which sponsored some of the 
projects and charged it to execute some projects on their 
behalf. Otherwise, it couldn't continue, when depending on 
Information Ministries' quota only.20 
2- Freedom and Independence: Although the AGJPPI is a 
governmental institution, one of its advantages is that it 
enjoys a complete independence in authority and decision¬ 
making and none of the member governments has direct 
influence on it. This privilege also gave the Institute the 
freedom to maneuver in selecting and hiring the best and 
most qualified staff, more than any other formal television 
enjoys. 
3- Careful planning: Planning is probably the essential 
element that distinguishes the work of AGJPPI from any other 
Arab television works and is the basic, vital secret of 
success. The Institute has two departments which carry out 
all the required planning. Among other jobs, Planning and 
Programming department studies and reviews all local, 
television, radio or film program-script Arabic, and foreign 
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proposal efforts; and finally, plans a program-script 
contest for the best script. The Public Relations 
department is responsible for all field studies and audience 
surveys on all the AGJPPI programs as well as other public 
and foreign relations.21 
From the beginning, every step was preceded by careful 
planning. Planning was not confined to the AGJPPI 
organizational structure but was also carried out in 
coordination with other Arab televisions and specialized 
institutions. Planning was based on studies and research 
conducted by AGJPPI in conjunction with educational and 
academic institutions. 
Experts and specialists were invited to assess 
projects before any action was taken and to make final 
judgments on the out come of the project. Before starting 
the "Iftah Ya Simsim", about $300,000 were spent on studies 
of Arab children. Seminars and conferences were held to 
analyze and evaluate the results of these studies. 
Evaluation technique was undertaken for every AGJPPI project 
before and after telecasting any project to overcome as many 
as possible disadvantages and mistakes so future works can 
be enhanced. 
Field tests and feedback were taken among the public 
and viewers during and after the programs were broadcast. 
Public and viewers' feedback was not the only feedback that 
AGJPPI has sought; formal feedback from the Ministries of 
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Education and Information in some Arab states were also 
sought. Also there is a consultants' council apart from the 
AGJPPI structure composed of educators and media specialists 
which holds periodical meetings to discuss issues and 
suggest solutions. 
One of the unique techniques that AGJPPI has utilized 
in its strategy is the "pilot project" tactic. In all its 
projects that have been produced, the AGJPPI produced two 
episodes of each project and then invited Arab scholars and 
consultants in education, Arabic language, television, and 
psychology to give their feedback, suggestions, critiques, 
snd reaction so the AGJPPI can do the modifications before 
producing all the episodes. This technique has proved to 
be a very effective method in improving the programs 
content. 
Before producing the first 130 episodes of "Iftah Ya 
Simsim", the AGJPPI produced two pilot episodes and invited 
education and media experts and specialists from all over 
the Arab states for a seminar to be held in Kuwait on 4-9 
March 1978 to discuss the two pilot episodes and the studies 
in this matter.22 The purpose of the sponsors was to get as 
many of consultations, suggestions, and recommendations as 
possible for better production. According to AGJPPI 
officials, much has been learned from this technique and 
very often many modifications, changes, and improvement have 
been made to the balance of the episodes in every project. 
302 
On top of all that has been mentioned above, the 
advertising campaigns were very well organized and preceded 
the launching of every AGJPPI project. The advertising was 
on the public level as well as on a formal level such as 
coordinating with other Arab televisions and governmental 
institutions. 
4- Enthusiasm and Faith: The enthusiastic and the sincere 
faith of all staff involved in the project, whether 
planners, producers, or administrators, caused them to give 
the best of their effort in the project and to be 
accomplished in the best professional manner. 
5- Cooperation and Coordination: The full cooperation and 
understanding of the team work in general and the 
exceptional coordination between the educators and the 
production team in particular is a distinctive feature of 
the AGJPPI and cannot be found in any other work at a 
similar level. Although the team work is composed of 
members from different Arab states, their true belief in the 
project as a pioneer Arab project has created an environment 
of full understanding and set a model for other similar 
future works. 
6- Democratic Management: Democracy was implemented in 
level of the managerial organization of the AGJPPI as 
every 
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an institution. All the decisions taken within the 
institution were taken as a consensus decision and according 
to democratic rules after discussing them in group format. 
Moreover, the democratic atmosphere exists also within the 
various separate project units at a sub-institutional 
levels. 
Despite the outstanding works that AGJPPI has 
presented over the years, however, the AGJPPI works within 
limited resources and is not operating with as much ability 
and potential as one might think. The Institute's 
headquarters are located in a small, humble rented building 
which has no studios. The full time staff are 25 personnel, 
of which are seven are top personnel and the rest are 
administrative and secretarial staff. Despite these limited 
resources, Faisal Al-Yasri, pointed out that with good 
management, organization, and planning these limited 
resources could be used to capacity in order to present a 
high standard of work.23 
Nonetheless, and despite the superior success of the 
AGJPPI experiment and the professional work of "Iftah Ya 
Simsim" series, Al— Malih does not, rule out the 
disadvantages and difficulties that AGJPPI are facing. 
First among these difficulties are the talented and skilled 
native human resources. Arab human resources and Arab 
creativity are still in shortage and deseparately needed. 
In the case of "Iftah Ya Simsim" for instance, Yasir Al- 
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Malih noted that there are no Arab staff specializing in 
children's programs. "First of all, we should confess that 
"Iftah Ya Simsim" is not a pure Arabic invention but rather 
an Arabic adapted copy of the American program, 'Sesame 
Street'."24 In addition to that, more than 25 hours of the 
original American footage were used in producing the 
episodes besides many other materials. 
Another difficulty is the television scriptwriters who 
specialize in the children's field. If the Arab world has a 
shortage of television scriptwriters, and if television 
writers are few, then even fewer specialized in children's 
writing. "We tried to attract the children's programs 
scriptwriters from all over the Arab world; they were 23 
writers; most found that writing for children in television 
is a difficult task; so we ended up with three of them who 
continued working for us."25 There have been many attempts 
by the AGJPPI to reduce the production costs of its 
programs. "If there is one problem that could reduce the 
production of such programs, it is the lack of good 
scriptwriters; well qualified scriptwriters do not exist n 
the region."26 
In addition to all these problems, the AGJPPI 
officials argue that there is lack of experience in planning 
for children's programs, qualified children's programs 
producers, and directors who specialize in directing 
children's programs. 
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In spite of all these disadvantages and difficulties, 
the AGJPPI experiment is truly considered a pioneer 
experiment in the authentic Arab television industry. More 
than that, it set the basic foundation and the frame work 
for any Arab television industry. The AGJPPI not only 
represents a regional cooperation, but its success proved to 
be Pan-Arab success. In the final report of the seminar 
Cultural Identity and its Interaction with Foreign Cultures 
in the Arabian Gulf States", which was held in U.A.E. on 
February 1988, the participants strongly recommended the 
continues support of the joint media institutions in the 
region especially the AGJPPI because of its contribution in 
producing programs homogeneous with the values and 
traditions of the Arab culture.27 
The AGJPPI experiment has demonstrated that joint Arab 
production is the only practical method of producing high 
standard national programs. This unique experiment has 
encouraged many other similar regional cooperations and the 
idea of Pan-Arab joint television production as the best way 
of establishing grass roots Arab television production. 
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Chapter VII 
REASONS FOR DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED WESTERN PROGRAMS 
Introduction 
This chapter is the last chapter of the study and is 
composed mainly of the analysis and results of the research. 
In this chapter the primary concern of the study, of that 
is, analyzing the reasons for dependence on imported western 
television programs, will be identified. At the same time, 
some of the problems and obstacles that hinder national 
television program production are identified. 
Based on all these analyses, the chapter presents some 
suggestions and recommendations which might work and serve 
as solutions or alternatives for importing and depending on 
western television programs, or at least reduce the level of 
this dependency. The chapter also suggests many ideas to 
enhance local and national Arab television production 
industry as a framework for grass roots. 
The chapter also reviews and analyzes the successful 
experiment of the Arab Gulf States Joint Programs Production 
Institution (AGJPPI) as the first professional and 
successful national Arab educational television production. 
It explores the secrets of success of this unique 
experiment, which could be used as an excellent small scale 
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model for a firm and grass-roots foundation for a pan-Arab 
television industry. 
Reasons_for Dependence on Western Programs 
The issue of the flow of western television programs 
is neither an easy nor a new issue. It is an issue of 
concern to the whole world rather than one concerning only 
Kuwait or the Arab states. Although this issue has been 
under debate since the 1960's on a global level, the debate 
is still going on because the issue still exists. 
The reasons for Kuwait television's dependence on 
western programs are many, and intricate where they overlap 
with each other; however, the essential reasons can be 
identified: 
1- On top of these reasons comes the price of these 
programs. The prices of western programs are very seductive 
to the pocketbook. The lower cost of purchasing western 
programs in contrast to the higher production costs of a 
similar show from the Arab states makes the deal very 
attractive. Moreover, the quality of Arabian-produced films 
are unlikely to be equal to or even close to that of western 
production. Purchasing ready-made western programs makes 
things easy, and saves money, time, and effort. One hour of 
an American series costs between $250 and $1000, depending 
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on the financial capability of the state, while an hour of 
an Egyptian or other Arab series cost an average of $1500 to 
$2000.1 
This tactic of manipulating the international market 
making available high quality western programs for 
cheap prices attracts many states to purchase them, 
especially those with limited financial resources. The 
state of Bahrain's television, for instance, can purchase an 
hour of "Magnum P.I" for only $300, while it sells elsewhere 
for $1000, which could explain why western programs in 
Bahrain television comprise more than 90% of its air time, 
the highest in the Arab world.2 Kuwait television because 
of its financial ability pays a higher price per program 
than Bahrain. An hour of "The A Team" costs Kuwait 
television $1142, and $1390 for each hour of "St. 
Elsewhere".3 
Despite the increase in prices for imported western 
television programs over the years, they are still 
considered very low compared to the cost of production. In 
late 1960's, however, prices for Kuwait television for half 
hour episodes were ranging between $60 and $90 and prices 
for feature films ranged between $250 and $350.4 
In the case of Kuwait television, the price of a 
program hour according to television official, is determined 
by the duration, quality, topic or story, featured actors, 
(new or old...etc.). But, in general, the price of one 
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television hour (for serials and shows) ranges between $1000 
and $1200; the hour price for best sellers drama, soap 
operas, light entertainment and variety shows is $1200; for 
long television feature films, the price ranges between 
$1500 and $2400.5 These prices are still considered very 
cheap compared to what they sell for in other countries, 
especially European countries. The reason for the disparity 
is because Kuwait television, like other Arab television 
systems is non—commercial government television and the 
countries are considerably less populated than European 
countries. 
Kuwait television has been authorized by other Gulf 
states to purchase western programs on their behalf, a step 
that can save money for the Gulf states if purchases are 
made collectively. This step, however, does not please 
Bahrain, which can obtain western programs for even less 
than the discounted price given to the Gulf states 
collectively.6 
2- Television in Kuwait is committed to broadcast at 
certain times every day. Unfortunately, due to poor 
national production and insufficient of national production 
to fill in this span of time, the only available alternative 
for filling this daily air time is the foreign alternative. 
It seems that filling the daily television air time is the 
obsession of Arab television officials. Salim Al-Fahad, the 
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former Director of Kuwait television pointed out that »We 
consume hours of television programs everyday, and faced 
with this necessity one's needs massive supplies and 
reserves of television programs for one's daily 
consumption".7 
3- The influx of western television programs exists, on one 
hand because of the abundance and variety of the foreign 
mass production. The other side of the coin is the 
incapability of Arab production to replace this influx. No 
alternative to foreign production is available. The choice 
does not exist in this business. "It is so easy to 
demonstrate the issue of foreign cultural invasion but to 
our deep sorrow we do not have alternatives or even the 
ability to choose. The choice is limited to what in the 
international market."8 
4- The Arab world suffers from a vast vacuum and extreme 
shortage of art, culture, intellect, and literature in the 
field of television. As a result, this influx of western 
programs fills the existing vacuum. Muhammad Al-Sanousi, 
former Under-Secretary Assistant for Television Affairs in 
Kuwait, describes the situation in the Arab world in this 
manner: 
Television work is team work and never a solo work. 
All elements of the circle have to be available so it 
can be inter-connected. In most cases all elements of 
the circle cannot be found in any single Arab state. 
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andeQiUIo^-therLis 9°0d Work but the Packaging is bad 
bad-^ I t the £°Yer is ele9anc but the content is 
® something wrong in the Arab mentality 
can bL o eV,1S1°!!: We must confess and say we are not 
capable of competing with others. We can't compete.9 
5- Television in the Arab states is a new technology, a 
relatively new introduction to the Arab environment. It is 
still considered by some to be a new science which has not 
been discovered to its full capacity. Many still have not 
comprehended its real functions and purposes. Due to this 
lack of this perception, the business of Arab television 
production was neglected for years, and it was not until the 
last several years that it began to give some concern. 
Television in the Arab gulf states emerged like a 
mushroom, and the only best available option has been 
foreign production. Unfortunatily, the Ministries of 
Information in the Arab Gulf states are the most 
backward countries with respect to follow better 
production".10 
6- Probably the most significant reason for depending on 
imported western programs is the lack of human resources. 
Human resources are the basic and most essential element in 
any television production. Lack of specialists and talented 
writers, casts, directors, scenarist, technicians and other 
elements of human resources of television industry make any 
attempt of television production impossible. 
Television is a serious business and we have to admit 
that we are much behind the west in the television 
field. We cannot fool ourselves and claim we have the 
capabilities of a television production industry. 
Let's be realistic and deal with realities and do not 
314 
?nduc^imKte °Ur abilities* How can we build an 
available?”611 6Ven ltS baSiC elements are not 
Yasir Al-Malih, Production Manager of The Arabian Gulf 
States Joint Programs Production Institution, observed that 
in the Arab world everything may be purchased except for the 
human resources element which is the most important element 
in the production process.12 
7— Although the factor of human resources is essential, 
however, it becomes meaningless if it lacks the element of 
creativity. Unfortunately, the element of creativity almost 
does not exist in Arab human resources. Despite the modest 
number of human resources in the Arab states, very few of 
them have the talent of creativity in presenting new ideas 
and tackling new issues. 
Yasir Al-Malih explained that if we take television 
writers in the Arab world, for instance, they are many and 
they are few. They are many because we see so many of them 
every day and they are few because few have the talent of 
creativity and originality. In the Arab world such are very 
rare.13 
8- The high professional western standard of quality cannot 
compared with those programs produced in the Arab states. 
There are so many type of series and selections of western 
programs that cannot be produced in any Arab states. 
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Resources for professional quality production are not to be 
found together within any Arab states. Abdullah Al-Rushaid, 
the Director of the Foreign Channel at Kuwait television 
noted that "The foreign programs exist because there is a 
necessity for them and they have very high production 
features that Arab programs still cannot reach.".14 
9- The people have become used to viewing a high quality 
level or standard of production through western produced 
programs; they always looking for better, and cannot accept 
the lower standard of locally produced programs. 
The people have become attached to foreign programs and 
they are connected mentally with American characters. 
Therefore, they are indispensable and they will 
continue. With the age of direct satellite 
broadcasting, the problem will continue and become even 
more complicated even if we have sufficient national 
production. National production is not the solution. 
We feel we cannot do anything about it.15 
Hamza Bait Al-Mal noted that viewers' level of 
appreciation for technically advanced television programs 
has risen as a result of exposure to professional foreign 
productions.16 Both views are supported by Sydney Head's 
view regarding this matter of viewers' acceptance in terms 
of the comparitive quality of foreign and local production. 
"People throughout the world have became knowledgeable about 
production quality, and most will not tolerate poor quality 
just because it comes from domestic sources. Programs must 
be attractive enough to motivate audience members to invest 
in receivers.".17 
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10- The competition among television systems in the Arab 
s^a^es and attract as many viewers as possible 
contributes to dependence on foreign production. This 
approach has led them to increase transmission hours, 
establish other channels, and offer western top shows and 
considerable diversity in western programs in order to 
compete with other neighboring states, knowing that people 
in these neighboring states would tune in to their station. 
Noticeably, the Arab states always get arrogant in 
their reports regarding the development of their television 
service in terms of the programs they offer, the long air 
time they broadcast, and the availability of channels they 
offer regardless of the content of programs. Some Arab 
states do not have the capability of offering all these 
services, nevertheless, they strain to do so in order not to 
be in less advantage position than other states. 
11- Other tough competition is coming from the videotape 
market which has led television to gamble on the same horse 
by providing similar programs to those available in the 
video market in order to attract viewers.18 Officials of 
Kuwait television indicate that even if western 
entertainment programs were not offered on Kuwait 
television, they are available in local theaters or in local 
home video store for home video system.19 
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Obstacles Facing National Prodimtinn 
1- The field of television production is considered a new 
field in the Arab states. it is still does not have a full 
grasp of its function and purpose. Although national 
television in the Arab states appeared decades ago, the 
national production industry did not start simultaneously. 
In fact, It was ignored for years and it was not given 
attention until in the last several years. 
Unlike theater, cinema, and press industries, 
television production in the Arab world began and grew 
within a government system. For years it was manipulated by 
governments, long before private production become part of 
the process. Private production started in mid-1970s, 
especially in those states who built their systems in early 
1960s. Nonetheless, the entrance to this industry was not 
fully equipped with enough preparation to deal with this 
kind of business. Thus, the start was very primitive and 
the result was very weak. 
Therefore, the ground in industry for national 
television production is still not firm or reliable. The 
industry's role in the daily national broadcasting is still 
ineffective and its participation in the national 
programming is still poor, weak, limited, and marginal. 
2- The Arab television market is very limited market for 
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commercial purposes and does not encourage any television 
production marketing. Furthermore, the complicated 
geographical, political barriers, and the intricate states 
marketting laws among the Arab states hinder any attempt to 
market on a large scale. Therefore, many Arab enterprises 
and companies who lost profits moved their businesses from 
Arab states to Europe and United States, aiming for better 
market and uncomplicated marketting barriers. 
Many of these enterprises have achieved success in 
western countries while they failed in their Arab states. 
Those enterprises who preferred to keep their businesses in 
the Arab states found themselves in a position where they 
had to reduce their production budget to a minimum, and many 
of them refused to produce a major work with big budget on 
the ground that the marketing of the production within the 
Arabic television market cannot cover the cost of the 
production. Therefore, many of them do not even bother to 
produce professional or high quality programs. 
Investing in television production in the Arab states 
is considered unprofitable business with a high risk and 
involving in it is a losing battle. Many enterprises prefer 
to invest their capital in fields other than the television 
field. 
3- The high cost of production is one of the main obstacles 
that hinders either high standard productions or very large 
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productions. Under financial pressures, many enterprises 
squeeze production costs to the minimum by hiring a low-paid 
unskilled writer, untalented cast, and uncreative director. 
The natural result of all this is a low quality program. 
Even in the case of highly professional standard nationally 
produced programs of considerable budgets, Arab televisions 
usually refuse to purchase the program for a high price, and 
treat it as if they were purchasing any low priced imported 
program. The newly established Arab production enterprises 
with limited financial and human resources cannot be 
compared in any way with the giant western multi-national 
corporations. 
4- Even though it is hard to find all elements of 
production available in a single Arab state to make the 
circle of work complete, on many lucky occasions when the 
circle of the team work of production was completed and 
available, and the work was done, the censorship department 
interfered and rejected the production on the ground that 
the topic or the theme of the program's content was not 
compatible with the media policy of the state or other 
reasons. 
Many executive managers in the private sector have 
expressed their resentment of the censorship department 
policy and how it discourages them and restricts their work 
They explain that they have produced many good works with 
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great ideas and they're capable of producing more if they 
given the chance, but censorship departments freguently 
reject their production for one reason or another. "One of 
the obstacles is lack of creativity, but when creativity is 
found, censorship becomes the obstacle."20 For them the 
production is becoming too risky and the censorship judgment 
is unpredictable. 
After spending all this money we were surprised to find 
out that no one would buy it from us and the loss was 
doubled. Sometimes we wish they would say what they 
would accept and what they would reject before we start 
working on any project; in many cases we worry about 
the censorship more than our work itself."21 
Moreover, there are no standard policies for accepting 
programs. The stipulations of the censorship departments to 
accept programs vary from one Arab state to another. Given 
this complexed situation, the production companies become 
uncertain of whom they should please. 
Consequently, to satisfy the censorship, most of the 
programs, especially the drama programs, try to escape 
tackling critical current issues and problems if the 
programs are not trying to sustain them. This has resulted 
in deterioration in the production content, with long and 
repeated monotonous dialogues with no significant end. 
Therefore, the fear of rejection from television stations 
became the major obsession of producers and the anxiety of 
getting approval from the censor became the aim of every 
production work. The result of all this is a dull content 
and low standard of production which can be suitable for any 
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time and place as long as it gets the consent of the 
censors, since it touches no sebsitive issue. 
5- Lack of freedom of expression: Because of the nature 
itical system in the Arab states and due to the nature of 
the broadcasting system in the Arab states as a governmental 
system operated, controlled, and financed by the government, 
freedom of expression does not exist within their television 
systems. Many producers feel that they lack the freedom to 
present a bold theme, fearing that their act might arouse 
the anger of the governments against them. As a result, the 
producers feel insecure, which hinders the creativity of 
their work. 
There are so many vital and sensitive national issues 
concerning the society that we do not dare to present 
or discuss on television and the reason is because of 
the censorship. The censorship department does not 
want any topic which provokes or stimulates the 
public. 2 
6- Lack of human and material resources: Needless to say, 
many essential elements for television production are not 
available in the most Arab states. Formost among these 
elements is the human resources element. There is a severe 
lack of creative writers, scenarists, casting personnel, 
directors, and technical staff. "We're wrong if we 
exaggerated and say we have creative capability of human 
resources. Actually we don't."23 Although governments 
might bear the major share of causing this situation; 
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Perhaps people's perspective toward television might also be 
blamed for this situation. A producer in the private sector 
noted that "People's approach toward television still 
passive and something must be done to provoke their 
imagination and creativity toward television work."24 
Suggestions and Alternatives for Importing Western Programs 
Since the reasons of importing western programs are 
somewhat complicated, the alternatives and suggested 
solutions are also somewhat inter-connected and overlapped. 
Before getting into any further details, general 
agreement on and the broad direction of any solution must 
come through national endeavors. Protection of indigenous 
culture depends in the first place on indigenous efforts. 
H. Schiller supported the point that developing countries 
must depend on no one but themselves in developing their own 
authentic broadcast materials and reviving their culture. 
He noted: 
If there is a prospect that cultural diversity will 
surface anywhere on this planet, it depends largely on 
the willingness and ability of scores of weak countries 
to forgo the cellophane-wrapped articles of the west's 
entertainment industries and persistently to develop, 
however much time it takes, their own broadcast 
material.25 
Foregoing western materials is not as inconceivable as 
it seems to those of limited vision, and developing national 
programs and materials is not "mission impossible." 
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1- The first solution must come from national governments 
because of many reasons; the mistaken government policies 
toward the function of television are actually the main 
factor which has led to the deterioration of this issue; 
second, since the television system has been always a 
government property under full government control, the 
government holds full responsibility for all outcomes and 
consequences inconnection with this medium; third, the 
government is the only authority which has the power of 
decision-making to decide any such policy toward television. 
Therefore, Arab governments must change their 
attitudes and reconsider their approach and mentality toward 
the function of television, and start immediate and serious 
action through their effective and vital contribution. "The 
whole issue revolves around one point. Why we broadcast, 
what should we broadcast, and how we broadcast if we think 
as planners.".26 So far there is no clear and definite 
answer for this main question. Most of the literature in 
the subject observed that one of the negative aspects of 
Arab television is the lack of planning and clear national 
policies and strategies toward television. 
Planning in Arab production almost does not exist, the 
minimum of production criterias is almost not 
available, performance is carried out extemporaneously, 
and no one presently cares to evaluate the 
after it's been broadcast to measure its feedback a 
effects on viewers.27 
Regarding this point, Arab television experts in 
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their seminar, Issues of Arab Television Production, 
recommended in one of their suggestions on improving 
production in government sector that Arab national 
television institutions should set long range production 
strategy, taking into consideration the future outlook of 
television in terms of the audience it addresses. Within 
this process there should be a balance between available 
resources and viewers growing needs to avoid any kind of 
spontaneous and quick production.28 
This queer mix between Arab and foreign programs is 
not based on clear and decisive strategy. Some Arab states 
provide some programs while other states do not; and 
sometimes this situation occurs within a single state where 
sometimes they allow certain programs and other times they 
do not. Very often the selection of this mix depends upon 
the personal mood and the temper of programs selection and 
censorship committees, mainly to fill in the space of air 
time. Therefore, many of these programs come inharmonious 
with the culture values. All this outcome is a result of 
the lack of national programming planning. The structure of 
Arab television systems lack serious studies and research 
into their programming planning. Unfortunately, few Arab 
televisions give this subject serious attention and few Arab 
televisions have research and studies departments within 
their structures. 
In support of the previous point, a study conducted by 
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the ASBU through the Center of Audience and Viewers Research 
on Arab televisions regarding this matter concluded that 25% 
of Arab television institutions have no intention to 
establish studies and research in their systems because they 
believe there is no need or necessity for this kind of 
departments; the other 75%, however, believe that it is a 
necessity but they do not have the available financial and 
human resources.29 
The Arab television experts also suggested that Arab 
governments should undertake evaluation research about a 
production after it has been broadcast to measure its effect 
on the audience and to know its cultural and social impact; 
planners and producers, in turn, should make use of the 
results of these studies and take them into consideration 
when setting up later production plans and strategies.30 
Moreover, the selection of broadcast programs should 
not be left to the whims of selection or censorship 
committees who may be incompetent because their judgment 
should not be the only criterion. The programs selection 
should be judged by specialized committees composed of 
religious scholars, educators, psychologists, sociologists, 
as well as media specialists who operate within definite and 
clear criteria. For the time being, these television 
committees do not have these specific qualifications. 
2- The business of television production is a big and vital 
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economic industry and part of the fundamental structure of a 
modern state. As they are establishing political, economic, 
industrial, social and other infrastructures of the state, 
national governments must give similar concern to 
establishing a complete and firm national grassroots 
television industry structure. It has become clear, 
especially in the last decades, that it is not less 
important than other structures. While ecognizing the 
substantial cost and the great effort especially in the 
first stages, in the long run it would be a profitable 
industry and great national investment. The lack of 
economic resources for television production has resulted, 
to great extent, in the lack of a firm industrial basis for 
the television production industry. 
However, the critical question which remains is 
whether Arab producers can ever satisfy Arab viewers' demand 
after seeing so many western programs or whether the 
homegrown production may or may not improve the overall 
quality of Arab television. The answer to this significant 
question is that sacrifice is actually needed from both 
sides, the government as a sender and the Arab public as a 
receiver, to cope with the various expected difficulties in 
the first stages so that there will be enough time for the 
standard of production materials to develop and grow. 
Otherwise, as Jacques Delors said, "all televisions will be 
made in Japan and all programs will be American.".51 
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3 National television production as a government concern 
should not be confined to or rely mostly on governmental 
production, as is presently the situation. Governmental 
work is always given priority and privileges over other 
private works. Private producers should also have the same 
privileges as government productions do. Relying mostly on 
government production is not a solution, and the 
government's capabilities by itself cannot meet all the 
demands of national production. 
Fuad Ballat, the Director of Syrian television, in his 
analysis of the problems of television production in the 
public sector emphasized the importance of separation 
between television as a whole (as a broadcasting system) and 
the production departments within the government television 
system, as a first step. The second step is to establish 
production centers financially and administratively 
independent from the television stations which would serve 
as economic centers with economic ends to avoid complicated 
bureaucratic procedures which often hinder the work.32 
In fact, there was a similar suggestion by Muhammad 
Al-Sanousi, the former Under-Secretary Assistant for 
Television Affairs to convert Kuwait television to an 
independent government institution with economic goals, one 
which would serve as a profitable, as in source to the 
government like the case of governmental airlines 
enterprises. Al-Sanousi cited that television attachment to 
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direct government administration and codes is restricting 
its development; television must be independent and 
operating far from government routines and bureaucratic 
system.33 
4- The private producers as a newly established 
institution in the industry, with limited human and 
financial resources, need the support and encouragement of 
the national government. Financial subsidies because of the 
high cost of professional production are the primary 
requirement. Many producers hesitate to produce high 
standard programs because of the high cost and less expected 
profit. Other kind of supports could be also offered 
through technical aids such as building or providing 
facilities, and giving priorities and privileges of using 
governmental utilities. 
There is a consensus among Arab television experts 
that Arab television production should not be a monopoly by 
government institutions only but rather multinational 
sources between which both sectors should cooperate. Such 
cooperation between the government stations and the private 
producers to set a strategy of national programming is a 
very useful method to enhance nationally broadcast 
materials. The governments can charge private producers to 
carry out their projects according to their plan and 
according to government stipulations. This technigue also 
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prevents the private producers from producing purely 
commercial, cheap programs. 
The government should also encourage the national 
production of these producers by giving them priority on air 
time and through purchasing their production in 
distinguished and special prices. The present status does 
not deal with this kind of preference. Foreign and national 
programs are purchased for the same price according to the 
length fo the programs. In the seminar, "Television 
Production Issues In the Arab States", the participants 
pointed out that the current programs' price list of Arab 
televisions does not encourage Arab producers, and that they 
are an obstacle in achieving the required high quality; 
therefore, it is illogical to compare Arab production with 
the foreign international production.34 
Private producers argue that they are unwilling to 
produce high quality programs because the purchased price 
would be the same as average programs as long as they run 
for the same period of time. They also indicated that they 
are highly unlikely to produce any kind of educational or 
cultural programs because the purchased price for this kind 
of program is less than the price of drama or entertainment 
programs. Therefore, since educational or cultural 
production is not profitable for them, the best way to make 
a profit is through producing entertainment or drama series 
Therefore, national governments should reconsider 
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their programs' price scale. As a way of support, the 
nationally produced programs should be valued at a higher 
price than the internationally produced programs. In 
addition, prices of national programs should be based 
according to quality rather than program span, the situation 
in the international market at the present time. This 
tactic can create competition among producers for better 
quality production and at the same time discourage them from 
producing low standard materials. 
Moreover, educational or cultural programs also should 
be encouraged and supported, and should not be treated as 
marginal programs at lower prices. This point supports the 
previous idea that a program's price should be based on 
quality. Otherwise, the market would be encouraged to be 
entertainment-dominated rather than concentrating on 
educational and cultural programs. 
In a meeting between UNESCO and the Arab States 
Broadcasting Union (ASBU), it was warned that even though it 
might be an advantage to import ready-made educational 
materials because they may be of good production quality and 
save time and money, selections should be based on local 
conditions and subjects matter must be relevant to the 
society's problems, concerns, and developmental needs. The 
meeting, however, emphasized making use of local production 
elements. 
in 1978, the Arab Educational Technology Center 
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requested its member states to submit reports on the extent 
to which they were using educational media materials to a 
seminar about educational technology in the Arab states 
which was held in Kuwait. All the reports raised the issue 
of educational film and video production and all states 
expressed the fact that they lack capabilities in this 
field, ranging from equipment, staff, funds, and 
specialists. Reports have shown that imported educational 
films had not been found suitable for local educational 
programs. At the end of the conference, the member states 
recommended establishing an Arab institution for the 
production of educational films. Nevertheless, So far no 
action has been taken with regard to this vital 
recommendation.35 
5- Muhammad Al-Sanousi, however, argues that the core of 
the crisis with respect to national Arab television 
production is not merely lack of financial or building 
facilities. It goes much deeper, to the issue of creativity 
and talented human resources capable of creativity and 
competition, without which television work becomes 
worthless. "So far, the competition is far and away extreme 
between Arab and western industries, and the main reason is 
creativity."36 It is true that the Arab world is 
experiencing a creativity crises. 
The paucity of intellectual grassroots in the Arab 
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world can be attributed to the collapse and deterioration 
the Arab cultural and intellectual institutions. This 
sterile situation was reflected deeply and directly by all 
aspects of arts, including the art of Arab television 
production. The lack of self- expression and creativity in 
the Arab world is the outcome of the absence of clear media 
and cultural policies. Arab governments bear the biggest 
part of responsibility in creating this crisis. Nearly 
since the First world War and the Arab world is living in 
continues and complicated political and ideological crises. 
The disappearance of political and ideological stability has 
led to lack of freedom of expression and atmosphere within 
which creativity can flourish. 
Arab television experts, meeting in Tunisia to discuss 
the crisis of Arab television production, emphasized the 
subject of creativity and suggested several points in order 
to activate and cultivate creativity, as follows:37 
A- Arab governments should provide as much freedom as 
possible to creative people on the ground that any kind of 
artistic expression can flourish only in the climate of 
intellectual freedom. Fuad Ballat pointed out "The real 
reasons that prevent the development of art to be a 
fundamental factor in any given people's civilization 
incarnate when hypocrisy and fearing become the ground of 
any decision in artistic production.' 
B- The governments should endeavor to enact legislation and 
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laws which guarantee all literature and financial rights of 
creative people and enhance their rank in the society. 
C“ The Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) should strive 
to support the trend of its members to set the rules which 
organize the artistic and intellectual ownership and reserve 
all rights of creative personnel who work in the field of 
television production. 
D- All government and private production institutions 
should work on providing the proper circumstances which help 
the development of the specialized television writer through 
arranging workshops and training sessions, or through incor¬ 
porating writers with production teams to stimulate in them, 
as writers, the creativity and perception of television work 
seen in its different stages. 
E- The Arab television institutions should establish resea¬ 
rch units within its systems. The mission of these units is 
to produce pilot programs aimed at checking ways of 
possibilities to produce creative or programs derived from 
the civilization of the Islamic and Arabic heritage. 
Noticeably, television in the Arab states has been 
brainwashed by a western style taste. Some see no Arab 
television style, merely a spinoff of western style. This 
was reflected in western model types of production. Most of 
the content of Arab programs is an imitation of western 
materials and rarely the content is originated from 
indigenous Arab culture. D. Boyd observed that television 
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in the Arab states has a predominantly western style. The 
brainwashing process usually occurs during training in 
western countries as agreements call for, reinforced 
automatically with the fascination of western techniques, 
and the constant viewing pattern of western programs. Boyd 
concluded that "The natural result of all this is western- 
type television programs in Arabic."39 
F- Academic people, on their part, should design curricula 
and research tools which can be used as criteria by televis¬ 
ion critics to evaluate television programs. 
6- There is a great necessity to allow the establishment of 
private stations. Television in all Arab states has been 
always a government property and the voice of government 
with one or two exceptions. Many producers have expressed 
their frustration that many national, regional, and local 
productions are rejected by these government stations for 
one reason or another such as low standard of production or 
incompatibility with government policy. Therefore, these 
producers found no other alternatives to market their 
productions. Moreover, these private stations expand and 
enlarge the ground of Arab television market in addition to 
their great potential of participating in democracy of 
broadcasting. Also, these private stations might serve as a 
vital and sincere supporter of the government system in 
achieving its national goals of informing, educating, and 
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entertaining. 
Nevertheless, there is a general concern that these 
private stations should be under government auspices and 
supervision, similar to the case of the private press in 
some Arab states. The reason for the government supervision 
is to avoid the negatives aspects and the misuses of being a 
commercial stations, like what happened to the European 
commercial stations when they came more dependent on 
imported programs and entertainment- oriented stations and 
the situation necame more critical. 
7- Arab television must decrease their daily broadcasting 
hours in order to depend less on imported western programs. 
Through the years Arab television expanded air time very 
dramatically, and always looked at this as a big leap in 
television development at the same time that national 
production was far less developed in the same proportion. 
In fact, the more air time increased, the more they became 
dependent on western programs. Arab states are in constant 
competition regarding the span of air time. Many Arab 
states feel that they are less advantaged than other states 
if they have short air time. Their solution is to expand 
the air time and fill it with western programs. With the 
establishment of second channels, the situation deteriorated 
and the issue became even worse. 
After all, from a logical point of view, there is 
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virtually no need for the bulk of western programs. 
Actually, there is no need for television at all, in the 
worse cases, if it has to be filled with western programs. 
People and the native culture are much better off without 
it. Most of the literatures confirms that the Arab people 
were more attached to their culture and were more enriched 
by their culture before the emergence of television. 
In this regard, we aver that there is no need for such a 
long span of air time, nor is it shamful to have a short 
span of air time. To have a few hours a day of national 
programs on a single channel is much better than to have two 
channels broadcast for many hours a week of imported 
programs. Many countries either developed or developing are 
enacting legislation to restrict importation of foreign 
programs to allow more air time for national programs. The 
United Kingdom, for instance, stipulates that a minimum of 
86% of air time must be of commonwealth origin, Canadian air 
time must be 55% locally produced and Australia 50%, and 
similar trends in Japan, Argentina, Italy, Mexico, Brazil 
and many other countries/0 In 1984, the EEC (European 
Economic Community) suggested a local-content quota of 60% 
of television air time.41 
In the case of the Arab states, actually there is no 
need at all for the foreign channel. The real purpose for 
the existence of these kind of channels is still not yet 
clear despite the governments’ excuses. The governments’ 
337 
justifications of these channels cannot be taken for granted 
and accepted as definite answers. Many Arab specialists 
believe that these channels are a premature development. 
8- One of the easiest methods to reduce reliance on western 
programs and to fill air time is to increase the exchange of 
programs among Arab states. At the present time, the 
exchange of national television programs among Arab states 
is very low. The Arab states import programs from western 
countries more than they import from each other. 
At the time when Arab states import from western 
countries more than 50% of their air time (mostly films, 
serials, drama, shows, entertainment, and children 
programs), the average exchange of television programs 
within the Arab states constitutes for only 13% of the total 
air time (mostly news and news programs and reports) ,u2 "If 
each television station in the Arab world presented its 
production to other Arab stations, we could have reduce the 
foreign importation to the half in each station.".43 
Indeed, there is a great demand for expansion of the 
level of programs exchange within the Arab world to make 
Arab people familiar with different life, customs, and 
traditions of other parts of the Arab world. Unfortunately, 
because Arab viewers watch western programs more than 
programs from neighboring Arab states, they know more about 
life in western countries than they know about the other 
Al-Harithi noted that "television offers 
Arab states. Sa'id 
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Arab viewers a wealth of information about western culture- 
far more than it brings them information about their own 
culture.44 
9- Needless to say, cooperation and coordination among Arab 
states regarding this matter is extremely essential to carry 
out successfully any such alternatives and suggestions. Ex- 
have shown that cooperation and coordination among 
Arab states is weak, if non-existent. Very often political 
and ideological disagreements among Arab governments' 
policies are the main obstacle hindering any such 
cooperation. 
Meanwhile, experience has also demonstrated that an 
action by a single state is courting failure. One state 
cannot solve the whole problem because all elements to 
establish a firm national grassroots production industry 
cannot be found in a single Arab state. As mentioned 
previously, all elements of the circle of television work 
have to be available so the circle can be connected 
otherwise, there won't be a solid foundation for an Arab 
industry. The issue needs full and serious cooperation 
among Arab states. 
The Arab governments realize this point very well. 
The Arab delegates focused on this point in the Government 
International Conference for Cooperation in Communication 
development which was held in Paris on April 1980 under the 
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auspices of UNESCO. The delegates expressed the need for 
cooperation among themselves and the necessity of 
cooperation in this field with industrially developed 
countries.45 
There have been many attempts and suggestions for Pan- 
joint production, but political disagreement among Arab 
states always hinders such agreement. The ASBU, at one 
point, encouraged sub-regional grouping among Arab states as 
a primary step after the failure of creating a unified Arab 
media policy and joint production. All Arab conferences and 
studies of this subject emphasized the importance of at 
least regional cooperation and coordination among Arab 
states in the field of production. Experience has shown 
that this technique of joint production is very effective in 
all aspects. The best successful example of this kind of 
regional cooperation is the Arabian Gulf States Joint 
Programs Production Institution. 
Footnotes of the Chapter 
340 
A1:Unf1!anV AbdulRazak S. Ml Analytical Comparative study 
~~ Television System and Decision-Making Process in Four 
States: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait. Bahrain and Qatar. 
Ph.D Dissertation, University of Wisconson, Madison, 
1984. p.199. 
2 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.200. 
3 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.201. 
4 Schiller, Herbert I. Mass Communication and American 
Empire, Beacon Press, Boston, 1969, p.89. 
5 Salman Al-Begshi, supervisor of marketting and Biding 
Department at Kuwait television, personal interview, 
Kuwait, December 1988. 
6 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.201 
7 Salim Al-Fahad, Director of Kuwait television, personal 
interview, Kuwiat, December 1988. 
8 Muhammad Al-Sanousi, Former Under-Secretary Assistant for 
Television Affairs in Kuwait, personal interview, Kuwait, 
December 18, 1988. 
9 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
10 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
11 Salim Al-Fahad, personal interview, ibid. 
12 Yasir Al-Malih, Production Manager of the Arabian Gulf 
States Joint Programs Production Institute (AGJPPI) , 
personal interview, Kuwait, December 10, 1988. 
13 Al-Malih, personal interview, ibid. 
u Abdullah Al-Rushaid, the Director of the Foreign channel 
(the Second Channel) at Kuwait television, personal 
interview, Kuwait, December 21, 1988. 
15 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
16 Bait-Almal, Hamza Ahmed, h Descriptive Analytical 
^ ^ ^ _ » TTra l VOTC 1 t V . Detro rnnnhrles Ph.D Dissertation, Wayne University, etroit. 
1986, p.115. 
341 
Head, Sydney W. World Broadcasting System: A Comparative 
Analysis, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, 1985, 
p • 22 8• 
18 Al-Usmani, ibid, p.201. 
19 Boyd, Douglas A. Broadcasting in the Arab World. Temple 
University Press, Philadelphia, 1982, p.119. 
20 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
Tawfeeq Amir, Executive Manager of Al-Nooress enterprise 
for television production, personal interview, Kuwait, 
December 13, 1988. 
22 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
23 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
24 Bassam Hassona, Co-Executive Manager of Al-Nooress 
enterprise for television production, personal interview, 
Kuwait, December 13, 1988. 
25 Schiller, Mass Communication and American Empire, ibid, 
pp.121-122. 
26 Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
27 issues of Television Production in the Arab States. Arab 
States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), Tunisia, 1985, p.15. 
28 issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, 
p. 17. 
29 Al-Buhooth journal, No 8, April 1983, ASBU, Audience and 
Viewers Research Center, Baghdad, 1983. 
30 issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, 
p. 19. 
3i Kurpean Ganaina Up to Limit Influx of U.S. TV Shows, 
Sunday Republican, September 10, 1989, p.F-1,4. 
32 Fuad Ballat, Arab Television Production Between Private 
Fand Public Sector, lecture given at the seminar of Issues 
nf Television Production in the Arab States, ibid, p.9. 
33 Aalam Al-Fen journal, Kuwait, Febuary 18, 1979, p.5. 
34 issues of Television Production in the Arab States, ibid 
pp.14-15. 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
342 
yahya Abu Bakr, Saad Labib, and Hamdy Kandil, Developmpnt 
gf Communication in the Arab States; Needs and 
Priorities, UNESCO, Paris, 1985. —- 
Al-Sanousi, personal interview, ibid. 
Issues of Television Production, ibid, pp.16-17. 
Fuad Ballat, ibid, p.29. 
Boyd, Broadcasting in the Arab World, ibid, p.9. 
Schiller, Mass Communication and American Empire, ibid, 
pp.85-86. 
41 Sunday Republican, ibid. 
42 Issues of Television Production, ibid, p.13. 
43 Amal Abdullah, Executive Manager of Al-Amal enterprise 
for television production, personal interview, Kuwait, 
December 10, 1988. 
44 Al-Harithi, Sa'id K. The Mass Media in Saudi Arabia: 
Present Concept. Functions. Barriers and Selected 
Strategy for Effective Use in Nation-Building and Social 
Awarness, Ph.D Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1983, 
p. 80. 
45 Arab Media. Present and Future; Toward New Arab 
Information Order. Arab League for Education, Culture, 
and Science Organization (ALECSO) , Tunisia, 1987, pp.49- 
50. 
343 
Final Conclusion—Closing Remarks, and Recommendations 
for Future Studies 
The issue of cultural invasion of the Arab national 
culture through importing western television programs is a 
serious and dangerous issue needing serious and prompt 
action in order to confront it. All literature as well as 
the analysis of this study have shown that the Arab national 
culture is in deep jeopardy and the rift in the Arab culture 
is great. Many aspects of the indigenous Arab culture are 
fading out, primarily as a result of western culture 
domination in particular through a large exposure to 
imported western television programs. The text also 
indicated that imported western television programs have had 
profound long-term effects on Arab culture. Imported 
western programs, especially entertainment programs, are the 
chief carrier in transmitting alien western values. 
Unfortunately, the issue of importing western 
television software was ignored for quite a long period of 
time by Arab governments, and was not given much attention 
until the last several years. This situation caused the 
issue to worsen. Despite the governments' concern and 
attention to the issue, the problem still exists and is 
becoming more aggravated. 
The issue of cultural invasion and importing western 
television programs in the Arab states is part of the big 
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problem that the Arab world is experiencing. Along with 
many negative factors in the Arab world, such as the 
complexity of the ideological and political situation in the 
Arab world, disunity, lack of consensus, and the myth of 
Arab unity, the Arab states cannot take a unified stance in 
countering this dangerous issue. Beside the fact that Arab 
television is not functioning positively in terms of 
enhancing and promoting the national Arab culture, the study 
shows that Arab television systems are not taking serious 
precautionary measures to protect and preserve the Arab 
culture from the alien values which penetrate through the 
content of the western imported programs. 
Despite the dominant global aspect of the issue and 
despite the strong current of the flow of western television 
programs, the study rebuts the allegation that dependence on 
western programs is unavoidable and any solution for the 
problem is impossible. The study presents and suggests many 
options and solutions which might work as alternative 
solutions for these problems if they were acted upon. 
Throughout the research , it became very evident that 
Arab governments bear a great deal of responsibility in 
dealing with and solving this crucial question. The current 
situations require that the Arab governments act promptly by 
taking serious measures to protect the Arab indigenous 
culture. The purpose and uses of television are not 
specified in most Arab states; when they are specified, no 
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provisions are made for their implementation. Arab 
television is mainly entertainment-oriented and is not 
effectively used for educational and cultural purposes; when 
it is, such efforts are fragmentary and not well planned. 
It is worth noting that the diagnosis and the results 
of the issue reported in this text are neither final nor 
absolute. Other studies might tackle the issue from 
different approaches and perspectives, and probably under 
different circumstances. Once again, to remind the reader, 
this study deals with the situation in the state of Kuwait 
as a case study for this research and Kuwait television as a 
model of Arab television. However, the situation and 
conditions might vary in other Arab states and not 
necessarily be the same. 
Other studies and research are strongly encouraged and 
recommended as a follow-up to this study. As mentioned in 
the beginning of this study, Arabic libraries lack sources 
in this field, and Arab studies and research into this issue 
are in extremely short supply. 
It is not claimed that the options and suggestions 
presented in this study are the only and best solutions to 
the problem. Certainly other suggestions which may not have 
been touched on within this study might be presented as 
additional solutions. This study's main concern is the 
relationship between television and culture. Different 
options from various perspectives might also apply. In 
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general, there is an urgent need for Arab studies and 
research to explore the many different ways that Arab 
television can contribute effectively, not only toward the 
preservation and protection of the Arab indigenous culture, 
but also toward its enhancement. 
The function of Arab television has to be re-invented. 
The Arab culture, through the television medium, must be re¬ 
discovered by the indigenous people who have their own 
style, technique and approach for survival. A cultural gap 
still exist between the people and broadcasting; there is a 
need to create programs that give authentic expression, to 
help in the process of confronting with westernization in 
order to preserve the national heritage. Such indigenous 
culture broadcasting must be connected to traditions, 
customs, values, and all aspects of art. 
However, it's worth emphasizing that preserving the 
Arab culture is not a responsibility of broadcasters and 
governments only. Rather it is a responsibility shared 
collectively, especially by scholars, clerics, historians, 
researchers, artists, and all educated people. 
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